





              

Abstract: The rapid development of information and communication technologies and their applications has stimulated
many definitions of an Information Society (IS), and the related concept of a Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE) from the
technological, political and economic standpoints. The ethics proposed for the emerging IS has concentrated on reducing
inequalities in access to technological developments.
In a key Report, “ICTs and Society”, Hofkirchner et al. (2007) insist that a new evolutionary, descriptive and normative
theory “for, about and by means of” the IS is necessary to support emergence of a moral, ecologically and globally
sustainable information society - GSIS.
This paper proposes a new kind of logic, a non-propositional, dialectic “Logic in Reality” (LIR), applicable to real systems
and phenomena, as the “missing ingredient” required for such a theory. LIR provides new interpretations of morality, self-
organization, communication and conflict, grounding them in physical reality and an appropriate information theory.
As a “logic of transdisciplinarity” in the Paris school acceptation, also directed toward the unity of knowledge, LIR confirms
that the techno-social field of study of ICTs and Society is a transdiscipline, with direct implications for sustainable
development. LIR moves debate beyond the limits imposed by naïve pragmatism and conservative ideologies and can be
an essential component of a critical theory.
Keywords: Cognition; communication; contradiction; dynamic opposition; information and communication technologies
(ICTs); information society; logic; morality; reality; society; sustainability; systems theory; transdisciplinarity
Acknowledgement: Parts of this paper have appeared in Chapters 1 and 2 and Appendix 2 of my book Logic in Reality,
published in 2008 by Springer Dordrecht. They are reproduced here with the kind permission of the copyright owner,
Springer Science and Business Media B.V., Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
 
his paper proposes the inclusion of a
new logical, structural and functional
principle in the theory of the structure,
functioning and objectives of the
developing Information Society (IS), and in
models of selected initiatives for application of
that theory. This principle states that the
communication, information and knowledge
processes in the various domains of the
Information Society are logical, in the sense of
a new extension of logic to the real world.
The current literature on information,
computation and their expression in society,
which reflects the explosion and
fragmentation of knowledge, is vast. Any
analysis purporting to identify any generally
applicable principle can only refer directly to a
minute percentage of it. On closer inspection,
however, theories of the IS tend to repeat a
relatively small number of underlying ideas or
concepts. These include spontaneity,
simultaneity and self-organization which play
key roles in the description and explication of
the partly intuitively perceived interactions
between agents and processes at various
levels of complexity. Although many theories
do not use standard bivalent logic or its
modern modal or deontic versions as such,
the basis of reasoning remains that of
classical logic, through the use precisely of
classical notions of categorial separation,
causality, determinism/indeterminism and
space-time.
 

The rapid and largely anarchic
development of information and
communication technologies and their
applications has stimulated many formulations
and definitions of an “Information Society” (IS)
from, especially, technological, political and
economic standpoints (Knowledge Politics,
2007). Theorizing about the IS and the related
concept of a “Knowledge-Based Economy”
(KBE) has focused on these aspects. An
ethics for the emerging IS has also been
proposed by collective work, especially at the
government level (World Summit on the
Information Society, 2005) which, however,
generally concentrates on bridging
inequalities in access to necessary
technological developments.
In a key Report (Hofkirchner, Fuchs, Raffl,
Schafranek, Sandoval, & Bichler, 2007), “ICTs
and Society” (below ICTs&S), Wolfgang
Hofkirchner, Christian Fuchs and their
colleagues at the University of Salzburg have
insisted that a new evolutionary theory “for,
about and by means of” the IS is necessary
and must be both descriptive and normative.
In other words, the major objective of the
theory is its ultimate use as a tool for
development of a moral, ecologically and
globally sustainable information society –
GSIS (Fuchs, 2006b).
The objective of this paper is to propose
that a new kind of logic, applicable to real
systems and phenomena, is the “missing
ingredient” required for a rigorous theory that
meets these requirements. I suggest that such
logic is the non-propositional, dialectic “Logic
in Reality” (LIR) that I have recently described
(Brenner, 2008a). In my opinion, this would be
an advance on currently available theoretical
foundations of a GSIS which use or refer to
theories of society, information and
economics in which the underlying logic is
essentially bivalent classical logic, a logic of
“exclusion”. Indeed, Barinaga and Ramfelt
(2004), quoting Castells, stated that one of the
challenges of the “network society” is that it’s
very logic is based on an idealized, one-sided
conception of society that excludes an
important part of the world population. In
contrast, Fuchs (2006a) suggests the need for
a new functional “logic of self-organization” in
another recent paper in this Journal.
Otherwise expert and comprehensive
analytical models of the KBE (Leydesdorff,
2006) fail to deal with normative aspects of
development, so that the “meaning” of the
meaning of information remains ambiguous,
without a moral dimension.
In this paper, I describe the essential
components of my “logic of and in reality”,
LIR, and show that it has the capability of
addressing and illuminating issues raised by
Hofkirchner et al. in their evolutionary
“Salzburg Approach”, as outlined in the
ICTs&S document. Starting from basic
principles, it founds a logical approach to a
theory of systems applicable to both groups
and individuals and their interaction, and to
the negative as well as the positive aspects of
current technological developments. It thus
supports efforts to disentangle ethical and
technological issues (Tavani, 2007). LIR
provides a new logical interpretation of key
concepts in social theory including morality,
self-organization, cooperation and conflict,
grounding them in physical reality and
authorizing logical inference. The term
“evolutionary” itself is discussed in terms of
similarities and differences with biological
evolution. LIR offers a logical explication and
expansion of Fuchs’ statement that nature
and society are both identical and non-
identical.
The Logic of and in Reality proposed in this
paper (LIR) permits new descriptions of the
underlying reality that current theories of the
individual and society purport to describe, as
well as the structure of the theories
themselves. It is hoped that the interpretations
provided may serve as templates for the
ordering by specialists in the various fields
and sub-fields of both theoretical and
practical, action-oriented approaches to
societal issues. Because this logical system is
grounded in and reflects the dualistic structure
of fundamental physical reality, it incorporates
a degree of transdisciplinary generality that
may 1) simplify certain problems by resolving
stalled debates about opposing concepts; and
2) provide in addition, through a more general
and “public”, non-sectarian concept of the
origin of morality, scientific support for an
appropriate ethics for the IS; and 3) authorize
the inclusion of concepts from both scientific
and non-scientific disciplines in a
transdisciplinary approach to a unity of
 

knowledge. The latter objective is in my mind
an essential part of a critical theory for the
development of the Globally Sustainable
Information Society.
Section 2 of this paper provides a brief
summary of the components of Logic in
Reality – its axioms, calculus and related
ontology and their integration into a two-level
framework for analysis. For detailed
applications in philosophy and science, the
reader is referred to the indicated publication.
Since it is proposed that the study of the
complex field of ICTs & Society is best
regarded as a transdisciplinary entity or
transdiscipline, Section 3 provides a view of
transdisciplinarity of which the LIR logic is one
of the conceptual pillars. LIR is a “logic of
transdisciplinarity” (Brenner, 2008b) in the
Paris school acceptation of transdisciplinarity
(Nicolescu, 2002). As such, LIR further
supports the proposal that the techno-social
field of study of ICTs and Society is a
transdiscipline or transdisciplinary, as it also is
directed, ultimately, toward a unity of
knowledge. In my view, integration into the
study of the concepts of logic and
transdisciplinarity in these senses is
necessary to raise the debate about the
Information Society beyond the limits imposed
by naïve pragmatism and conservative (not to
say neo-liberal) ideologies toward a
compassionate science.
Section 4 provides the LIR view of systems
and systems theory and shows that this
approach explicates and confirms many of the
systems-theoretic points made in the
“ICTs&S” document. With these tools in hand,
Sections 5, 6 and 7 show the application of
the LIR logic and ontology in three domains
that are critical to a TIS, namely, Morality,
Meaning and Conflict. These domains
correspond roughly to the three “pillars” of a
theory for the Information Society in the
Salzburg Approach – that of this Journal –
Cognition, Communication and Cooperation.
As will become even clearer, none of these
domains can be considered in isolation from
the others, and LIR provides a language for
discussing their relations in a rigorous
manner.
 
 
LIR is a new kind of logic (Brenner, 2008a),
grounded in quantum physics, whose axioms
and rules provide a framework for analyzing
and explaining real world entities and
processes. The term "Logic in Reality" (LIR) is
intended to imply both 1) that the principle of
change according to which reality operates is
a logic embedded in it, the logic in reality; and
2) that what logic really is or should be
involves this same real physical-metaphysical
but also logical principle. The major
components of this logic are the following:
• The foundation in the physical and
metaphysical dualities of nature
• Its axioms and calculus intended to reflect
real change
• The categorial structure of its related
ontology
• A two-level framework of relational analysis
LIR is based on the original work of
Stéphane Lupasco (Bucharest, 1900 – Paris,
1988) based in turn on the quantum
mechanics of Planck, Pauli and Heisenberg,
and subsequent developments of 20
th
century
quantum field theory. LIR states that the
characteristics of energy - extensive and
intensive; continuous and discontinuous;
entropic (tendency toward identity or
homogeneity – 2
nd
Law of Thermodynamics)
and negentropic (tendency toward diversity or
heterogeneity – Pauli Exclusion Principle) -
can be formalized as a structural logical
principle of dynamic opposition, an
antagonistic duality inherent in the nature of
energy (or its effective quantum field
equivalent) and accordingly of all real physical
and non-physical phenomena – processes,
events, theories, etc. (Lupasco, 1987). The
overall theory is thus a metaphysics of energy
and LIR is the formal, logical part of that
metaphysical theory. LIR is a non-arbitrary
method for including contradictory elements in
theories or models whose acceptance would
otherwise be considered as invalidating them
entirely. It is a way to “manage” real
contradiction, in a manner different from that
of paraconsistent, inconsistency-adaptive and
 

ampliative-adaptive logics, which deal with
formal contradiction alone.
The key postulate, as formulated by
Lupasco, is that every real phenomenon,
element or event “e” is always associated with
an anti-phenomenon, anti-element or anti-
event “non-e”, such that the actualization of
“e” entails the potentialization of “non-e” and
vice versa, alternatively, without either ever
disappearing completely. The point of
equilibrium or semi-actualization and semi-
potentialization is a point of maximum
antagonism or ‘contradiction’ from which, in
the case of complex phenomena, a T-state (T
for “tiers inclus”, included third term) emerges,
resolving the contradiction (or ‘counter-action’)
at a higher level of reality. The logic is a logic
of an included middle, consisting of axioms
and rules of inference for determining the
state of the three dynamic elements involved
in a phenomenon (‘dynamic’ in the physical
sense, related to real rather than to formal
change, e.g. of conclusions).
Based on this ‘antagonistic’ worldview, I
have proposed the following axioms which
‘rewrite’ the three major axioms of classical
logic and add three more as required for
application to the real world:
LIR1: (Physical) Non-Identity: There is no A
at a given time that is identical to A at another
time.
LIR2: Conditional Contradiction: A and non-
A both exist at the same time, but only in the
sense that when A is actual, non-A is
potential, reciprocally and alternatively.
LIR3: Included (Emergent) Middle: An
included or additional third element or T-state
(T for “tiers inclus”, included third term)
emerges from the point of maximum
contradiction at which A and non-A are
equally actualized and potentialized, but at a
higher level of reality or complexity, at which
the contradiction is resolved.
LIR4: Logical Elements: The elements of
the logic are all representations of real
physical and non-physical entities.
LIR5: Functional Association: Every real
logical element e – objects, processes, events
– is always associated, structurally and
functionally, with its anti-element or
contradiction, non-e, without either ever
disappearing completely; in physics terms,
they are conjugate variables. This Axiom
applies to the classical pairs of dualities, e.g.,
identity and diversity.
LIR6: Asymptoticity: No process of
actualization or potentialization of any element
goes to 100% completeness.
The real-world elements involved are
commonly termed ‘facts’ or extra-linguistic
entities or processes in standard conceptions
of reality.
In the LIR calculus, the reciprocally
determined ‘reality’ values of the degree of
actualization A, potentialization P and T-state
T replace the truth values in standard truth
tables. These values have properties similar
to non-standard probabilities. When there is
actualization and potentialization of logical
elements, their non-contradiction is always
partial. Contradiction, however, cannot take
place between two classical terms that are
rigorously or totally actualized or absolute,
that is, where the axiom of non-contradiction
holds absolutely. The consequence is that no
real element or event can be rigorously non-
contradictory; it always contains an irreducible
quantity of contradiction.
The semantics of LIR are non-truth-
functional. LIR contains the logic of the
excluded middle as a limiting case,
approached asymptotically but only
instantiated in simple macrophysical
phenomena and abstract contexts, e.g.,
computational aspects of reasoning and
mathematical complexity.
The third major component of LIR is the
categorial ontology that fits the above axioms.
Categories of LIR
Material
Energy/Quantum Field
Formal
Process
- Emergence, Closure and Downward
Causation
Dynamic Opposition
- Separability and Non-Separabilty
Subject, Object and Subject-Object
T-state
 

In this ontology, the sole material category
is Energy, and the most important formal
category is Dynamic Opposition. From the LIR
metaphysical standpoint, the elements of real
systems, phenomena or processes in which
real dualities are instantiated are not
separated or separable! Real complex
phenomena display a contradictory relation to
or interaction between themselves and their
opposites or contradictions. On the other
hand, there are many phenomena in which
such interactions are not present, and they,
and the simple changes in which they are
involved, can be described by classical, binary
logic or its modern versions. The most useful
categorial division that can be made is exactly
this: 1) phenomena that show non-separability
of the terms of the dualities as an essential
aspect of their existence, at their level of
reality; and 2) those that instantiate
separability.
LIR approaches in a new way the inevitable
problems resulting from the classical
philosophical dichotomies, appearance and
reality, as well as the concepts of space, time
and causality as categories with separable
categorial features, including, for example,
final and effective cause. Non-separability
underlies the other metaphysical and
phenomenal dualities of reality, such as
determinism and indeterminism (see below),
subject and object, continuity and
discontinuity, and so on. This is a ‘vital’
concept: to consider process elements that
are contradictorially linked as separable is a
form of category error. I thus claim that non-
separability at the macroscopic level, like that
being explored at the quantum level, provides
a principle of organization or structure in
macroscopic phenomena that has been
neglected in science and philosophy.
Stable macrophysical objects and simple
situations, which can be discussed within
binary logic, are the result of processes of
processes going in the direction of non-
contradiction (cf. Section 8.4.2 on “frozen”
dialectics). Thus, LIR should be seen as a
logic applying to processes, to trends and
tendencies, rather than to “objects” or the
steps in a state-transition picture of change
(Brenner, 2005).
LIR is thus a valid logical system with a
formal part –axioms, semantics and calculus;
an interpreted part – a metaphysics,
categorial ontology and a contradictorial, two-
level framework for analysis with applications
in philosophy and science. I distinguish LIR
from logics that employ standard linguistic
concepts of truth, falsity and logical
operations. Despite its application to the
extant domain, LIR is neither a physics nor a
cosmology. It is a logic in the sense of
enabling stable patterns of inference to be
made, albeit not with reference to
propositional variables. LIR resembles
inductive and abductive logics in that truth
preservation is not guaranteed. The elements
of LIR are not propositions in the usual sense,
but probability-like metavariables as in
quantum logics. Identity and diversity, cause
and effect, determinism and indeterminism
and time and space receive non-standard
interpretations in this theory.
LIR thus applies to all real dualities,
between either classes of entities or two
individual elements. Inter and intra –level
examples are theories and the data of
theories, or facts and meaning, syntax and
semantics. Others are interactive relations
between elements, relations between sets or
classes of elements, events, etc. and the
descriptions or explanations of those
elements or events. To repeat, LIR does not
replace classical binary or multi-valued logics,
including non-monotonic versions, but
reduces to them for simple systems. These
include chaotic systems which are not
mathematically incomprehensible but also
computational or algorithmic, as their
elements are not in an adequately
contradictorial interactive relationship. Such
relationships are characteristic of entities with
some form of internal representation,
biological or cognitive.
 
Of all existing logics, Logic in Reality is
perhaps closest to those of relational quantum
mechanics, in which provision is made for a
superposition of states that is something like
an emergent included middle, and which
involve non-standard probability distributions
of variables. Closer to the themes of this
 

study, however, is the natural logic of Grize
(1996), defined most simply as a logic used
spontaneously for customary reasoning
performed by means of everyday language.
The domain of application of natural logic is to
first person experience, and that of formal
logic to scientific observations. Natural logic is
thus always situated in a social context and is
not subject or topic neutral. Formal, classical
logic and the formal view of reasoning was
specifically criticized by Grize as taking place
in a closed domain, elaborated at some point
from facts, but without further relation to
reality. Grize also proposed natural logic as a
tool for the sociologist to help in the
understanding of his own dialogue, as well as
its differences with those of the physical and
natural sciences (Grize, 1994).
Fuzzy logics have been used in sociology
to some extent. However, compared to LIR,
they are still propositional logics centered on
truth values, subject to the same linguistic
paradoxes that are a consequence of the
need for a “limit” between truth and falsity.
They will not be discussed further here.
  

The philosophy of LIR can be very rapidly
characterized as a non-naïve dualism that
assumes a real, interactive relation between
all the classic dualities when they are
instantiated in reality. The simplest statement
of the LIR view is the following: the world is
both deterministic and indeterministic, in the
contradictorial relation suggested above. All
processes are deterministic, in the sense that
the trajectory of all particles could in principle
be followed since their creation; indeterminacy
is epistemological, not ontological. The
possible exception is that of the timing of
radioactive decay. I cannot state what, at the
nuclear level, the potentialities are that are
operative in radioactive decay in the same
way as I can describe the potential of the
carbon atom for forming covalent bonds, or for
people getting married. The apparent ubiquity
of such potentialities suggests their existence
at this level as well, but this does not affect
the further argument. The key idea here is
that of the ‘influence’ of the quantum level. It
is the potentialities that are the carriers of
dynamic opposition to higher levels and not
actualized quanta. In any event, effective
indeterminism at this level does not preclude
determinism at any other, but only that it is,
effectively, potentialized.
Other randomness is epistemological and
the cognitive result is a deterministic reality –
classically, necessity – dialectically linked to
the appearance of chance. Feedback loops
that result in the emergence of new qualities
or entities are not inconsistent with
deterministic causation since both
determinism and cause and effect must not be
understood classically, but in new, logical
terms (Brenner, 2008a).
Further development of LIR as a philosophy
or metaphysics is not possible here. The
reader may wish to keep in mind Hegel’s
dictum that the function of philosophy is to put
us in touch with the real, and that is certainly
also the objective of LIR. Zimmermann (2008)
indicates that the theory of evolutionary
systems still needs a metaphysics, a more
general and intrinsically speculative theory
that would serve as its foundation, and I
believe LIR could provide one.
 
In what follows, I will show how my logical
system applies to issues in the theory of the
Information Society (TIS) by resolving some of
the familiar “classic” dichotomies and
paradoxes that appear in the sociological and
systems literature. First of all, however, I wish
to show how LIR supports the
transdisciplinary approach to a TIS outlined in
the ICTs&S document. Several definitions of
transdisciplinarity exist, notably the one of
Gibbons and of Novotny and her colleagues
at the University of Zurich. This is a pragmatic
view centered on approaches to solving
concrete problems.
Transdisciplinarity, in the more universal
definition of Nicolescu (2002) concerns that
which is at the same time between, across
and beyond all disciplines, the things they
have in common. Its objective is the
comprehension of the current world, of which
one of the imperative necessities is a unity of
knowledge. It is a theory that places the
human being at the center of its
preoccupations, and, in my opinion, this view
 

has greater generality and is the one more
suitable to discussing issues in education,
ethics and other aspects of social theory. For
example, a key event in the application of
transdisciplinarity in education was the
International Congress in Locarno in 1997:
“What University for Tomorrow? Towards a
Transdisciplinary Evolution of the University.”
This event was sponsored by UNESCO and
The International Center for Transdisciplinary
Research in Paris.
The three conceptual “pillars” of
transdisciplinarity in the Nicolescu acceptation
are 1) levels of reality; 2) complexity; and 3); a
logic of the included middle, from which LIR
has been derived. The key relation between
disciplinarity and transdisciplinarity is that
disciplinary research tends to involve just one
level of reality, while transdisciplinarity is
concerned with the dynamics resulting from
the interaction of several levels of reality or
complexity at the same time. A good model is
in the work of the sociologist, biologist and
philosopher Loet Leydesdorff on the
interactions between the economic, political
and knowledge-based sub-systems of society
(2006) to whose theory of the Knowledge-
Based Economy I will refer later.
Logic in Reality, as discussed, is a logic of
transdisciplinarity in the acceptation of the
Paris Group. It is therefore a natural candidate
as an additional tool for research in ICTs and
society if this field, adapted to the needs of
contemporary society, is indeed a
transdiscipline. The unique function of this
logic and its ontology would be to establish
the structure of the relationships between
competing theories and disciplines and
thereby bridge the gap between them. In this
“logic of transdisciplines”, disciplines such as
humanities and social sciences are not
conflated in a differentiated unity but are
dynamically connected epistemologically,
changing one another and giving the
opportunity for the emergence of new
concepts.
The various applications of
transdisciplinarity to the development of the
TIS, such that ICTs and Society (ITCs&S) can
be framed as a “critical transdiscipline”, will
become apparent in what follows. I wish to re-
emphasize however, that the objective of
application of the theory should be to further
the normative development of a Globally
Sustainable Information Society (GSIS). If
transdisciplinarity as such becomes more
visible as a consequence, this is probably
desirable and does not need to be separated
from the primary objective.
The distinctions made by Hofkirchner et al.
between multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity
and transdisciplinarity are fully consistent with
LIR, and are in fact essentially the same as
those laid out by Nicolescu in his Manifesto of
transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu, 2002). However,
in significant contrast to other proponents of
transdisciplinarity, and I think to his credit,
Nicolescu lays the groundwork for progress in
the morality and ethics of the GSIS. Chapters
in the Manifesto deal not only with the
pragmatic opportunities that can result from
application of a transdisciplinary approach,
but its implications for a needed feminization
of society, the deviations and wrong turns that
are possible, the requirements for scientific
rigor as well as tolerance of opposing views
and the concept of a trans-cultural trans-
humanism. The advantages of the combined
use of transdisciplinarity and its logic will
emerge in the subsequent discussion.
As a final introductory note, I should
mention the Charter of Transdisciplinarity
which was promulgated at the 1
st
International
Congress on Transdisciplinarity held in
Arrabida, Portugal in 1994. Article VII of the
Charter states that transdisciplinarity is not a
new discipline, nor a new religion, new
philosophy, new metaphysics nor a new
science of sciences. It can be considered as a
process, a logical framework, a logic of
human experience, a rigorous way of thinking
about the relations and implications between
events and people’s actions, a language and
an approach. As Nicolescu states further, the
deontology of transdisciplinarity is based on
the inalienable rights of the inner person in the
context of the irreducible scientific and cultural
novelties of today’s world. Transdisciplinarity
is a coherent terrain in which effective political
will can be transformed by and into poetical or
artistic will, a true politics of civilization, a
civilized politics.
Today, initiatives in education based on this
view of transdisciplinarity are in progress in
 

Brazil, Romania and the Republic of South
Africa, among others. At the University of
Stellenbosch in South Africa, a firm link has
been established between transdisciplinarity
and sustainable development, in that it is one
of the first universities in the world to establish
a Ph.D. program in sustainability for which the
theoretical approach is transdisciplinarity and
complexity (Sustainability, 2008).
By incorporating the principle of dynamic
opposition (PDO) and LIR into the design and
construction of a theory of the Information
Society and its methodology, the theory can
be grounded in real social phenomena.
Transdisciplinary properties can be more
easily recognized and hence are available in
the formulation of the theory, avoiding excess
detail but facilitating consensus.
 
The purpose of this Section is to present a
model of social systems that incorporates the
transdisciplinary logic of/in reality, starting
from the basic physical principles originally
formulated by Lupasco. Like the LIR logic
itself, the model is grounded in the
fundamental dualities in nature and provides
for the emergence of new entities. The LIR
model of society is consistent with the basic
aspects of systems theory and views of logic
in relation to them expressed in the General
Systems Theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy
(1969).
The advantage of the LIR systems model is
that it provides (at least) one more
fundamental level of explanation to the far-
better known theories of Morin, Maturana,
Varela and their followers, including Eric
Schwarz, originator of the rather complete
“Neuchâtel Model” of autopoiësis and
autogenesis. Many of these intuitions are
correct, but my concern is that they can have
no significant impact on the way society
develops unless they are invested with an
additional scientific component. The major
criticism that I level against the systems
theoretic notions of Maturana, Varela and
Morin is that precisely because there is no
physical grounding for, for example,
intersubjectivity, the physical basis for morality
is absent. This is perhaps most striking in
Morin (1986), whose approach, like LIR, also
combines logic, epistemology and notions of
the basis of ethical behavior.
LIR would thus appear to be consistent with
the systems-theoretical approach of De Vree,
mentioned by Hofkirchner et al., in that it also
starts from physical considerations and also
avoids “cutting society free from the material-
energetic world”, a mistake made by
Luhmann. Because it is totally unfamiliar to
people accustomed to talking about
thermodynamics, however, I wish to re-
emphasize here that LIR incorporates an
additional key physical consideration, namely
the Pauli Exclusion Principle for electrons.
This Principle accounts for the potential for
formation of complex physical and biological
structures starting with atoms and molecules
and accordingly operates in a direction and
manner opposite to that of the 2
nd
Law of
Thermodynamics. In my Logic in Reality, I
show that thermodynamics alone, as
proposed by Prigogine and his followers using
the concept of dissipative systems far from
equilibrium, is insufficient to ground
emergence of systems at higher-level
biological, cognitive and social levels.
  
The LIR ontological approach to reality, as
originally laid out by Lupasco (1986), starts
from its simplest aspects, the existence of
more than one thing, of many things and of
their collection in more or less stable groups
or systems. I define systems as elements
linked by either some internal property, or by
the forces or operations that they express of
which they are or could be the agents. From
the dynamic view of reality discussed here,
the appearance of a principle of contradiction
(or its equivalent) in this line of argument, that
is similar to the one derived from
considerations of the dualistic aspects of
energy as such, supports the idea that there is
something of fundamental theoretical
importance about contradiction or
antagonism, physical dynamic opposition,
throughout nature.
There are three points to be made
regarding the existence of systems:
1) systems are not possible if there is no
force of repulsion or exclusion between
elements which prevents their “agglomeration”
 

into an undifferentiated mass, and not
possible if nothing attracts or associates two
or more elements; they all fly apart, so to
speak. (I consider here that repulsion;
exclusion and dissociation are equivalent
terms.) Accordingly, for a system to form and
exist, its constituents must be able, at the
same time, to both attract and repel one
another, associate and dissociate, to integrate
and disintegrate. Every system is therefore a
function of two antagonistic forces, linked to
one another, constituting a relation of
antagonism. Every interacting system, be it
nuclear, atomic, molecular or at the level of
the macroscopic objects of our senses is
always, in this view, a function of, in its
constitution, this relation of antagonistic or
opposing forces.
2) The second argument is similar to the
first: a system would not be possible if all its
constituents or elements were strictly
identical, strictly also meaning with relation to
their location and configuration in space-time.
They would be “confounded” in the same
continuity or homogeneity. No system would
be possible, either, if all elements were totally
heterogeneous, without some degree of
homogeneity that would prevent this diversity
not only from not being a system, but even a
class or set. Every system thus implies at the
same time homogeneity and heterogeneity.
The relation of contradiction is maximal as
identity and diversity approach equality. The
relation of non-contradiction thus depends on
the levels of both antagonism and identity. As
antagonism decreases, non-contradiction
increases and contradiction decreases.
3) The third concept that every system
requires the energy involved in its dynamic
relations in order to exist. All its constituents
and elements, according to the equivalence of
mass, energy and information, must consist of
energy
1
. Lupasco developed his “logical
algebra of energy” as a chain of implications
expressing the above, with the addition of
another key concept. Every energetic process
(or phenomenon) passing from a potential
1
The exceptions are the elements of classical
mathematics and all other abstract elements,
including semantic elements, such as paradoxical
sentences, in which the quantity of energetic
interaction is nil.
state to an actual state finds itself necessarily,
at a certain moment in an intermediate state
T, called the T-state, where it conflicts with the
antagonistic process passing from a state of
actualization A to one of potentialization P, as
indicated above.
Each of these three elements is an
antagonistic energetic duality or alternatively
an antagonistic conjunction. Each is a system,
and all more complex systems are generated
by such antagonistic dynamisms. Two types
of system imply a progressive actualization of
non-contradiction, and a third an actualization
of contradiction and potentialization of non-
contradiction, that is, movement toward an
emergent entity. These logical systems of
energy apply to all phenomena or aspects of
experience, from microscopic to macroscopic,
if it is agreed that antagonism and
contradictory values are irreducibly
constitutive of all real events. These logical
systems are the basis for the generation of
systems of systems, formally, by the
extension of the concept of actualization,
potentialization and T-state to the operation of
implication itself.
The first of these corresponds to
progressive homogenization, i.e., the 2
nd
Law
of Thermodynamics; the second to the
progressive actualization of heterogeneity, a
“systemogenesis” of living matter or life,
based on the existence of atoms and
molecules ultimately due to operation of the
Pauli Exclusion Principle for fermions; and the
third to the situation of maximum contradiction
applying to the quantum, cognitive and social
levels of reality. Finally, all these chains of
systems and systems of systems can be
considered as constituting dialectics and
dialectics of dialectics, generated by the
contradictory nature of energy and its
principles as outlined above. The critical
property of this model for this study is that it
includes, ex ante, a dialectic interaction
between the individual and the social group to
which he belongs.
The advantage of LIR for a theory of
systems, applicable to the reality of the
Information Society, is thus that it provides at
least a partial answer to the question of why
some systems self-organize, or display
autopoiësis, and others do not. Two concepts
 

adduced as attempts to ground these
phenomena recur frequently: the concept of
“spontaneity” and the related concept of
ontologically random behavior, with some
form of combinatorial selection to insure a
minimum incidence of emergence. This
displaces the problem: 1) it requires both
random and deterministic processes, without
explanation of why two should exist, tied back
to a still arbitrary “Big Bang”; 2) to define, as
Morin does, that a self-organizing process is
one in which each system creates its own
determinations and its own finalities raises the
further question of the minimum system,
which is viciously circular. Kauffman and his
colleagues have proposed (Kaufman, Logan,
Este, Goebel, Hobill, & Shmulevich, 2008)
that it is the smallest system capable of
executing one thermodynamic work cycle, but
the origin of this capability remains unclear. I
will not speculate here on the relation of these
views to some perhaps partly unconscious
bias to avoid determinism. This might be an
underlying dynamic in combinatorial views of
the structure of the universe (Kauffman, 1995)
or of ontology (Jacquette, 2002) but these will
not concern us here.
Morin (1986) describes a logic, “dialogic”,
that includes an element of Lupascian
antagonism: “Order and disorder are enemies:
one abolishes the other, but at the same time,
in certain cases, they collaborate and produce
organization and complexity. The dialogic
principle allows us to maintain duality at the
heart of unity. It associates two terms that are
at the same time complementary and
antagonistic.” His corollaries from this picture
are well known: recursion, non-linear cause
and effect, and a “new” part-whole
relationship. “Not only is the part in the whole,
but the whole is in the part.”
In another attempt at description of a
system, Morin suggests that the concept
homo is a triadic polysystem whose terms
(connected by single arrows) – Individual,
Species, Society – are at once
complementary, concurrent and antagonistic.
However, he then says that the “idea of
organization is a logical simulation, but as it
comprises a-logical elements (antagonisms,
emergents), it is equally the reflection of what
it simulates and what simulates it”. This
assignment of a non-logical character to
antagonisms is, of course, unnecessary in my
expanded definition of logic.
Another logical system to which reference
is often made in the systems literature is the
“logic of forms” of Spencer-Brown. The new
“virtual logic” described by Kauffmann (2002)
can be interpreted as a logic without a law of
the excluded middle. It is capable of handling
or systematizing a wide variety of problems
related to imaginary values in (Boolean)
mathematics and the geometrical
constructions of both Peirce and Spencer-
Brown (“Logic could be an encoded form of
geometry.”) In my view, the Kauffmann
discourse takes place in the domain of
classical logic, in which there is no basis for
giving meaning to the otherwise correct
statement that the system and its observer
are neither separate nor coincident.
Without going in this Prolegomenon into the
full history of logic in systems theory, the
absence of an appropriate physical basis for
the interactions described in the above
selections constitutes a weakness for their
application at the level of society. The
purpose of my critique is not to deconstruct
the often insightful remarks by Morin and
others on biological principles playing out at
the level of individuals in society. Morin is
correct when he calls for a meta-point of view
due to the inevitable self-reference (“self”- is
correctly used here; see next Section) of the
sociologist’s being embedded in the society,
as well as self-observance and self-criticism
to achieve a degree of “complex thinking”.
However, by excluding the necessary
dynamic physical grounds of the interactions
involved, Morin and his followers have not
only reduced their credibility of their systems
approach, but attempts to use it to ground an
appropriate morality for an evolving society
fail at the same time.
 
One concept to which the rigorous logical
approach of LIR can be applied is that of self-
organization. If I assume a standard definition
of a system, a self-organizing system is
defined as distinguished by the formation of
some states or entities arising from the
reciprocal or collective interactions
(encounters) between its components, quite
 

independently of outside inputs. LIR theory,
however, states that the critical terms of ‘self’
and ‘independent’ involve question-begging
assumptions, given its ontological sub-
category of Non-separability.
In a standard discussion of self-
organization, the encounters are, at least,
between elements that are really, as opposed
to analytically, distinct. The consequence of
any self-organizational process is the
constitution of emergence of a new form, or of
a restructuring, by complexification, of an
existing form. The problem is how this comes
about in the absence, by definition, of any
organizing entity. In LIR, however, the causes
of emergence can be seen to be the residual
potentialities in and of the elements that are
the effects of their constitution by prior
processes.
There are, in addition, mathematical
theories of self-organization. However, that is
just all they are – ways of showing how ideal
objects can organize themselves into more
complex states or structures. These will not
be discussed further as I consider that they
are not relevant to my current critique of a
principle of self-organization that allegedly
applies to physical, spatio-temporal entities.
Under these circumstances, the most
reasonable view is that self-organization is
not, in and of itself, a ‘self’-evident mode of
system formation and change. All systems
involving alleged self-organization also involve
some degree of organization-by-external-
agent, with the two are, again, in the LIR view,
dialectically related. Varela refers to
something like my view of self-organization
(1999) when he states that coupled non-linear
oscillators can give rise to kinds of self-
organization that result in the emergence of
neural structures from the component level. A
local-global interdependence is necessary to
understand the emergence. The components
“attain relevance” through their relation with
their global correlate.
In the further dynamical systems language
used by Varela and also by van Gelder, a
satisfactory description incorporates a role for
both stability and instability, defining both
stable and unstable regions in the phase
space of the system. However, the system
then, allegedly, flops spontaneously
(emphasis mine) between them even in the
absence of external driving forces, and by
definition, of any internal physical attractors.
One is left here with process concepts that
fail to describe the structure and the dynamics
of the relation or correlation. I suggest that the
critical step in the organization process is not
spontaneous, in the sense of uncaused by
outside agents, which the use of the particle
“self-” without qualification implies. New
organizational structures are the effective
consequences of the potentialities residing in
the components and/or introduced during the
original constitution of the natural system or
artificial experiment.
I believe this view supplements the
discussion of self-organization in society
proposed by Fuchs, in which the emphasis is
on a dialectical, emergent transition from
simple elements defined by one or two
parameters to more complex process-like
entities instantiating quality (or meaning, see
below). To repeat, LIR simply takes the theory
of self-organization and grounds it in (at least)
one lower level of reality, without the need for
invoking any non-causal spontaneous
processes.
  

Schwarz (1997) has presented a succinct
summary of the development of systems
theories, starting with General Systems
Theory. The further evolution of cybernetics,
due to the generalizations by von Foerster
toward second-order cybernetics, the
cybernetics of observing systems and the
elaboration of the notion of autopoiësis (self-
production) by Maturana and Varela have all
led to substantial new insights into the
“structure” of existence. Again, though, von
Foerster (Van de Vijver, 1997) talked only of
“circular causality” as a source of dynamic
development and self-organization and did not
propose mechanisms about the way
spontaneous (sic) order can emerge in nature.
The “Neuchâtel Model”, proposed by
Schwarz, places all these concepts, plus
those of autogenesis (the self-production of
rules of its production by an entity), in terms of
planes (or levels) of structures, information
and a totality. Schwarz’ model is useful in that
 

objects and laws are not separated and do not
appear to operate within the constraints of a
static, binary Aristotelian logic, but form
complex wholes which are existing (non-
physical) entities. His ontology generates
three basic epistemological categories for the
study of natural objects: objects, relations and
wholes.
However, Schwarz’ models are
epistemological, not ontological, the “idealized
patterns of a meta-language”. This language
does not apply directly to concrete real-world
systems, but rather represents the “production
processes by which the systems of the world
are made.” In contrast LIR, in particular in its
oppositional-energetic aspects, is intended to
apply to the real world directly. Through the
alternation of actualization and potentialization
of a phenomenon and its opposite, one can
give a reasonable basis for the dynamics of
the whole, self-referential or not, to which
Schwarz refers.
 

The reader may have remarked the
absence of any references to a literature of
logic in reality or of the detailed work of
Lupasco from which I have derived LIR, let
alone any application to current sociological
issues. The explanation is simple: apart from
the adaptation by Nicolescu and its
incorporation into his approach to
transdisciplinarity, there is almost none of
value.
The thesis of the sociologist Marc
Beigbeder (1971) is the exception. It is the
only book length work ever published that is
devoted solely to the theory of Lupasco and
its applications. Chapter VII, which occupies
more than half of the book, is a still fascinating
analysis of sociology and the logic of social
systems. Beigbeder presents pertinent
accounts of Lupasco’s work in relation to that
of Marx, Freud, Sartre, Lévi-Strauss,
Foucault, Althusser, Deleuze and Derrida,
among others. He praises the work of the
latter four, in particular, as contributing more
or less consciously and more or less directly
to the deconstruction of the prevailing
paradigm of a logic of macrophysical non-
contradiction. (Despite the clarity of these
authors, Beigbeder felt that in the absence of
more explicit references to the relation of logic
and their philosophy, “they leave us in a fog,
unless they convert us to some
sectarianism.”)
Beigbeder showed that the Lupasco logic
resolves the need for a separate psychology
and sociology, one for the individual and one
for the group. Due to the dynamic relation that
exists between them, neither individual nor
group should have their usual meanings; the
group is as much an identity as an
individuality, or set of individualities, and vice
versa. Both are dependent on movements
toward identity (homogenization) and toward
diversity (heterogenization), and as these tend
toward equal strength, both individual and
group can move from predominantly subject
or object and toward becoming a “subject-
object”, the locus of a degree of
consciousness of consciousness, or of what
one might call “group-individual
consciousness”. I feel this is quite a common
experience. In the dynamics of the group, the
concept of a pure individuality is a fiction, like
that of an isolated particle or member of a set.
The group – individual couple defines, and is
defined by their contradictory link, the
structure of a system of “individuals”; a
functionally antagonistic dualism whose
equilibrium, always in question, is made of the
dynamics of the conflict/cooperation between
the collective relative to the “individuals” and
the individual relative to the collective. The
higher the degree of internal conflict, provided
it is manageable, the greater may be the
creativity of the group. A society has a
comparable dialectic contradictory
complementarity between it and the sub-
groups and individuals that compose it
2
.
These ideas are supported by current work
in philosophy and metaphysics on a re-
definition of the individual, individuality and
discernability (Ladyman & Ross, 2007). As I
show elsewhere (Brenner, 2008a), the non-
separability of quantum particles, the fact that
they are both individual and non-individuals,
2
In a context of a standard logic of knowledge,
Rescher wrote “…it is by no means easy to
describe how group knowledge is related to
individual knowledge (2005)”. LIR explicates the
relation, cf. Section 6. on Knowledge.
 

has its counterpart at the social level for
human beings, who physically individual but
socially and economically “non-separable”.
This has immediate consequences as a
logical basis for “individual” moral behavior.
We can now see that LIR offers a logical
explication and expansion of Fuchs’ statement
(2006a) that nature and society are both
identical and non-identical.
 
Three types of societies, each with its
corresponding ethics, were described by
Lupasco as current (Lupasco, 1986b):
totalitarian societies and those “inspired by
Marxism” that are based on an ethics of
homogenization; democratic countries based
on an ethics of heterogenization. Totalitarian
regimes potentialize the ethics of
heterogenization and T-state, generating
conflicts that stimulate movements seeking
individual liberty and human rights, as well as
spiritual and religious needs. In democratic
countries, the ethics of the T-state, together
with that of homogenization, are also often
potentialized, provoking a search for
community life and greater general social
justice, as well as, again, a spiritual life. The
latter can be viewed as the source of the
attraction of all kinds of traditions, both in
legitimate and illegitimate forms (such as
sects). Democracies and dictatorships today
thus resemble one another in absolutizing one
form of ethics to the detriment of the two
others, potentializing an emergent equilibrium.
As a third category, societies that are liberal
(in the U.S. sense) are, certainly, more correct
and balanced but also focus on the concept of
“mass” and the privileging of social
categories, professions and patterns of
consumption.
Under these conditions (Nicolescu, 2002),
individual evolution and social evolution
condition one another. Individual evolution
does take place even in the absence of social
evolution, but social revolution, toward greater
balance between opposing forces, is
inconceivable without individual evolution.
Nicolescu stated that the contradictions within
democracy itself, which should be apparent,
require study and new forms of expression to
bring them into the collective consciousness.
“The challenges of all kinds – be they
irrational conflicts that permeate social life, the
destructive conflicts that menace the life of
nations, or the danger of destruction of our
own species – can be solved if the individual
and social co-evolution is respected.”
A social revolution, as referred to above, is
probably not possible in its “classical” form.
But the new availability of ICTs is of no use in
daily life unless accompanied by a revolution
in intelligence. Such a revolution “transforms
our individual and social life into an esthetic
as well as an ethical act, an act that unveils
the poetic dimension of existence. In our time,
an effective political will can only be an
affective poetic will.” Comprehension of the
transdisciplinary logic of reality, which
includes and explicates such a dimension, is
relevant to this objective.
  

The biologist E. O. Wilson has developed a
model of social evolution, based on insect,
animal and human data that accounts in its
current form for most of the dynamics of
individual and group selection. Most
importantly for this study, it describes the
origin and relative evolutionary success of
altruism or groups in which altruistic individual
predominate. His theory clearly acknowledges
the dialectic character of the situation in his
dictum: “Selfishness beats altruism within
groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups.
Everything else is commentary” (Wilson,
2007, p. 346). I call the attention of the reader
to the obvious, but usually ignored concept
that nothing in this picture is 100% true or
applicable in all cases; the LIR Axiom of
Asymptoticity holds.
A typical objection made against Wilson is
his claim that all phenomena, up to and
including the working of social institutions, are
ultimately reducible to the laws of physics. In
contrast, Mayr (2004) said that none of the
autonomous features of biology (and hence
the more complex ones of society) could
possibly be unified with any of the laws of
physics. It should be easy to see that the only
problems here lie in the definitions of the laws
of physics and of what constitutes reduction.
The LIR principle of dynamic opposition is
 

simply an aspect of laws of physics that has
been neglected, not something outside of
them; the principle explicitly excludes
“unification” as a criterion of application; and
reduction does not mean elimination of the
emergent aspects of biology, none of which
are completely “autonomous” given their
physical base at a lower level of reality.
It is also necessary to see that some of
those emergent aspects can involve the
dialectics of appearance and reality. The
balance between truth and manageable
falsehood, as Changeux has pointed out, is
what constitutes the reality of political
dialogue. It is a commonplace that politicians
lie, to a greater or lesser extent, every time
they open their mouths. LIR explicates this
phenomenon in logical terms, pointing the
way toward its more formal recognition and
possible reduction of the impact of some
demagogues.
  

The proposal of an evolutionary theory, in
this case, of the Information Society, should in
my view incorporate a definition of evolution
itself that reflects its dialectical and
contradictorial aspects. An evolutionary
perspective means more than a temporal
succession of phases shown by “self”-
organizing systems. It implies the presence of
additional features that found the process of
evolution: continuous as well as discontinuous
processes; the importance of context; and
both analog and digital codes.
The concept of code-duality as outlined by
Hoffmeyer (2000, p. 180) claims that the
dynamic mode is basically a semiotic mode.
What is essential is the “interdependence of
the analog and the digital as two equally
necessary forms of referential activity arising
like twins in the individuation of that logic we
call life.” Digital codes provide stable access
to the temporal world, and analog codes
provide the basis for interaction with the
world, other-reference and preference.
Through the introduction of the concept of
tacit cellular knowledge, Hoffmeyer provides
an antagonistic mechanism for the evolution
and higher development of living systems that
embodies some of the key concepts of LIR.
The tacit knowledge aspect of cellular (or
organismic) activity, the recognition
capabilities of macromolecules, Hoffmeyer
argues, is “the strangely overlooked key to
biosemiosis.” In the LIR view, it is the inherent
potentialized chemical properties in molecules
that correspond to ‘tacit knowledge’, as well
as the relations. They are arbitrary, in a
sense, but they are tied back to the
antagonistic categorial processes that
pervade existence. From this standpoint, even
digital codes have some residual potential
semiotic character, and one would be ill
advised to make the separation too absolute.
The ‘interdependence’ of analog and digital, is
an example of contradictional dynamic
opposition, one aspect being temporarily and
alternatively actualized at the expense of the
other, with the emergent organism playing the
role of an included middle.
Aerts has also applied his concepts, in
particular that of context-driven actualization
of potential (CAP) to a theory of evolution
(Gabora & Aerts, 2005). The basic idea is that
all entities evolve through a reiterated process
of interaction with a context. As before, the
interaction between context and entity leads
to indeterminism that defines a non-
Kolmogorovian distribution of probabilities.
This is different from the classical distribution
of chance described by a Darwinian theory of
evolution based on natural selection alone.
The Darwinian view is seen as materialist,
selection for “forms of concrete and actual
matter” - materially actualized states.
It is important to point out where classical
Darwinism is not incorrect. As Mayr has
shown, none of the major controversies in
evolutionary biology involving adaptation,
epigenesis, and the gradualness of evolution
bring into question the basic Darwinian
paradigm, since they deal with individuals or
populations, not with genes. But we are
concerned here, of course, with populations; it
should be clear that both processes are
operative (Mayr, 2004).
In this more general theory of evolution,
potentiality states, defined with respect to a
given context (superposition states in
standard quantum mechanics) co-exist with
actuality as the basis for context-entity
interaction, making possible in turn different
 

pathways for evolution that do not exist in the
classical sense. The general evolutionary
process is broadly construed as the
incremental change that results from recursive
CAP. Aerts believes that this theory of
evolution provides explanations for the non-
code-dependent processes of real evolution,
including other non-Darwinian, that is, non-
selective processes such as autopoiësis,
emergence and symbiosis, noting that the
concept of natural selection offers little in the
way of explanation for why biological forms
and phenotypes arise in the first place. A
model of an evolutionary process may consist
of both 1) deterministic segments, where the
entity changes state in a way that predictably
follows given its previous states and/or the
context to which it is exposed; and 2) non-
deterministic segments where this is not the
case.
The ‘pure’ randomness or indeterminacy
that is a necessary condition for Darwinian
natural selection is incorrect, but it is so not
because it does not exist, but because it is not
absolute. As we have seen, in LIR, potentiality
and actuality do not just ‘co-exist’, they
mutually determine one another, and
potentiality is not a formal superposition of
states, but a property of matter that, with
actuality, can define a third state as an
included middle/emergent process. Finally,
potentializations, as energetic phenomena,
should not be considered as non-material,
simply because non-actual.
Aerts correctly calls attention to CAP as
describing evolution in other domains, for
example creativity and culture, as requiring a
non-classical formalism given the possibility
for inheritance of acquired characteristics. The
consequence is that an evolutionary theory of
society, that is, one that describes how
society evolves, should also evolve according
to the same principles. Keeping in them in
mind facilitates their application. LIR supports
the view of Leydesdorff (2006) that models of
society no longer need to be solely historical
or grounded in an evolutionary metaphor of
survival.
As one saw the more-or-less rational forces
in play in the 2008 United States presidential
campaign competing with obscurantism, one
might ask if any scientifically valid social
theory could have the slightest effect on the
dynamics of this process. The question
contains its own answer. One may take hope
from the thought that responsibilization of
people is also an on-going process that does
not always fail, and that the “means of the
Information Society” provide a rapid
mechanism for circulation of the most
necessary information for political evaluation.
Any evolutionary theory of the TIS should be
able to explicate the dynamics of such
processes, including development of identity
as a counter to globalization in the sense of
Castells (2004)
3
.
 
In this and the next two Sections, I will
illustrate the application of the LIR logical
system in the three broad domains of interest
of Cognition, Communication and
Cooperation. It should be clear, especially in
view of the categorial feature of non-
separability in my ontology, that the division is
for purposes of descriptive clarity and
convenience, and that each of the three “C’s”
is in a dialectic relationship with the other two.
Thus although morality has its basis in the
cognitive structure of individuals, it is the basis
for cooperation, and obviously is dependent
upon communication.
There are many theories, far too many to
even catalogue here, that describe the
structure and evolutionary development of the
Information Society. With regard to ethical
principles, however, many of these theories
fail by excluding normative aspects
completely, or by providing only a formal,
mathematical basis for them that occults their
dynamics. I will refer to some of these in
Section 7 below on Conflict and Cooperation.
3
The major three-volume work of Castells,
published at the end of the last century, entitled
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture,
has proven extremely prescient. He sees society
as a complex system of networks that are a
consequence of the new information and
communication technologies. His views are very
relevant today in the LIR context because of their
reference to a “logic” of the network society and of
its dynamics.
 

 
An obvious requirement of any analysis
relating the development of the information
society to human values is a restatement of
those values. The normative aspects of any
theory should have these in the foreground
and not as a by-product of the analysis. I have
accordingly used the sub-title of the book by
Bhaskar, meta-Reality (2002), as the title of
this Section, since these are certainly values
everyone should be able to agree upon.
The work of Bhaskar and others has been
subsumed under the term of critical realism,
seen as a non-Marxist continuation of the
Frankfurt school of philosophy. While the
objectives of this movement are laudable, I
see a structural weakness in their method,
namely, a form of transcendentalism that, to a
hardened (non-reductionist) realist like myself,
seems naïve. According to LIR, if dualism is
“hard-wired” into reality, then the solution to
the problems of society cannot lie in
transcending its duality but to live it. The
former is what has been preached for
centuries and is still being preached in a
similar form, with the results that one
observes.
The systems approach should always
include, and can always benefit, from
reasoned and earnest restatements of ethical
goals. However, the value of such
restatements should not be diluted by
reintroduction of precisely those abstract
elements of binary logic that result in failed
explanations of the dynamics of society-in-
conflict.
 
Any normative theory for the Information
Society requires a correspondingly current
view of morality and ethics. Following Tavani
(2007), I define morality as a system of rules
for guiding human conduct and principles for
evaluating those rules, and ethics as the study
of morality, constituted by ethical theories.
Two key issues then appear: 1) are there any
unique moral issues associated with new
ICT’s or “cyber-technology”? 2) How do
various ethical theories relate to such
technological developments?
The answer to the first question in my view
is no. Nothing has “happened” to change the
core moral human values of life, liberty and
justice. Without going into detail here, the
most applicable ethical theory is almost
certainly a comprehensive one which does not
restrict the basis of morality only to inherent
virtue, Kantian duty, social utility or social
contract but involves aspects of all of them.
Once the requirement of absolute non-
physical cognitive individuality of human
agents is lifted, the overlap becomes obvious
and the differences ones of perspective only,
as is implied even in Kant: duty promotes
utility, but LIR suggests in addition that the
contrary is also operative.
In his book whose title is the title of this
Section, however, Magnani (2007) discusses
the changes that will be required in the
application of ethical theory. He calls for a
revitalization of research in ethics to achieve a
“long-range ethics of responsibility”, and
deserves credit for accepting, analyzing and
trying to prepare for the consequence of
technological developments leading to what
he sees as a fait accompli. He makes the
rather unusual argument that since the current
tendency is to ascribe high value to things,
one should value people as things, inversing
the Kantian maxim of the necessity to treat
people as ends.
Magnani suggests that the primary impact
of technology is effectively to create a man-
machine hybrid (human intertwined with non-
human in his rather, to me, chilling image).
This entity, however, has the same moral
obligations, defined as Kantian duties, as
humans have always had, but now primarily
related to knowledge, far more easily
accessible than in Kant’s day. People have a
right and duty to knowledge as such and as a
basis for action.
What kind of attitude should one take, then,
to people who say (sincerely?) that their
virtual “second lives” on the Internet are fuller
and more rewarding than their physical
ones
4
? We can apply here LIR and the Wilson
concept of selfish groups. Internet groups are
diversities that approach a limit of non-
4
Cf. Fuchs’ in-depth study of the use of
interactive sites by students, which appeared while
this document was in proof (Fuchs, 2009).
 

contradiction where there is a large number of
limited real interactions with other groups.
With participation benefiting only themselves
5
,
their future seems one of marginalization, if
not extinction. The obvious corollary is that
redefinition of the organization and functioning
of physical groups, e.g. political parties should
accompany evolution in cyber-space.
Magnani’s idea of treating people as partly
the machines that they are partly becoming is
worthy of consideration. The objective is
clearly not to reduce the human being further
to some kind of absolute impersonality, but as
a heuristic device (to be used with care) to
change fixed mental structures that are non-
dynamic and prevent consideration of these
necessary, if less attractive, aspects of the
current evolution. If the result is that existing
and new, more useful ethical relations
between people can be developed then the
exercise is worthwhile.
In line with the major thrust of this paper,
Magnani further points to the need for a new
logic of morality in a technological context.
Simple deontic logic fails to include the
relation up to and between internal intensions
and external structures on which moral worth
has been conferred. Magnani proposes a
variety of abductive logic, that is, inference to
the best explanation, that he calls
manipulative abduction. This refers to extra-
theoretical behavior involving communication
of new experience and its integration into
previously existing systems of experiment and
theory.
It is clear that appropriate ethical
knowledge and proper moral reasoning are
the basic conditions for maintaining freedom
and taking responsibility for one’s actions.
Knowledge as duty means here, then,
producing and up-dating ethical knowledge as
much as any other. The logic proposed is
directed essentially at reasoning processes,
that is, human intensional states with a
propositional content.
My thesis as outlined in this paper
introduces the new concept that a logic of
non-propositional entities up and including the
5
One thinks here of the multiplicity of Non-
Governmental Organizations competing to
participate in relief efforts after natural
catastrophes, straining logistic resources.
IS itself is also required, and that it is the
relations involved here that establish that
ethics. Let us now see how this works out in
one of the most difficult of all domains, that of
cognition.
  
In this Prolegomenon, I can only call
attention to the obvious point that any Theory
of the Information Society (TIS) requires a
suitable model of human cognition and mental
phenomena. If LIR applies to such a TIS, it
(LIR) should incorporate an appropriate theory
of mind, but this part of the theory has not yet
been formalized in detail. I can nevertheless
anticipate somewhat and say the following:
The central problem for a philosophy of
mind is to show how physical tokens, the
neuro-physiological processes occurring in
the brain, can give rise to mental tokens that
retain the properties of intentionality,
“aboutness”, individuality and some level of
causal powers or functionality. The weak point
in some current views (Esfeld, 2006) is that
physical and mental tokens must be identical
(identity theories of mind (ITM)). The LIR
principle of opposition at all levels of
perception, mental processing and action
gives the logical and scientific basis for saying
that something is the same and different, here
physical and mental tokens, in dynamic
opposition at the same time.
My claim is that the LIR contradictorial
picture of consciousness is a form of identity
theory that avoids the indicated difficulties by
the introduction of the principle of dynamic
opposition at all levels of perception, mental
processing and action. No new, independent
entities of the kind postulated in the various
forms of representationalism seem to me to
be required, due in part to the absence, in
such theories, of an adequate categorization
of the relation between internal and external.
It is the alternating actualizations and
potentializations derived from the initial inputs
that are our ideas, images, beliefs, etc.
In calling an LIR theory of mind a form of
ITM, the term identity is not to be understood
in some Leibnizian sense – body and mind
are identical, or some such interpretation. The
terms of body and mind can be retained,
 

provided that they are placed in the dialectical
epistemological perspective I have proposed.
A recent comprehensive systems approach
to a logic of mind, which is close in spirit to
that presented here, is that of Ignazio Licata
(2008). In his Open Logic of Mind, he shows
that a proper description of mental
phenomena as processes constitutes an
informal, non-propositional logical system that
shares many key features with Logic in
Reality, including its transdisciplinary
character, with insights from physics,
neurobiology and computer science. Thus
“The open logic of mind transforms
fundamental (Gödelian) incompleteness into
the emergent plurality of cognitive strategies
(2008, p. xviii)”. As in LIR, descriptions of
processes are also interactive processes, and
there is categorial non-separability between a
description and what is described. Complex
information (non-Shannon; see below Section
6.1) is always bidirectional and the
correspondence between systems bi-univocal.
LIR adds the conception of diversity grounded
in the Pauli Exclusion Principle and the
principle of dynamic opposition. These
provide the basis for non-linearity, non-
circularity and emergence and explicate, in
Licata’s phrase, “the non-local aspect of our
immersion in the world”.
Any theory of mind must, of course, also
deal with the origin of the intentional
uniqueness in first-person experience. At this
point in our knowledge, I believe the only
honest answer is similar to that of the weak
anthropic principle of reality: first-person
consciousness (Emmeche, 1997) is an
emergent higher order pattern that has both
causal power and a qualitative phenomenal
aspect. However, in LIR, a physical model is
provided of the locus of intentionality in the
dynamic interpretation of experience,
experience of experience and their on-going,
continuous and contradictorial interactions.
A significant consequence of the LIR form
of determinism is that it provides a basis for
morality without “free will” as it is usually
defined. My view is that free will exists, but
only as an appearance in the conscious mind
of an individual in opposition to and because
of her unconscious knowledge of her lack of
total ‘freedom’ - isolation from other
individuals. The issue of compatibility with a
deterministic universe is therefore a false
problem; individual responsibility for one’s
actions does exist, but its source does not lie
in free will, or the absence of it. There is a
reciprocal mutual instantiation of appearance
and reality that corresponds to the
contradictorial, LIR interpretation: appearance
and reality can never both be fully actualized
at the same time. The idea of a completely
free agent is a delusion, not unrelated to ultra-
conservative libertarian ideology.
However, if we as knowers are not totally
external to what is known by us, not
completely different from it, then I know that
there are other knowers that are part of my
known and vice versa. The source of human
dignity is in ourselves as knowers, but if we
avoid the error of solipsism, the origin of the
sense of moral responsibility can only come
from the relation to other knowers, in other
words, all human beings, and by extension,
other beings and perhaps even, as suggested
by Magnani, certain non-living entities
(Magnani, 2007). A contrario, one cannot find
responsibility in oneself as an isolated agent.
Since we are both a ‘not-other’ and an ‘other’,
a self-interest argument for morality holds.
The LIR position is thus that two or more
human individuals are also systems in the
category not only of Subject-Object, but that
of Non-separability. An individual is no more
isolated logically, psychologically and morally
than he or she is economically. It is because
our will is not free that we must try to insure
the viability of the environment and so on.
To conclude this Section, a discussion of
which is more appropriate - a more
conceptual or formal mathematical approach
to a theory of the Information Society on the
one hand, or a dialectical approach that is
context-sensitive on the other - is far from
academic. As we have seen above, if one
relies solely on a conceptual dialectical
underpinning of ethics, one is open to the
attack that the conclusions, available
methodology and derived programs are
hopelessly idealized. Such a discipline could
perpetuate nothing but itself.
I claim that only a framework like LIR that
can include both the conceptual and dynamic
systems approaches without conflation can
 

provide for the actual dynamics of the
werdende (becoming) Information Society.
Continuing Lupasco’s initial critique of Hegel
as having ignored the via negativa, and his
insistence on the logical character of messy,
unpleasant, and unjust phenomena, my
approach attempts to insure that these have a
logical and therefore equivalent scientific
status to the others.
 

A theory of the Information Society (TIS)
will obviously incorporate some theory of
information and of communication of
information. One can distinguish between the
science of information and information
technology, and a science of an information
society. The former are disciplines that can be
defined relatively simply. The latter is a
transdiscipline, for which the more awkward
denomination as a science of a society in
which information and communication
technologies are dominant is perhaps more
accurate. In this Section, I will show that the
logic I am proposing can help to disentangle
the closely related concepts of information,
knowledge and meaning and their roles in the
development of a coherent TIS.
The recent definition of the operation of
social systems, which began with Giddens’
methodological concept of “duality of
structure”, has received further explication
through Leydesdorff’s evolutionary
substantive perspective. LIR can be seen as a
further stage in this intellectual process, as a
logical “dynamics of duality”. It is a potentially
novel way of addressing the interdependence,
mentioned by Luhmann, of theories of
systems, communication and evolution,
without his requirement of self-referential
closure (1989).
Communication involves both the
information communicated and the
communicating system. One may first ask, as
I did above regarding morality, if there are
fundamental changes in progress in what is
communicated. My answer, given the outline
of the LIR theory of mind, is that the
messages have not changed any more than
has the intentionality of the communicators:
lovers communicate love, and haters hate,
etc. What have changed of course are first the
access of individuals to information; the
structures of the society and the context in
which communication takes place; the
technology used and the volume of
communications. In addition to these factors,
second-order complex phenomena appear
due to interactions involving communication
systems themselves. I will show that LIR is
well placed to describe these phenomena.
As a final introductory point that exemplifies
the LIR standpoint, I propose that it can be
useful to speak of “communicating” as well as
communication, to emphasize its process
aspects. Please note that I do not view the
two terms as “interchangeable”, that I can just
exchange one for the other. This is a typical
binary interpretation. Both terms are
necessary, corresponding to underlying
dynamics that are connected dialectically, with
one or the other preferred or predominating,
as the case may be.
  

The theory of information that I will assume
in this paper is compatible with the logic of/in
reality and cuts through much of the debate
about what information is and is not. The first
point is that information is not primitive; there
must be physical systems and properties for
there to be any information. Information thus
both is and encodes energy, and its apparent
“insubstantiality” can be rejected since there is
not an absolute dichotomy, in LIR, between
the abstract and the concrete, between
substance and structure.
As is well known, Shannon-Weaver
information theory looks only at the capacities
of channels for transmitting information in
which the quantitative measure is relativized
to initial uncertainty in the receiver about the
source. To use Ladyman’s term (Ladyman &
Ross, 2007), I am using a “stringently
naturalistic metaphysics” to clarify the
conceptual anarchy around ideas of
information and Shannon and general
thermodynamic entropy. In this book, Collier
proposes the term of “logical depth”, defined
as algorithmic compressibility as studied by
computer science to provide a measure of
informational non-redundancy.
 

The addition that I make to the Ladyman-
Ross-Collier picture is to extend the concept
of logical depth in the direction opposite to
that of a solely objective measure of
informational content in the abstract non-
thermodynamic sense. The values of
actualization, potentialization and T-state are
also properties of structural models of real
patterns, that is, the process entities of
interest. In particular, the LIR approach is
more general since it refers to real non-
Markovian processes involving information
transfer (communication) for which algorithms
are not available. Elsewhere, I have referred
to this domain as one to which a “logic of non-
computability” applies, that is, LIR (Brenner,
2008c).
 

In the epistemology of LIR, the principle of
dynamic opposition (PDO), applied at all
levels to the various entities considered as
processes defines a hierarchy in terms of
complexity of interaction, both internally and
externally.
Kauffman, Logan and their colleagues
propose a new reading of information that
unites matter, energy and information
(Kauffman, Logan, Este, Goebel, Hobill &
Shmulevich, 2007) that is consistent with this
picture. They show that neither the Shannon
definition of information as a scalar quantity of
bits, devoid of meaning, nor Kolmogorovian
information which refers to standard
probability distributions of non-interactive
systems is applicable in biology. Information
should be designated as ‘instructional’ or
‘biotic’ in the sense that it carries meaning and
consists of constraints or their physical
equivalents - boundary conditions that also
partially cause events. Most importantly, the
coming into existence of the constraint is itself
part of the propagating organization of the
entity. “Constraints are information and
information is constraints.” This recursive
aspect is characteristic of non-Markov chains,
the non-Kolmogorovian probability behavior of
two mutually dependent entities to which LIR
applies.
Accordingly, one can write:
• Shannon/Weaver Information
Meaning 1 Knowledge (or
Knowing):
• Kauffman/Logan Intensional (or
“Biotic”) Information Meaning 2
Knowledge of Knowledge (or
Knowing) Meaning 3
Meaning 1 is inherent in information as a
constraint/potentiality at non-cognitive levels
of reality. Leydesdorff calls this a “first
codification”. Knowledge enables codification
of the Meaning 1 of information, and this
knowledge can be further codified.
At the cognitive level, information (and its
meaning) is organized into knowledge and
acquires Meaning 2 that subsumes normative
and other values. My logical system applies to
both Meanings 1 and 2, since the origin of the
former is also in basic physics. Knowledge is
however more than just a classification; it is
also a process of "knowing", and should not
be reified. Meaning 2 will be present not only
with knowledge but also within the process
of knowing (human and animal). At the human
level, one has knowledge of knowledge and
knowing of knowing (human only), and
meaning of meaning. Knowledge and
knowledge of knowledge are related
contradictorially, that is, when one
predominates (is actualized), the other is
predominantly potentialized and vice versa,
alternately and reciprocally. I associate, with
knowledge, Meaning 2 in order to say that
knowledge, in contrast to Information, also
has higher-order moral or esthetic aspects. By
adding the step Meaning 2 --> Knowledge of
Knowledge --> Meaning 3, the feeling that
Knowledge of Knowledge also has Meaning is
captured, without their having to be
identical. In other words, at this level, which I
insist is not about abstractions but real
processes, Knowledge of knowledge and
Meaning 3 are themselves in a contradictional
interaction, in the sense that when I focus on
one aspect, the other is repressed (or
potentialized)
LIR brings the “missing ingredient” of
dynamic opposition or antagonism that
reinforces this picture of information for the
evolution of living systems. It provides a
 

cybernetic explanation of how constraints-as-
information in their physical manifestations
can be causally effective when identified with
the residual potentialities of all material
structures more complex than an isolated
quantum particle. By locating the causal
powers of constraints in the physical
potentials available “from the bottom up”, one
has at least part of an explanation of why
structures, up to and including social
structures, have the properties they have. The
assumption of “auto”-catalysis and totally
“spontaneous” processes is unnecessary, as
discussed. (In this connection, using the same
argument as that presented above, we can
introduce the term constraining in addition to
constraint, the participle giving a more
accurate description as a process.)
Any theory of biological development or
becoming must capture the duality of
biological systems, that is, the composition of
living systems by non-living substrates. This
can be presented as the existence,
concomitantly and contradictorially, as the
presence of a cybernetics of macroscopic
matter and one of biological matter. In the
absence of a logic that defined their
existence, there has been little justification for
such a distinction. One can then look at the
unique relation between these two cybernetics
and the quantity of information present, as
follows: in physical systems, with the increase
in positive entropy, that is, homogenization,
the quantity of variety or information
decreases in direct proportion. Biological
phenomena, from this standpoint, are highly
improbable, and their information content
should also increase in direct proportion to the
negentropy generated.
From the standpoint of the living system
itself, in its dissymmetrical equilibrium with
inorganic matter, the production of negentropy
has a higher probability, and the amount of
information should decrease in proportion
(Lupasco, 1986a). Improbable and hence
information-rich ‘homogenizing’ perturbations
provide the information that initiates the
control loop, permitting the information-poor
system to maintain its heterogeneity (repair
itself, etc.).
Information can thus vary directly or
inversely with the quantity of negative or
positive entropy being produced, according to
the relative probabilities of homogenization or
heterogenization. At the microphysical and
cognitive levels, entropy and negentropy
result in increased quantities of information,
since the probability of any dominant
development of either homogenization or
heterogenization decreases or is blocked (but
their contradictorial coexistence has a high
probability). This is another way of describing
the decrease in indeterminacy with increased
contradiction that is a corollary of the PDO.
These definitions of knowledge and
knowing emphasize, if need be, the limitations
of standard conceptions of knowledge. This
was illustrated for me at a recent conference
(World Knowledge Dialogue, 2008) at which
almost all discussions of knowledge referred
to more and more complicated ways of
handling data and data bases. In the LIR
model, in contrast, the formal locus to
meaning at the level of recursive knowledge
can function as a basis for some form of
“wisdom”, leading to the possibility of
emergence of a “wise” society.
 
 
 
The third component of the target theory of
the Information Society (TIS) is the process by
which information, knowledge and meaning,
as defined in the previous Section, is created
and transferred, that is, communicated in the
society The concept of what a society is
involves more than communication of
information alone by a simple “sender” to a
“receiver”. This would amount to a static,
binary input/output model in which there is no
reflexive loop between sender and receiver.
The process of effecting any real
communication changes both actors
6
, and it is
this change that confers higher levels of
meaning on the message. LIR brings out the
dynamics of the communication process,
“communicating” and of what is
communicated in logical terms.
6
“Dynamic” propositional or predicate logics of
belief change lack the tools to describe such
changes.
 

The evolution of society and the economy
from ones in which an information sector
became important enough to be defined as
such to more complex concepts that integrate
the various aspects of information processes
and their communication has been carefully
studied and documented by Leydesdorff
(2006). He provides a sufficiently complex
model of the dynamics and sub-dynamics of
communication in the KBE and KBS to
address all the issues of importance for the
target TIS. Concepts and interpretations from
LIR complement his theory with the necessary
normative principles tending toward a GSIS.
First, however, I will add my critique to his of
the views of Luhmann on communication and
society because it helps to illustrate the LIR
standpoint.
 

Luhmann deserves historical credit for his
effort to place a theory of society on a firmer
basis than that provided by classical
“input/output” models or naïve uncritical
analogies with the standard terminology of
biological evolution. Luhmann gained his
reputation through his detailed analysis and
description of the key role of information in
society (“Society is grounded in
communication.”), using ideas derived from
the systems theory and the autopoiësis of
Maturana, Varela and others. He referred,
among other things, to the importance of “third
or fourth generation cybernetics” and
polyvalent logic. However, as Priest has
shown, polyvalent logics do not even provide
as adequate a description of real
contradictions as paraconsistent logics, which
themselves retain substantial classicality
(Brenner, 2008a).
Thus, unfortunately, Luhmann’s
interpretation of systems theory of and
applications of it to sociology was more
dependent on its weaknesses, some of which
I have described above, than its strengths.
Summarizing very rapidly in LIR terms,
Luhmann’s functionalist conception of society
as communication described social systems
as consisting of communications and their
attributions as actions. Communications are
operations which cannot be observed directly,
but one can make inferences about them by
testing hypotheses against the observable
interactions among the agents. The
communications and agents are strongly
coupled and therefore the states of the agents
can be used as indicators of the evolving
communication processes among them. This
model in terms of isolated (closed,
autonomous) sub-systems excludes the
human subject and in my view reflects
standard categorial notions of exclusivity and
exhaustivity.
Fuchs (2006a) makes the statement that
“The function of Luhmann’s theory for society
is that it is completely useless”. I note first that
Luhmann himself would probably have
considered this statement paradoxical, but
that it is perfectly logical in the LIR system:
the theory’s uselessness is predominantly
actual, but it has the potential for some
function that can become actual under the
right conditions.
Extending this view, I find that Luhmann
neglected the relation of the dynamics that
must be present for a dialectic logic such as
LIR to operate. If two elements, processes,
theories, etc. are not dialectically interactive,
then the applicable logic is binary, bivalent, of
an excluded middle, whatever. The whole
conceptual structure of Luhmann of meaning
as a difference making a difference (see next
Section) and related notions seem to me to
miss this point. If two notions were never in an
adequate contradictorial relation, and
Luhmann’s functionalist definition of isolated
systems insures this, then they are not, in my
opinion, contradictories at all.
When one states that something (a "ground
of being") is at the same time potentiality and
actuality, this is not LIR but paraconsistent
logic. Similarly, meaning cannot be a unity of
actualization and potentialization (or re- and
re-). In unity, the two lose the necessary
alternance. "Society" does not "contain"
human beings, but society is a group of
human beings, composed of individuals and
the group, and their contradictorial relations
and dynamics. Luhmann took human beings
as agents out of his system, and replaced
them with abstractions. As Leydesdorff
shows, Luhmannian structures can be defined
analytically, but that is not sufficient for a TIS.
 

Just as it is incorrect not to see an
interaction where there is one, it is incorrect to
talk as Luhmann does about a binary code in
connection with self and other, and ignore an
interaction that has been present ab origine.
Luhmann specifically stated that a third term
is required in social systems, and the reader’s
immediate reaction might be that this is an
emergent included middle in the sense of LIR!
“The logic of the world, however, can only
include excluded third possibilities” (Luhmann,
1995). In LIR, however, no "third" has to be
"reincluded" since it never disappeared in the
first place. In fact, thirds are not things that
are "included" as if the term came from the
active verb. They are emergent phenomena,
"included" only in the sense that one
visualizes them in configuration space as
positioned somewhere in between the lower
level entities.
According to Laflamme (2008), Luhmann’s
approach provides a basis for morality that
would make it significant for this study, as she
quotes his grounding of morality in a self-
referential processing of meaning into
symbolic generalizations “that others accord
with the expectations one believes must be
assumed for social relations to continue.”
However, Luhmann stated that these
considerations are “functional abstractions”, in
line with his overall analytical approach.
These limitations appear in another aspect
of Luhmann’s work that has contributed to its
attraction, namely, his analysis of law, that is,
jurisprudence (1989). While correctly seeing
the systems aspects of the judicial process,
rather than some kind of input/output relation,
Luhmann’s reification of the resulting system
and its theory reduces its applicability. “The
concept of the autonomy of the judicial system
cannot be formulated at the level of (causal)
relations of dependence and independence.”
It describes nothing else than the operational
closure of the system as a condition of its
openness. Such a theory however cannot be
convincing unless it is capable of determining
precisely in what the specific closure of the
system consists and how this conditions its
openness.” We can give Luhmann credit for
some intuitive notion of the relation between
closure and non-closure, except that it leads
him to a conception of normativity that is
nothing more than an artificial, factitious form.
It is not that Luhmann did not see
exceptions or intermediate situations outside
his absolute categorizations of closed sub-
systems in society; it is that he failed to assign
to them any fundamental ontological
importance: “One must conclude, in a realist
perspective, that the law adapts itself (sic) to
dominant interests …” (Luhmann 1989). With
such a radical pluralism or dualism, as Fuchs
has pointed out, Luhmann was unable to
explain how society as a, for him, abstract
construction and nature, including human
subjects, could be related in the obvious
dynamic sense they are. Logic in Reality
enables a dialogue on the nature and extent
of the dynamic interactions of individuals and
social groups, as I have shown. From a
technical standpoint, Leydesdorff confirms
that the binary codes used by Luhmann are
too abstract for sociological analysis (2006).
 

Some commentaries suggest that the term
“Information Society” is too opaque. Our
target theory might be designated as one of a
“Knowledge Society” rather than “Information
Society”. This seems to me an unnecessary
complication at this stage, however, provided
the broader concept outlined above of
information as having (or being) normative
meaning is kept in mind. Accordingly, for the
purposes of this Prolegomenon, I propose to
differentiate between the Knowledge-Based
Economy (KBE) and the Knowledge-Based
Society (KBS) only by reference to the values
of the meanings associated with information
and knowledge. The KBS is then the KBE
plus the information and knowledge
components to which an economic value
cannot be assigned easily or at all. Consistent
with the overall LIR view, neither of these
values is “pure”, although the coupling, e.g.
between monetary and esthetic value
becomes increasingly complex as one goes to
these higher levels of cognitive activity. The
basis of the value of works of art is itself an
enormous subject that can only be mentioned
here. However, to the extent that esthetic
values are important as, also, human moral
values, they should be included in any
satisfactory theory of the Information Society,
 

and this is of course possible in a
transdisciplinary framework.
In his 2006 study, Leydesdorff provides an
extensive overview of the historical and
technological factors defining the properties of
a Knowledge-Based Economy and how it is to
be distinguished from its historical
predecessors. His analysis starts from the
position that the market and the political
system contribute two sub-dynamics to the
dynamics of our social system. Organized
scientific and technological knowledge
production and control have by now added a
third sub-dynamic. Interactions between these
sub-dynamics lead to a complex model due to
differing time scales of evolution, historical (for
technology) or instantaneous (for the market).
Leydesdorff sees the sub-dynamic of
knowledge as analytically different and
orthogonal to older economic systems and
their communication and control structures.
The large and rapid influxes of knowledge
create an emergent dynamics of expectations
or anticipations that determine the further
evolution of the KBE. In addition, these
interactions in and of themselves contribute to
the generation of a knowledge base.
Leyesdorff’s thesis is that above a certain
level of complexity of interactions, recursive
and hyper-recursive processes take place
essentially involving only the systems
themselves. In particular, communications
systems, the “links” of the network, “process”
information differently from human action
systems considered as the “nodes”. The three
scare quotes I have placed represent my view
that not only should such links and nodes not
be discussed as if they were independent, the
interactions between links and nodes involves
the principle of dynamic opposition, in which
one or the other feature predominates.
The processing of information (Shannon-
type) and the processing of knowledge exist in
a “two-layer” or two-level relationship,
dependent on each other because of
couplings. The former can be slowed or
accelerated by the processing of meaning and
knowledge. When the various processes and
sub-dynamics are distinguished analytically as
independent operations, the respects in which
a development is increasingly knowledge-
based can be studied.
Logic in Reality contributes to this picture of
a “knowledge-dependent” society by placing
the processes involved and the terms used in
a logical, dialectical framework. For example,
LIR defines reflexivity and recursion with
reference to the way in which processes
develop between contradictory alternatives in
both the epistemological and ontological
domains. Systems, like the other entities
involved, are both real and abstract, like other
creations of the human mind. In LIR, the
included middle (T-state) that emerges from
interactions of maximum contradiction or
antagonism immediately enters into dialectic
relations as a substrate for further interactions
and possible emergence of a T1-state. Thus,
the result of an interaction in relation to an
event can be considered as another event.
A further contribution that LIR can make is
to clarify the relation of the participant in and
the observer of the sociological enterprise.
Luhmann’s communication-theoretical
approach in sociology can still be read as a
meta-biological model, but the problem
remains of finding an adequate meta-biology.
As stated by Leydesdorff, Habermas
appreciated Luhmann’s distinction between
psychic and social systems, but he challenges
us to bring the critique of metaphysical issues
(of providing meaning to events in a
dialectics) back into a meta-biological
perspective that processes meaning without
intentionality, that is, as a scientific
objectivation. How can one think both these
metaphysical and meta-biological
perspectives?
According to Habermas, intersubjectivity
cannot provide meaning to events at the
supra-individual level when the sociological
model is defined only in terms of social
systems theory as he knew it. The human
subject and the social system are then only
coupled in an objectified interaction among
these systems. Both Luhmann and Parsons
would thus have reduced intersubjectivity to
interpenetration as a systems operation
without sufficient appreciation of the
normative and affective components that bind
people together at the communal level. As put
by Leydesdorff, the perspective of a meta-
biological system and one of metaphysically
based intentionality can be seen as the two
sides of the interface between social systems
 

and psychological systems. If the social
system is distinguished (considered totally
independent of) the psychological units
carrying the system, the intentionality at the
level of the social system cannot easily be
defined, and thus the social system tends to
be objectified. As long as society is
considered as integrated in persons, the
tensions between the two types of meaning
processing (that is, of the social and psychic
systems respectively) could be resolved as
meaning shared ex ante within a community,
but not necessarily as the result of interaction.
However, the sub-dynamics on both sides of
the interface contain feedback loops, and thus
a non-linear dynamics of meaning can be
expected when the two systems bifurcate
within the complex overall communications
network of the society. In other words, one
distinguishes between the reflections among
systems and the (hyper-) reflections within
systems as different operations
7
.
Leydesdorff proposes a mathematical
perspective to bridge the gap between the
meta-biological and metaphysical
perspectives by specifying (describing) the
additional degrees of freedom involved. LIR
provides a logical bridge. The significance of
the Leydesdorff approach in LIR terms is that
the hyper-incursive routine of a knowledge-
based system remains the result of the
intentionality of the carriers. This not sufficient
for the emergence of a new form of
expectations (or intentionality) at the systems
level, but requires dialectical interactions with
the weak anticipations in social formations to
develop into a differentiated communication
structure.
  

Leydesdorff is aware (2008) that the above
theory includes no explicit discussion of
7
Habermas (1985, p. 5) appears to have had a
strong intuition of the failure of theories based on
separability: “But this concept (the transcendental
“ought”) only exemplifies the contradictions that the
firm distinctions between facts and values,
empirical being and transcendental validity, nature
and culture, seek in vain to resolve.” The LIR
approach, summarily, is to change firm distinctions
to firm interactions.
normative aspects of knowledge production
and communication. Normative aspects have
been excluded not because they are not vital,
but due to the focus imposed by the
methodology. In fact, he follows Luhmann in
considering normative properties as
associated with (integrated into) only
“historical contingencies” such as
organizations and individuals. “At the level of
the social system, one expects this integration
to be counterbalanced by the self-organization
and functional differentiation in the fluxes of
communication. This changes the notion of
intentionality at the supra-individual level. The
latter would be analytically orthogonal to
individual intentionality”. Leydesdorff cites
Husserl to suggest that the intersubjective (at
the higher level) is qualitatively different from
the subjective. Completely?!
Taken to the limit, this analysis would
suggest that the social system is a-moral,
something that we have produced, worse than
a Golem, a system of fluxes over which we
have little or no control. Leydesdorff is right in
one sense; society does, unfortunately, have
these aspects, but they are neither
fundamental nor exclusive. It is therefore
important not to consider them so if one
wishes to have any reasonably positive effect
on the course of events, starting at the
educational level.
The LIR approach, to take just this specific
point, is to insist on qualitative overlaps
between individual and supra-individual
intentionality, with both being expressible in
terms fluxes, trends, tendencies, etc. It is the
logical and categorial basis for the non-
separability of all the relevant dualities active
in the society, knowledge based or not –
subjective/intersubjective; individual/group;
autonomy/inclusion and even normative/non-
normative and knowledge/ignorance. It is this
interpretation of all of the normative aspects of
information, communication and meaning that
should be applied to the direct dynamics of
conflict and cooperation.
To repeat once more, the purpose of talking
in terms of the logic of/in reality is to help
insure a realistic model of the society in which
positive and negative tendencies interact and
overlap, and that the latter are assigned their
proper dialectic role. As an example, I note
 

two new social-structural trends in the United
States, both in principle concerned with the
environment: one is the development of
Conservancy Groups, the other the so-called
Cultural Creatives movement.
The former are relatively informal
transdisciplinary groupings of people expert in
fields of botany, ecology, economics, finance,
management, architecture, education, politics
and art history, among others. Conservancies
have the objective of preserving significant
parts of the commons such as parks (New
York, Pittsburgh) and indeed entire ecological
regions, as the Conservancy for Western
Pennsylvania.
The latter advertises itself as consisting of
informal groupings, linked by the Internet, of
new political progressives, categorized by the
movement’s founder as “Deep Green, Against
Big Business, and Beyond Left and Right”
(Ray, 2002). In the new political compass that
is defined, people committed to Saving the
Planet, Women’s Concerns and a Wisdom
Culture Paradigm comprise the dogma of an
allegedly emerging majority. On closer
inspection, this movement turns out to include
a thinly disguised commercial enterprise,
whose leaders offer “retreats” for enormous
fees on luxury islands. So far, I am not aware
of any positive impact of this initiative. Without
being overly pessimistic, a critical theory of
the Information Society should, in my opinion,
maintain a constantly balanced reference to
both its positive and negative aspects and
their interaction, and LIR provides a logical
framework for such an approach.
 
It is obvious that the existence of new ICT’s
has resulted in new forms of cooperation as
well as the facilitation of old ones. A theory
that described only the details of this fact
would be trivial. The normative theory that this
paper seeks to develop, however, is
concerned with the dynamics of cooperation
and its relation to the ICT’s in the construction
of a Globally Sustainable Information Society.
Cooperation, like communication and morality,
needs to be further defined and grounded.
As an introduction to the discussion of
cooperation, I believe that it is essential to
distinguish between two forms of opposition or
resistance to cooperation, if you like, of anti-
cooperation, considered itself as a complex
process.
 
Conflict and cooperation are observed in
the behavior of all social animals. Models of
real human society accept as given the
coexistence of individuals and groups in
whose genetic makeup a propensity for
selfishness and refusal of cooperation has
remained dominant and the opposite. The
origin of non-cooperation is seen as either
“inherent in human nature”, a hangover from
some Western religious traditions, or in a
simplistic conception of Darwinian selection.
The recent work of Wilson in sociobiology
(Wilson & Wilson, 2007) explains the details
of the evolutionary process by which
cooperative social groups should and often do
prevail over “selfish” ones, as indicated
above. Further explanation seems required,
however, to account for the on-going systemic
division of human beings into two categories
characterized by social vs. anti-social
behavior or its equivalent, expressed in terms
of the narrowness or breadth of kinship or
interest groups accepted as such. One failure
to recognize such differences, with
catastrophic consequences, occurred in the
2000 presidential election in the United
States, in which Ralph Nader, running as an
independent on the platform that Democratic
and Republican policies were the “same”,
received enough votes from Democrats to be
a major proximal cause of the Bush victory
8
.
In the metaphysics of LIR, two
contradictorial tendencies are instantiated in
the human beings that constitute society, and
this is another reflection, at a social level of
reality, of the underlying contradictorial
structure of the world. This cleavage (never,
absolute, of course) is observed in the
cognitive domains of science, philosophy and
politics. A benign example in philosophy, at
least as contrasted with that in the previous
8
It is a source of grim amusement to note that
the result constituted a refutation of Nader’s own
theory, but it did not discourage him from being a
candidate in both the 2004 and 2008 presidential
races.
 

paragraph, is the apparently irresolvable
conflict between realists and anti-realists. A
more serious problem, and closer to the
issues in this study, is the view of many
workers in computer science and artificial
intelligence that life eventually can be reduced
to a set of algorithms. Such positions, which
can also in some cases be described as
ideological or fundamentalist, ignore the fact
that non-Markovian processes, that is,
complex, context-dependent processes
whose variables do not depend simpliciter on
the last state of the system, have been shown
to be non-computable. As stated flatly by
Leydesdorff (2000), “The social system is
non-computable in principle.” Mathematical
algorithms are adequate for the description of
some simple recursive processes, but those
of crucial interest to the target theory of this
study will not be captured.
 
 
In the complex system that constitutes
society, it is inevitable that individuals and
groups will have valid contradictory objectives.
The relationships involved, like those of the
previous Section, are also dialectical, and
given limited resources (always the case, to
all intents and purposes), conflicts will arise
over their allocation. Analysis of the issues
arising has tended to conflate the two forms of
interaction, namely, those related to the
existence of two types of individual mentality,
and those between two groups or individuals
in fair competition, in which both share a
minimal adequate degree of altruism.
Recent work on conflict often uses
negotiation as the term of art for conflict
resolution. One is immediately confronted with
the question of whether a negotiation is
carried out in good faith or bad faith. In my
opinion, negotiation in good faith is equivalent
to cooperation. Negotiation in bad faith is
conflict, with the objective of maximizing non-
social gain as described by standard game
theory. It involves the absence of
transparency, and one might as well speak of
negotiation tout court. One therefore has to
ask whether negotiation is this sense can
possibly be moral. Let us leave this open for
the time being, recognizing that the answer
will depend on some very fundamental
aspects of the model of society that is used.
Like any (good) critical theory, LIR
eliminates the necessity for any absolute
views or pre-determined idealized structures
in society and is in this sense materialistic.
But as a realistic but non-reductionist
approach, LIR supports the inherent
normative transdisciplinary aspects of the
ICT&S field that are antagonists of exclusion
and domination, while recognizing the
concomitant potential for prolonging
exclusions and retarding the advent of a
GSIS. As I state on several occasions in this
paper, understanding and admitting that “the
enemy is within our walls” is essential to the
instauration of appropriate strategies to
combat it.
 
As reported by Nicolescu (2003), Lupasco
experienced strong resistance to the use of
the term “antagonism” as being altogether too
anthropomorphic and extra-logical. As I have
tried to show, however nothing as real as
antagonism need be considered illogical in the
extended sense of LIR. It is thus an
appropriate for further codification of the
antagonisms in the social sphere identified by
Hofkirchner et al. in the emerging IS:
antagonisms between information rich and
information poor; inclusion and exclusion;
equality and autocracy; scientific rationality
and the worst aspects of manipulation by the
mass media. In other words, antagonism is
present between democratic structures and
special interest monopolies at all levels of
society, politics and economics. In fact, it is
the concrete manifestation of antagonisms in
the interplay of the subsystems of the society
that in Hofkirchner’s view should form the
object of critical investigation.
LIR is a system of reasoning that is “totally”
realistic about the perennity of the dialectical
interaction between people who operate on a
basis of integrity and respect for nature or with
a tendency toward alienation from nature,
especially, today, in regard to the eco-sphere.
This will be "nothing new” for Freudians.
However, LIR suggests that the death wish in
the individual and behavior in the direction of
the destruction of the environment are both
 

examples of the over-expression of the trend
defined by the 2
nd
Law of Thermodynamics of
the running-down (heat death) of the universe.
The entire Section in the ICTs&S document
on the dialectics of the socio-technological
world defines the transdisciplinary context into
which any advances in ethical theory and
practice must be made. We are again
confronted by the fact that the theory and the
objects of the theory cannot be totally
separate, as in the object-meta-level
framework of LIR, and include the study of the
relationship between the different disciplines
as one of those objects.
 
In the development of an evolutionary
theory of the Information Society (or of other
complex systems), I feel that Evolutionary
Game Theory provides an inappropriate
model. Such theories are generally analytic,
discussing abstract, idealized agents and
“game” conditions, and, as we have seen in
other cases in this paper, with a foundation in
standard bivalent logic.
As a more promising example, I have
chosen a recent article on an evolutionary
game perspective on learning in multi-agent
systems (Tuyls, Nowe, Lenaerts, &
Manderick, 2004). Agent-based computing, in
which ‘agent’ is understood as an
autonomous computational entity with a
flexible dynamic behavior in an unpredictable
environment is an important new evolving
paradigm in computer science. In contrast to
the conceptual approach taken by
Zimmermann, Evolutionary Game Theory
(EGT) can or should assume that games are
not only played once by rational players, and
the players do not know all the rules and
details of the game.
In principle, EGT can provide a model of
how individuals make decisions in a complex
and uncertain real world. However, the
version of Tuyls et al. looks at discrete-time,
homogeneous Markov processes. The
mathematical models of the learning process
involve binary notions of reinforcement and
reward. Accordingly, for an EGT to be an
appropriate paradigm outside the domain of
computation as such, in my view, requires
reference to real actors in real situations. In
such circumstances one would generally say
that one is not dealing with a game. Not
necessarily in the LIR approach: a situation
may have some aspects of a “game”,
provided these are seen as predominantly
potentialized. To write Evolutionary Non-
Game/Game Theory is far too awkward, but it
is in a sense more correct.
  
The dynamic structure of the logic of/in
reality makes it eminently suitable for the
discussion of issues at the highest levels of
human consciousness in regard to individual
and collective social behavior, including its
pathology. In particular, LIR provides a basis
for debate and the rejection of all forms of
dogmatism whose origins can be traced to the
misapplication of principles of binary logic.
Such a discussion would take us too far from
the limited objective of this introduction to the
LIR system. The interested reader will find a
non-technical discussion of social issues in
the work of Nicolescu (2002) in which further
references to the original views of Lupasco
can be found.
The sociology of LIR makes provision for
the existence of real contradictions in the
world (dialetheias). The resulting
contradictorial sociology is certainly closer to
that of Marx and his categories of man than
that to Hegel and his categories of thought.
Both Hegel and Marx (and Engels) accepted
the existence of true contradictions, and did
not mean something else as many of their
interpreters have tried to say, as Priest points
out (1989). But in Hegel’s final ideal
‘synthesis’, the contradictions in the real world
no longer persist, and, in the final stage of
Marx’s dialectic the resolution of the
contradiction removes it; there is no
contradiction between labor and capital in a
communist society. It is not necessary to
belabor the point that such resolutions are not
for the near future.
In today’s world in which interdependence
of actors is obvious, starting from a standpoint
of directing energy and resources toward the
more disadvantaged should be an acceptable
to a large majority, its origin in Marx
notwithstanding. If we agree that a critical
 

theory contains a certain standpoint, critical
ICTs&S research, as Hofkirchner et al.
suggest, can be conceived as identifying and
analyzing antagonisms resulting from the
ICTs, e.g. the Internet, and in all competitive
and cooperative dimensions of society.
Hofkirchner talks about the “colliding forces”
of cooperation and competition, but also about
their potential, natural in LIR terms, for leading
to the dissolution or at least reduction of
exploitation and oppression.
LIR thus answers the question posed in
critical theory as why there is a difference
between actuality and potentiality and how
this difference might be bridged. Actuality and
potentiality are reflections in the
physical/temporal world of the underlying
duality of the universe, a basis for why
something exists rather than nothing. Bridging
the gap means, to me, working in the same
direction as emergent processes in general,
without elimination of the difference, and while
recognizing that forces of regression are an
equally fundamental part of the total story.
LIR is a useful theoretical framework in
which to discuss struggles in society at the
individual and group level. It contains a
principle of dynamic opposition that a priori
includes the relationship between the
competing and cooperating actors and insures
that neither is considered in total isolation
from the other. Application of the categorial
features of actuality and potentiality to both
social actors and social theory could
eventually assign values to not-yet realized
potentials for social development. From the
LIR metaphysical standpoint, the
disadvantaged are not only objects that
deserve our sympathy and charity, as
“second-class” citizens of the society, but
subjects that do not deserve to be relegated
to some second-class ontological status. They
are essential members of the Subject-Object
category.
By looking at the contradictorial dynamics
of facilitators and inhibitors that condition the
design of both ICTs and their social context to
achieve a GSIS, LIR provides both a
paradigm and a transdisciplinary methodology
for logically addressing contradictions
wherever they are found. This is in total
contrast to the perspective of standard logic,
which is generally one of strategies to
eliminate or “manage” contradictions or deny
their relevance, rather than use them to
ground emergent possibilities for study or
action.
 

We now have the tools in hand to complete
the main task of this paper which, to repeat, is
to show the utility of LIR in relation to some
specific issues and objectives set by
Hofkirchner and his colleagues for the
“Salzburg Approach” to a theory for the
Information Society (TIS).
 
LIR, which can be viewed as a meta-logic
and a meta-philosophy or metaphysics as well
as a logic, nevertheless contributes to the
scientific as well as philosophical status of
ICTs&S in view of its grounding in physics, as
compared to a standard view of metaphysics
based on bivalent logic (Lowe, 2006). Thus,
bridging gaps between disciplines, and seeing
that some form of unity can emerge from their
interaction, is viewed as a real, logical as well
as an epistemological process. What is
alternately actualized and potentialized are
the relevant perspectives, say analytical and
synthetic, but this can be done with the
assurance that, since according to the
principles of LIR they share some of one
another’s properties, neither is ever totally
excluded at the expense of the other. In the
LIR conception, it is logical to look at the
beauty of a crystal, or of a highly symmetrical
computer program, and then at its diffraction
pattern or running time respectively.
 

LIR, as the logic of transdisciplinarity,
includes the critical categorial feature of non-
separability, derived from the axiom of
Functional Association. In my opinion, it thus
cuts through the debate as to whether such
categories as the “Two Cultures”, specialists
and generalists, or basic and applied
research, academics and non-academics can
be totally independent or divided – they can
 

not be. Further, either in their interaction or in
the emergence of a third entity (a “Third”
Culture), the elements are not conflated, but
maintain their logical and methodological
specificity or identity. In the LIR picture, this
can be taken as a matter of course.
The Mittelstrass triangular model of pure
basic research, application oriented basic
research and product oriented applied
research, quoted by Hofkirchner et al., rather
confuses the dynamics of the dualities
involved. The major conflict as I see it is what
I experienced personally in an industrial
laboratory environment. It is between the
expenditure of resources (energy) for
fundamental understanding or for commercial
use, whether product or application oriented.
The search for fundamental understanding
was potentialized by the need to develop new
products for sale, but it could still appear and
claim one’s attention, albeit for only a limited
time.
 

While psychological, economic and political
factors define the sciences of sociology,
economics, politics and so on, it seems too
early for a science of the Information Society
per se to be characterized. Logic, however,
has not been widely used as a tool in even
these disciplines, for the good reason, in my
view, of its inability to describe more than the
simplest models of the corresponding
processes.
The new kind of logic that LIR represents
has this capability, in the sense that it
captures at least some significant general
features of the underlying dynamics. I
therefore see an opportunity for a science and
logic of the IS to develop in tandem,
constituting thereby a new form of analysis.
An important relevant feature of the LIR
system is its ability to focus on both inter- and
intra-level relationships, in which the same
principle of dynamic opposition is instantiated.
There is thus no need for an absolute
separation between either two “competing”
theories, a theory and the data of that theory,
broadly, between theory and meta-theory, or
between the society and the challenges
arising from that society.
The lack of necessity of impossibly clear
definitions, including that of the basic
prepositions “of” and “for”, simplifies the role
of science, but places a more stringent
requirement on the rigorous use of such a
flexible system. Once it is recognized that the
principle is embedded in the methodology
itself, its advantages in avoiding dogmatic
positions should become quickly apparent. It
should be natural that a science of the
Information Society is also a science for the
Information Society, since a dialectical overlap
between the two levels is “built into” the LIR
logic and ontology.
“Aboutness”, qualia or phenomenal
character are terms commonly used in the
philosophy of mind to describe the intensional
aspects of human thought. The key aspect of
human consciousness is its phenomenality,
that is, that things have subjective, first-
person appearances to people, who cognize
them and react as a consequence of the fact
that these appearances are about something.
Brentano had designated this ‘aboutness’ as
intentionality and this thesis of intentionality
has given rise to extensive on-going debate
as to its purport (Smith, 1999). LIR provides
the basic consideration of these terms as real
processes rather than abstractions from those
processes. If a science of the Information
Society is also about that society, then LIR
anticipates not only the logicality of this
formulation, but its ability to subsume
normative positions about crisis and conflict
and their origins.
 

I have referred above to the concepts of the
knowledge-based economy and the
knowledge-based society. From the LIR
standpoint, the subsequent dialectics of Marx
and Engels simply transpose, to the social
level of reality, the same Hegelian drive
toward a synthesis involving the suppression
of, in contrast to Hegel, all contradiction.
In this Section, rather than repeat the
analysis provided in the ICTs&S document, I
have summarized the most important issues
in its dialectical model that are either
exemplifications of the LIR logic or to which
 

this logic provides an approach to a
resolution.
 

Hofkirchner et al. consider that systematic
thinking involves application of a principle of
unity-through-diversity enables a synthetic
world view required for a theory of the
Information Society (TIS). LIR provides the
rigorous basis for saying that variety and unity
are achievable “at the same time” via 1) the
LIR axiom of Non-Identity that no concept of
any absolute identity can be maintained or
used as the implicit or explicit basis for
discussion; and 2) the LIR axiom of
Conditional Contradiction which states that if
any two opposites are present at the same
time, it is only in the sense that when one is
predominantly actual, the other is
(predominantly) potential, and vice versa,
alternately and reciprocally, in a
complementarity that is isomorphous to that at
the quantum level. I feel this is rigorously
equivalent to the ICTs&S formulation of
establishing unity in line with difference, or
Morin’s ideas of “conjugating parts”. LIR helps
to focus on these ideas applied to real
systems and their changes, and, in addition,
for the emergence of a new entity (or
perspective). This is my proposal for a “third
perspective” through which different value
systems can brought together, that is, their
legitimate insights used, without conflation.
The relation between methods and theory,
between understanding and approach, or
between higher and lower levels of
abstraction can be discussed within the two-
level LIR framework of analysis. The
advantage of this is that one has, as a
consequence, additional scientific elements of
knowledge about such relations that “make
explicit what is implicit”. In particular, one
avoids absolute dichotomies that can falsify
analyses of antagonistic tendencies and
opportunities for change in society. As it is put
in the ICTs&S document, “Dialectic analysis in
this context means complex dynamic thinking
(JEB: both processes following the LIR logic).
In a dialectical analysis, phenomena are
analyzed in terms of agency and structures,
discontinuity and continuity, the one and the
many, potentiality and actuality, global and
local, virtual and real, optimism and
pessimism, essence and existence,
immanence and transcendence, etc.” The
logic of and in reality is a principled manner
for understanding how one moves from one
element to the other, as all of these elements
instantiate the critical ontological aspect of
non-separability, and can be the loci of
emergence.
To say that contradictory tendencies pose
both positive and negative potentials at the
same time, that is, of opportunities and risks
is, in the theory proposed here, a logical
statement that can be linked to similar
phenomena at all levels of reality. An example
of a duality for which an LIR description is not
appropriate is that of a surface or boundary,
as generally understood. It is certainly not a
function of description, nor is it a purely
natural thing. Agreed. But regardless of its
reality as an entity, a simple boundary
between two solid, liquid or gaseous phases
or even a frontier between two countries is not
a dynamic process. It is thus not a model for
specifying the relations between real systems.
As an example to which LIR does apply, one
should take the membrane of a cell, or the
skin of an animal, boundaries that are three-
dimensional, extremely complex and dynamic
systems.
 


LIR is a logical method for joining,
dialectically, agency and structure, and I
propose it as a candidate for a mechanism
that makes “social systems and their
constitutents tick.” In the ICTs&S document,
Bunge is quoted as saying that a dialectic is a
process whose products “freeze” into
structure, which then influences subsequent
processes which it both enables and
constrains leading to the emergence of new
qualities.
In 1951, Lupasco wrote, in a Chapter
entitled “The logic of frozen (emphasis mine)
operations or dialectic stages” (Lupasco,
1987): “The elements (products of logical
operations) appear as stops in the dynamics,
in the development of an implication,
 

determined by the discontinuous structure of
the contradictory dualities and by the dialectic
rhythm they imply. … The element or event
signified is at the same time both the point of
arrival and point of departure of a further
implication
9
.” I should remind the reader that
for Lupasco, implication was a dynamic
process in and of itself, referring to the actual
physical deployment of the energies and
actors in any complex process.
We have the basis here for the concept of
techno-social systems, in which human
individuals have sometimes conflicting roles
as users and producers of technology, which
of course cannot be in a sensible way defined
without reference to these individuals in their
social role. I simply prefer to see the
organization or rather organizing process
occurring in these systems as dependent on
previously existing potentialities of the social
entities and thus not 100% “self”-organization.
In the LIR interpretation of the ancient part-
whole problem, parts and wholes are also
dialectically linked, sharing part of one
another’s attributes. This is a basis for saying
that, as in the discussion of downward
causation by Heylighen (1995), the parts
contribute to the emergence and maintenance
of the whole, but the quality of the whole
cannot be reduced to any quality of the parts.
As Hofkirchner et al. continue, we can now
conceive of a real dynamics of the relation
between ICTs and society mutually shaping
each other in non-linear ways. The language
of LIR, however, prefers the explicit
description of the complex causality involved
in the relationship of society and technology
as a non-linear spiral causality. The use of
circular here and in the work of Varela and
others is perhaps intended to imply that
autopoiësis never returns to exactly the point
of departure, but I then see no reason why the
inapplicable term of circularity is retained,
unless due to a kind of philosophical inertia.
To say that technology represents a
potential for the realization of social goals is
then not just a metaphor. It has this potential
instantiated in it during its own construction by
people which is the origin of its capacity for
9
I do not claim that this idea is “totally” an
original one of Lupasco’s. According to Plato, the
Heracliteans described objects as “slow” actions.
change and evolution. By applying the
principle of dynamic opposition to the sub-
systems involved, one has a basis for
continuous and discontinuous evolution, that
is, qualitative revolution, rather than a simple
succession of phases. The location of the
evolution in part in the human sub-systems,
however, means that one cannot apply a
simple Hegelian model. The changes that will
result, from an LIR perspective, can never be
totally positive, only with their negative
aspects more or less potentialized. This is
important to avoid “eu”-topian formulations.
 
 
The above considerations apply to Internet-
human interactions, the former being
considered also as a complex process, but I
will not go further into these here. There is
nothing in LIR that conflicts with the concept
of the Internet as a tool for cooperation to
achieve the aims and values of a GSIS. I
simply wish to confirm that LIR can be used to
formalize critical aspects of a logic of “techno-
social production and reproduction” that refers
to the dialectical relationship between human
social agency and social structure as the
driving force for social organization tout court.
The conception of inter-level interactions in
LIR is broadly compatible with the description
of the new phases of the evolving Web,
involving deepened social exchanges and
emergent meaning structures. These meaning
structures are new forms of human relations
being defined by the very complexity of the
interactions possible on the Web, a
complexity that has been designated by
Berger (2008) as "cyber-complexity". The
space constituted by cyber-complex relations
has its own properties of transparence and
expression of fundamental human values,
ethics and affect. The logic of the
relationships involved in these structures is
certainly not standard binary logic. Some of
the interactions will be dynamic and
dialectical, best described by "logic in reality",
corresponding to exchanges of knowledge or
"knowing". The information transferred will
contain meaning defined above as
"instructional" information because of the
instructional function the information performs.
 

Others will be less so, limited to exchanges of
information whose “Meaning 1” refers only to
the constraints of its production.
My preliminary answer from an LIR
perspective as to whether inference rules
could be established for software agents that
could operate on knowledge distributed on the
Web and process it creatively is a negative
one. Such rules would, in my opinion, be
equivalent to a claim of full computability of
natural processes, including of course
knowledge representation, which I believe is
excluded by the dialectic aspects of
knowledge and knowing as processes
themselves. Working toward such a goal will
undoubtedly produce new and useful
technology, but this result should not have as
a consequence the devaluation of what is
neither captured nor capable of being
captured by such rules.
 

In this paper, I have made a first attempt to
demonstrate the fit between a new kind of
logic, a logic of and in reality (LIR), and the
major incentives for, and objectives and
methodology of, a potential theory of and for
the Information Society (TIS). The categorial
ontology of LIR, in particular the feature of
Non-separability, illuminates the three “pillars”
of a TIS, namely, Cognition, Communication
and Cooperation and naturalizes (offers a
rigorous description of) an interpretation of
their internal structure and dynamics as well
as their relations to the economic, political and
technological realities of the society as a
whole. Issues in three critical domains of
Morality, Meaning in Communication, and
Conflict and Cooperation have been analyzed
from this perspective, in which LIR provides a
formal basis for talking about interdependence
and context.
LIR is a logic of real phenomena, which can
include theories, but it is primarily explicative
in situations of antagonism or real energetic,
dynamic opposition between entities and
processes, individuals and groups that are
strongly coupled. It permits inferences to be
made about the relative and reciprocal and
alternating actuality or dominance of one
element vs. the other, and the potential
emergence of a third that resolves the
opposition or contradiction at another level of
reality or complexity.
LIR supports a “logical social realism” that
regards the forces at work in society as real
processes and accepts and integrates the
aspects of society that have proven
recalcitrant to analysis, or have been simply
neglected as too uncertain. It points out that a
complete theory of the Information Society
should include the negative aspects of
Information and Communication Technologies
for both individuals and society as logical
elements, therefore scientific, and therefore in
principle more amenable to correction.
LIR is a logic of transdisciplinarity. It
therefore supports the view of Hofkirchner and
his colleagues that the study of the TIS is a
transdiscipline, and that this is an essential
aspect of its capacity for playing a role in the
ethical development of ITC’s toward a
Globally Sustainable Information Society. LIR
supports further integrative ITC assessment
and design approaches that incorporate a
normative view of technology and society.
There is no place in LIR for value-free
science; the practitioner is always involved
logically with the material substrate of his
science, whose dynamics and properties he
partly shares. As clearly stated by Hofkirchner
et al., a normative approach requires “doing
justice” to what is both normative and factual,
actual and potential.
Much further work is necessary to
demonstrate the utility of this logic in the
codification of a theory of the information
society (TIS), as well as in other domains of
science, epistemology and metaphysics. A
clear weakness of LIR is its lack of
mathematical formalism, and the introduction
of an appropriate mathematization that would
not contain question-begging assumptions
(such as that of inapplicable continuity
inherent in differential calculus, a problem with
dynamic systems theory) would be desirable.
Nevertheless, the metalogical and
metaphilosophical validity of the principle of
dynamic opposition seems to me well
expressed in the realities of the emergent
Information Society. This may well be
therefore, a preferred domain for future
application of the LIR approach.
 


Barinaga, E. & Ramfelt, L. (2004). Kista – The Two Sides of the Network Society. Networksand Communications Studies,
18 (3-4), 225 – 244.
Beigbeder, M. (1971). Contradiction et Nouvel Entendement. Paris: Bordas.
Berger, R. (2008). Private communication.
Bhaskar, R. (2002) meta-Reality. The Philosophy of meta-Reality. Vol. 1, Creativity Love and Freedom. London: Sage
Publications.
Brenner, J. E. (2005). Process in Reality. A Logical Offering. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 14, 165-202.
Brenner, J. E. (2008a). Logic in Reality. Dordrecht: Springer.
Brenner, J. E. (2008b). The Logic of Transdisciplinarity. In B. Nicolescu (Ed.), Transdisciplinarity – Theory and Practice.
Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press.
Brenner, J. E. (2008c). The Logic of Non-Computability. European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Montpellier,
June.
Castells, M. (2004). The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Volume II The Power of Identity.
Malden/Oxford/Carlton: Blackwell Publishing.
Emmeche, C. Köppe, S. & Stjernfelt, F. (1997). Explaining Emergence. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 28, 330-
331.
Esfeld, M. (2006). From being ontologically serious to serious ontology. In M Esfeld (Ed.), John Heil. Symposium on his
ontological point of view. Frankfurt (Main): Ontos-Verlag.
Fuchs, C. (2006a). The Dialectic of the Nature-Society System. Triple C, 4 (1), 1-39.
Fuchs, C. (2006b). Towards a Global Sustainable Information Society (GSIS)? Triple C, 4 (1), 40-99.
Fuchs, C. (2009). Social Networking Sites and the Surveillance Society. Retrieved January 22, 2009 from
http://fuchs.icts.sbg.ac.at/SNS_SurveillanceFuchs.pdf
Gabora, L. & Aerts, D. (2005). Evolution as Context-Driven Actualization of Potential. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews,
30(1), 69-88.
Grize, J.-B. (1994). Logique naturelle et sociologie. L’année sociologique, 44, 281-289.
Grize, J.-B. (1996). Logique naturelle et communications. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Habermas, J. (1988). On the Logic of the Social Sciences. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. (Originally published as Zur Logik
der Sozialwissenschaften. Frankfurt-am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).
Heylighen, F. (1995). Downward Causation. Retrieved 2004 from http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be//DOWNCAUS.html
Hoffmeyer, J. (2000). Code-Duality and the Epistemic Cut. Tacit Knowledge. Closure; Emergent Organizations and Their
Dynamics. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 901, 175-186.
Hofkirchner, W., Fuchs, C., Raffl, C., Schafranek, M., Sandoval, M., & Bichler, R. (2007). ICTs and Society: The Salzburg
Approach. University of Salzburg Research Paper No. 3, December. Salzburg: ICT&S Center.
Jacquette, D. (2002). Ontology. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Kauffman, S. (1995). At Home in the Universe. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kauffman, S., Logan, R. K., Este, R., Goebel, R., Hobill, D., & Shmulevich, I. (2007). Propagating Organization: An Enquiry.
In Biology and Philosophy, 23, 27-45.
Kauffmann, L. T. (2002). Time, Imaginary Value, Paradox, Sign and Space. In D. Dubois (Ed.), Computing Anticipatory
Systems. AIP Conference Proceedings 627, CASYS-Fifth International Conference. Liege, Belgium.
Knowledge Politics (2007). Retrieved 2008 from http://www.knowledgepolitics.org.uk
Ladyman, J. & Ross, D. (2007). Every Thing Must Go. Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laflamme, D. (2008). Ethics and the Interplay Between the Logic of the Excluded Middle and the Logic of the Included
Middle. In B. Nicolescu (Ed.), Transdisciplinarity – Theory and Practice. Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press.
Leydesdorff, L. (2000). Luhmann, Habermas and the Theory of Communication. Systems Research and Behavioral
Science, 17 (3), 273-288
Leydesdorff, L. (2006). The Knowledge-Based Economy: Modeled, Measured, Simulated. Boca Raton, Florida: Universal
Publishers.
Leydesdorff, L. (2008). Personal communication.
Licata, I. (2008). La logica aperta del mente. Turin: Codice Edizioni.
Lowe, E. J. (2006). The Four-Category Ontology. A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. New York: Oxford
University Press.
 

Lupasco, S. (1986a). L’énergie et la matière vivante. Monaco: Éditions du Rocher. (Originally published in Paris, Julliard,
1962.).
Lupasco, S. (1986b). L’homme et ses trois éthiques. Paris: Éditions du Rocher.
Lupasco, S. (1987). Le principe d’antagonisme et la logique de l’énergie. Paris: Editions du Rocher. (Originally published in
Paris, Éditions Hermann, 1951).
Luhmann, N. (1989). Le droit comme système social. Droit & Société, 11-12, 53-77.
Luhmann, Niklas (1995). Social Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Magnani, L. (2007). Morality in a Technological World. Knowledge as Duty. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mayr, E. (2004). What Makes Biology Unique? New York: Cambridge University Press.
Morin, E. (1986). La méthode 3. La connaissance de la connaissance. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Nicolescu, B. (2002). Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
Nicolescu, B. (2003). Private communication.
Priest, G. (1989) Dialectic and Dialetheic. Science & Society, 53 (4), 388-415.
Ray, P. H. (2002). The New Political Compass. Retrieved 2006 from http://www.culturalcreatives.org
Rescher, N. (2005). Epistemic Logic. A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Schwarz, E. (1997). Toward a Holistic Cybernetics; From Science through Epistemology to Being. Cybernetics and Human
Knowing, 4, 17-50.
Smith, D. W. (1999). Intentionality Naturalized? In J. Petitot et al. (Eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Issues in
Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Sustainability Program (2008). University of Stellenbosch. Cf. http://www.sustainability.net
Tavani, H. T. (2007). Ethics and Technology. Ethical Issues in an Age of Information and Communication Technology. John
Wiley &Sons: http://www.wiley.com/college/tavani
Tuyls, K., Nowe, A., Lenaerts, T., & Manderick, B. (2004). An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Perspective on Learning in
Multi-Agent Systems. SYNTHESE, 139 (2), 297-330.
Van de Vijver, G. (1997). Conversation with Heinz von Foerster 02/06/1995. Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 4, 3-16.
Varela, F. J. (1999). The Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness. J. Petitot et al. (Eds.),
Naturalizing Phenomenology. Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Von Bertalanffy, L. (1969). General System Theory. New York: George Braziller.
Wilson, D. S. & Wilson, E. O. (2007). Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology. In The Quarterly Review of
Biology, 82 (4), 327-348.
World Knowledge Dialogue (2008). Conference in Crans-Montana, Switzerland, September.
World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva 2003 – Tunis 2005 (2005). WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (Rev.1) E, 18
November.
Zimmermann, R. E. (2008 in press). New Ethics Proved in Geometrical Order. Spinozist Reflections on Evolutionary
Systems. Goodyear, Arizona: ISCE Press.

Joseph E. Brenner
Joseph E. Brenner was born in Paris in 1934, the son of the American sculptor Michael Brenner (Lithuania, 1885 – New
York, 1969). After primary and secondary education in New York, he received B.A. and M.S. degrees from the University of
Chicago. In 1958, he earned a Ph.D. in Organic Chemistry from the University of Wisconsin, which was followed by post-
doctoral studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In
1960, he joined the E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Company at its Wilmington, Delaware laboratory as a polymer chemist. From
1965 to his retirement in 1994, he was involved in corporate development and technology transfer with Du Pont de Nemours
International in Geneva, Switzerland, working primarily in the Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe. In 1998, he began
collaboration with Basarab Nicolescu, Professor (em.) of Theoretical Physics at the University of Paris VI and President of
the International Center for Transdisciplinary Research (CIRET) in Paris. The focus of this on-going collaboration has been
to make the logical system of the Franco-Romanian thinker Stéphane Lupasco (Bucharest, 1900 – Paris, 1988) accessible
to English-language readers. Brenner’s extension and up-dating of this work has been the subject of publications and
presentations at conferences and seminars in Europe, Brazil and the U.S.A. Dr. Brenner is a member of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science; the New York Academy of Sciences; and the Swiss Society for Logic and the
Philosophy of Science. He recently joined the Editorial Board of this Journal.
tripleC 7(1): 38-73, 2009 73