



      



 


 
Abstract: The article intends to conduct a philosophical analysis of democracy as it is presented by democratization
processes in societies under globalization. The turbulent political life of contemporary Ukraine with its ‘revolution’ of 2004
provides an excellent example of such a process. The authors demonstrate that processes in question could be denoted as
rather manipulation than democratic transition. Democracy today finds its subject not in the modern nation-state, but in
human personalities engaged in social self-organization and opposed to crowds led by contemporary demagogues.
Keywords: Democracy, democratization in Ukraine, personality, ‘Orange revolution’, social self-organization
he aim of this article is to conduct a
philosophical investigation of the nature
of democratic processes in contemporary
society. Ukrainian society that has faced
many political events in recent years is an
adequate source of inspiration for our
philosophical musing over its experience.
However, we still intend to review democracy
in its essence, in its universal notion
applicable to the whole contemporary world,
rather than focus our attention on empirical
representations of a democratic system in
Ukraine or in any other country. Indeed, those
representations could be considered rather
doubtful and/or incomplete. Our position
would probably raise even more doubts and
generate some distrust – regarding not
democracy itself, but conscious or
unconscious usurpers of that name engaged
in hiding unattractive features of manipulation
technologies under the mask of democracy.
 

Democracy is now one of the most
common terms used in the public rhetoric;
however, it seldom serves as an object of
philosophical reflection. Indeed, democracy
could sometimes appear as a ‘worn out’
notion used in order to express quite different
feelings and ideas. The situation with
democracy in post-communist countries in
fact resembles their recent past. The usage of
the word ‘democracy’ equals to the usage of
the word ‘communism’ several decades ago:
the term is widely used on official occasions,
but nobody takes it for real. And the fact that
many today’s born democrats in Ukraine and
other ex-Soviet republics are former
convinced communists only strengthens the
idea that ‘democracy’ could be perceived as a
keyword denoting the belonging of its bearer
to the self-described ‘power party’. As
 

Ukrainian sociologist Iryna Popova explains
that situation:
“…parading the ‘democracy’ of our
society, constant usage of the term
‘democracy’ in the situation of
lawlessness and actual violation of
people’s rights, considerable spreading
of poorness and poverty is a blasphemy,
because it leads to devaluation of that
word, to the commonplace perception of
democracy as a situation where
‘anything goes’, and ‘a plain man’ has no
protection against that. In other words,
against a background of our practices,
that terms obtains the sense, which is
directly opposite to what a researcher
means by it” (Popova, 2008, pp. 19–20).
Nevertheless, we still believe that the
phenomenon of democracy should not be
reduced to its real-political connotation and
must be studied by means of philosophy,
providing foundations for its true realization.
However, such studies require an adequate
approach based, in particular, on
contemporary paradigm of nonlinearity, self-
organization, and concreteness. What we
mean by such a statement is that there are at
least two major conception of democracy:
political and philosophical, – democracy as a
certain given way of organizing the political
system (that features general elections,
parliament, freedom of speech etc.), and
democracy as a certain ideal of harmonious
social life (democracy from a philosophical,
rather than political, perspective).
Our position here is close to the tradition of
participatory democracy. In particular, its
illustrious American champion Benjamin
Barber (1984) argues that the two types of
democracy present in today’s society are
official democracy with its ‘Big politics’, party
intrigues, corruption and bureaucracy, – and
real ‘neighborhood democracy’ with its
practice of local self-government and
grassroots voluntary activities. That’s why,
according to Barber, we have to expand our
understanding of what counts as democratic,
rather than expanding democracy itself.
However we think that the philosophical
approach to democracy is aimed at limiting
that understanding rather than expanding it –
for every philosophical term implies strict
limitations over phenomena of reality that fit
(or do not fit) the notion. That is, democracy
by definition must be separated from other
phenomena that exist in our society and title
themselves as a democracy while not
satisfying all the necessary requirements for
such a denotation.
So, how then should philosophy understand
the term ‘democracy’? Democracy as just
‘power of the people’ as it is usually being
explained, as the people’s sovereignty, where
the people are the sources, the bearers, and
the conductors of power, – such a formulation
used to present an adequate guideline and an
ideal of social-political structure at the age of
Absolutism, when the usual reality was the
dominance of a sole monarch or a narrow
circle of persons possessing power by the
right of birth. Then the ideal of the power for
all the people – and not one single person or
single exclusive estate – was progressive and
revolutionary.
But today such an approach to
understanding and defining democracy turns
out to be very abstract – that is, not clear
enough in order to serve as a lodestar in the
semidarkness of the political life of our
society, which already calls itself ‘democratic’.
As Barber (1984) states, the history of
democracy itself is contained in the history of
the word democracy. In our opinion, that
history lies in the concretization of the notions
people (‘ ’) and power (‘’) that
constitute the term ’democracy’. Such a
concretization could still be presented as a
development (not only expansion) of the
meaning of the notions in question. In Ancient
times, the democracy of poleis was based on
the labor of masses of slaves, deprived of any
rights, even of the right to be considered as
human beings. The ‘’ (people who can
be and are subjects of democracy) quite
differs here from ‘’ (all the people in
general, saying nothing of their possibility to
be subjects of power). In other words, ‘the
people’ here are certainly not all the people
we often have in mind when we talk about
true democracy. Medieval European cities,
which also had some form of democracy,
supplied obstacles of similar kind as well. Until
the end of the 18
th
c., strict qualifications
based on property or social status prevented
all the people from participating in political life,
 

let alone their ability to become subjects of
power.
However, even after all the revolutions of
18
th
, 19
th
, and 20
th
centuries, it could not be
testified that humanity in any way has really
achieved true democracy, when all the people
participate in policy making in full. Still, the
development of the human society and its
government could be presented as an
evolution towards the most optimal form of
that society and that government, that is,
towards democracy. In other words,
democracy under such nonlinear approach
appears not as a given state of affairs, but as
a constant process of development. Neither
stage of that process could be considered as
a complete democracy in fact, but each one of
those stages can serve as a certain
approximation to that ideal – the complete
realization of democratic form of social and
political organization of human life.
The notion of the people who can be and
are subjects of social and political power is
being constantly specified and extended.
Gradually, the slaves, the serfs, the workers,
the poor, women, national minorities and
other groups and strata are tending to be
included into the notion of ‘demos’, into the
volume of people subject to be bearers and
conductors of social power. Thus, national
democracy discovers that different ethnic
groups have equal rights for participation in
the life of society. Similarly, social democracy
defends rights of the poor, and stands for
equality of all human beings irrelevant to their
social positions.
Those named forms of democracy, – or, it
would be better to say, those stages of the
democratization process, – are still actual
under present-day situations. However, at the
same time, they remain abstract in relation to
further possible concretization of what
democracy really is. Both social and national
‘democracies’ appear as obsolete under the
situation of the globalizing world. Globalization
changes human lives, their traditional modes
of activity, and requires even more
specification of both our ideals and forms of
our social organization. The world is now
more unified than ever, and its common future
that concerns every person could be easily
endangered with a simple single action by a
superpower. We think that such a situation
conditions the necessity for all people of the
world to decide directly, and not through their
representatives of any kind, the fate of
humanity.
That means that the notion of power
present in the term ‘democracy’ also develops
and concretizes itself. In Greek, as well as in
other languages, there are different nuances
of the word ‘power’. First, it is the initial
‘’, power as a wraparound dominance
and possession, peculiar to the past historical
forms of total governance. Second, it is a
more gentile ‘’ – power as a guidance
and administration. And finally, it is ‘’ –
power as the ability to create, to behave, to
act. While all three do contribute to our
understanding of democracy, the
development from the first to the second and
then to the third of denoted aspects could be
seen as the real process of democratization
(see: Tolstoukhov, Myelkov, & Parapan,
2008).
Unfortunately, the situation we now observe
is quite different, if not opposite, from what
philosophy can and should say about
democracy. Democracy in its most
widespread meaning is considered not as a
process of social evolution, but – in a linear
perspective – as a certain given state of
affairs that exists in some time and place and
could be easily transferred to other time and
place. Most western experts do believe that
only the ‘Westminster’ model of democracy,
especially in its American version, with all its
traditional attributes – like legal state, strict
division of power, parliamentarianism, and
civil society – is the only possible form of
democracy. Thus, any deviation from that
model in any country, any insufficient level of
the development of some of its elements, or
their absence at all, is branded as an
inadequacy and/or incompleteness of
democracy in that country.
Such a view does not give justice to
contemporary nonlinear studies of democracy
we are trying to conduct, neither to its
classical ideal representations. We would like
to cite the criticism of that position by famous
Canadian theoretician of participatory
democracy, C. B. Macpherson:
 

“The model of democracy that has been
raised to orthodoxy in American political
science… is counter-democratic (by the
older concept of democracy) in that it
empties out, as being normative,
unrealistic, or utopian, the egalitarian
and developmental moral ideal of the
original liberal-democratic theory, and
accepts as an adequate model (and
proclaims as the only accurate model) of
democracy, a competition between two
or more élite groups for the power to
govern the whole society. Democracy is
held to be consistent with, and even to
require, a low level of citizen
participation: only so, it is said, is the
political system likely to stay in
equilibrium. Democracy is reduced from
a humanist aspiration to a market
equilibrium system. And although the
new orthodox theory claims scientific
neutrality, its value judgment is clear
enough: whatever works, is right – that
is, whatever enables the existing class-
stratified society to operate without
intolerable friction is best” (Macpherson,
1973, pp. 78–79).
In other words, without the people acting as
real subjects of democracy, the democracy
itself turns to be just euphemism, and the use
of this term for denoting the said model
becomes philosophically and scientifically
unjustified. Democracy as a historical concept
is inseparable from the Modern classical way
of thinking, classical humanism, and the idea
of general liberation of a human being from
the dictate of tradition and authority.
Democracy is such a state where every
person, using Kant’s expression, has the
courage to use one’s own mind. In this case –
using one’s own mind while governing oneself
and one’s society, and not trying to alienate
that burden and that privilege in favor of
somebody else.
The ‘élite theory’ could state that all the
people do not have such a developed state of
mind so that they could really exercise the
mentioned courage and ability, and it is thus
obvious that a circle of ‘people’s
representatives’ must be elected to govern the
society. However, in our opinion, even if such
state of affairs is considered to be temporary
or preliminary, while providing for the gradual
process of transition towards ‘total and pure’
democracy (like in Lenin’s ‘vanguard’ theory),
there is still one problem remained.
Particularly, the ability to use one’s own mind
is required for electing adequate political
representatives to the bodies of
representative democracy, no less then it is
needed for actual self-governance under the
situation of conceptual ‘complete democracy’.
We can sum the presuppositions for
representative democracy considered as a
lawful embodiment of classical democratic
theory as the following – a person that has no
possibility to conduct his/her power over
social governance directly, comprehends and
accepts:
• his/her democratic right for exercising the
power;
• his/her inability to actually realize that
power, either because of shortage of time,
or deficiency of personal qualities or
education;
• his/her interests in such a governance that
could be delegated to another person;
• that person’s suitability for governing the
society in accordance with the elector’s
interests.
It could be easily concluded then that
requirements for the true democratic elector
are in no way less utopian then those that
define the true democratic subject of power.
So, it turns out that the theory of
representative democracy from the
philosophical point of view, in its
contemporary form, has little to do with
rational classical democracy (Myelkov, 2007).
There is no rational possibility for an elector to
choose an adequate delegate. Political
scientists, like Samuel Popkin (1994), find it
appropriate to talk about ‘low information
rationality’, ‘gut reasoning’ etc, when élite
politics are being chosen basing on emotional
criteria. Still, as the indicated author has to
admit, “There is something rather miraculous
about the fact that citizens believe that
leaders selected by balloting are legitimate, -
that they are entitled to govern” (Popkin,
1994, p. 8).
Thus, the realization of the true democracy
is inseparable from philosophical
consideration of democracy as a process of
 

development. It is not enough for democracy
to provide human with an abstract right to
govern his or her social and political system.
The very nature and features of that system
should enable human to be capable of
governing it. Democracy that only provides
rights to the people, and does not care about
realizing those rights, is but a mere formality.
For example, western system supplies both
the rich and the poor with equal rights; at the
same time it does not take into account that
their real positions are quite different. ‘Equal
opportunities’ do not always mean ‘equal
possibilities’. That rule would certainly not
work in non-western countries, like Ukraine. It
would only lead to corruption and further
social misbalance of power that in no way
could be described as a kind of democracy or
even a step towards democracy.
To be more precise, the definition of
democracy as the system where each human
being is the bearer and the conductor of
power, implies that each human being is
indeed the highest value of democracy, and
not those structures and institutions that
constitute the corresponding system of
political and social power in society, even if
they belong to the long-standing traditions of
Western Democracies. That is, democracy is
not the division of power, neither is it
parliamentarianism or elections of
representatives. Democracy is just means for
optimizing social life so that it would better suit
interests of each person. In other case, the
struggle for democratization of the world turns
to be moral relativism. Democracy is not
‘Democracy above all’, but ‘Each person
above all’. Violent implantation of ‘western
standards’ as the only criterion of legitimate
democratization is anti-democratic in fact. The
ideal of the power of the people is essentially
concrete. We can call any country a
democracy if and only if it has democratic idea
realized in the best way possible under
concrete conditions of its embodiment, while
the given level of democratic governance
corresponds to social-economical abilities and
cultural-political features of the society.
 

The authors of this article feel that they
have the right to muse about philosophy of
democracy in the way they do that in the
previous chapter, because events in Ukraine
in 2004 that somehow gained the semi-
acknowledged title of ‘the Orange revolution’
form an excellent empirical basis for reviewing
the democratization processes under
globalization. While analyzing that ‘revolution’,
we prefer to rely on our own experience as its
forced observers, and on independent
sources published in Ukraine (Pohrebinskiy,
2005; Pohrebinskiy & Tolpygo, 2007). In
Europe or the US, public opinion concerning
the ‘Orange revolution’ was shaped by other
points of view, though, and those positions
often misrepresent the events happened in
2004 (see, for example: Kuzio, 2005).
In short, the ‘myth of the Orange revolution’
goes as follows: under Presidential elections
in Ukraine in 2004, there was a competition
between ‘authoritarian’ ‘power’ candidate
Yanukovich, and ‘popular’, ‘pro-democratic’
candidate Yushchenko. The second round
proved victory to Yanukovich (with 49% to
46%), but many significant falsifications were
revealed, people entered streets demanding
fair elections and democracy, and the third
round of elections, organized by the order of
Supreme Court, finally claimed victory for
Yushchenko.
We would now state our objections to that
myth. First, revolution means radical change
of the whole social system. Such change is
comprehensive and fundamental; it takes
years to be fulfilled and centuries to be
comprehended. We are still not ready to
summarize the results of the Great French
revolution of the 18
th
c., to say nothing of
those of socialist revolutions of the 20
th
c. As
for events of the beginning of the 21
st
c.,
‘Orange’, ‘Rose’ and other so-called
revolutions are not worthy to bear that
honorary title. A real revolution can hardly
coincide with elections conducted in
accordance with the lawful constitution, as it
mysteriously happened in Ukraine. The social
system had not been changed as a result of
those events; the only change that had taken
place is the change of élites in power. In no
 

way Yushchenko and his prominent
supporters represented a popular opposition
to the corrupted system of power (‘regime of
Kuchma’, the former Ukrainian President):
there were two former prime ministers, two
former Parliament speakers, and a number of
former ministers among leaders of ‘the
Orange revolution’. And the replacement of
élites in power is what one would usually call
‘coup d’état’, and not revolution. The claims of
the victorious party for the status of revolution
leaders naturally originate some doubts as for
the very fact of their democratic election, to
say nothing of the legality of its results.
The election process transformed into well-
directed performance, where the masses
were assigned a part of a flash mob, can
hardly be described as a popular democracy.
Colin Crouch, British author of the ‘post-
democracy’ conception, writes:
“Under this model, while elections
certainly exist and can change
governments, public electoral debate is a
tightly controlled spectacle, managed by
rival teams of professionals expert in the
techniques of persuasion, and
considering a small range of issues
selected by those teams. The mass of
citizens plays a passive, quiescent, even
apathetic part, responding only to the
signals given them. Behind this
spectacle of the electoral game, politics
is really shaped in private by interaction
between elected governments and élites
that overwhelmingly represent business
interests” (Crouch, 2004, p. 4).
Second, one more important characteristic
of any social revolution is that revolution is
indeed some form of self-organization, as the
people rise to defend their rights and
interests, and thus it appears as a big leap
towards democracy. True revolution is indeed
carried out by masses, and not only by a
group of revolutionaries, although the latter
often provides a necessary condition for
forming premises for national revolutionary
uprising. However, the masses that had found
themselves standing on Maidan and shouting
‘Yushchenko for President’ were rather
organized than self-organized – for a
presidential campaign is by no means a
spontaneous process. Prominent Ukrainian
politician Evheniy Kushnaryov, who opposed
Yushchenko, describes his experience of
visiting the Maidan:
“I asked my driver to try to get to the
Maidan. Upon return, he said that the
guards did not let him pass. They
questioned him for a long time, who is
he, from where, why did he come. They
contacted a foreman by radio, which
questioned him again, and finally told
that they won’t let him pass to the
Maidan without a clear answer on who is
he and whom does he represent… It is
clear… What is going on the Maidan – is
not a spontaneous action, but an
organized process with its own ideology
and precise inner structure”
(Kushnaryov, 2005, p. 23).
That is, under such a ‘revolution’, it is not
masses of the people that self-organize
themselves into democratic movement. It is
rather certain politicians that organize revolts
of crowds to support their claim for the place
at the top of the government. Simple as that.
A crowd does not consist of developed and
conscious personalities, and thus it is eager to
obey demagogues and to drive its destructive
force into any direction pointed by them.
Revolutions are not created by crowds;
crowds as a destructive tool in hands of
external leaders, and the people, the
consolidated communities composed of
creative personalities, – those are two quite
different things. As Russian philosopher
Mikhail Lifshitz says:
“The people create the great rallying of
the revolution, while a crowd supervised
by demagogues decomposes and ruins
it. Movements similar to fascism
transform the people into a crowd;
movements similar to the October
revolution raise a crowd onto the level of
the people” (Lifshitz, 1988, p. 235).
That is, instead of developing human
personalities, non-democratic revolts depend
on unconscious destructive force of organized
crowds. Coming back to ‘the Orange
revolution’, we note that the leaders of crowds
had been prepared beforehand to direct that
spontaneous force. The result is not self-
organizing democratic revolution – that
 

revolution is just a false front for a complex of
what is called political technology: a series of
non-democratic ways of gaining power by
manipulating human consciousness. As
French journalist Vincent Jauvert observes,
‘creators of revolutions’ are being hand-picked
and prepared in western centers for
overthrowing social systems of the East:
“In general they are employed by
western institutions, mostly Americans.
They can be named ‘international
democratic brigades’ controlled by
Washington. Some of them have been
consecrated into ‘champions of freedom’
by George Bush himself. For
overthrowing regimes of the East, those
revolutionaries have unique know-how,
subtle mixture of non-violence, marketing
and fund raising”
1
(Jauvert, 2005, p. 3).
Thus, we come to another important feature
of ‘the Orange revolution’. Recent events in
Eastern Europe are nothing but an ‘export of
democracy’ from the West. Instead of
supporting democracy as the self-organization
of the Ukrainian society, leaders of the
Orange revolution relied solely on external
ideological forces. They were naturally
opposed by ‘easterners’ that relied rather on
Russia than on the West. But both positions
here present an extrapolation of internal
contradiction of the Ukrainian society. Instead
of being developed in a dialectical way and
creative collaboration of different positions
(what true democracy is, we believe), political
leaders transformed that contradiction into the
reason for revolts of crowds. Those events
serve interests of the USA government,
interests of some or other political leaders, –
but not interests of the civil society and the
citizens of Ukraine. The most regrettable
observation we have to make is that it was the
USA competing with Russia during Ukrainian
2004 elections, and not really democratization
1
“Et en général ils sont employés par des institutions
occidentales, principalement américaines. A leur sujet, on
pourrait parler de «brigades internationales
démocratiques», parrainées par Washington. Certains
d'entre eux ont d'ailleurs été sacrés «champions of
freedom» par George Bush en personne. Pour renverser
les despotes de l'Est, ces révolutionnaires ont un savoir-
faire unique, subtil mélange de non-violence, de
marketing et de fund raising (collecte de fonds)”.
processes peculiar to the Ukrainian society
itself.
It is obvious that the practice of relying on
external forces in the struggle for power and
even in the development of a certain society
could not be described as a feature of
democracy. The legitimacy power of Western
authorities was strict and unambiguous: USA
had officially stated that they are not
accepting the results of the Ukrainian
elections, if the pro-western candidate is not
declared the winner (Richter, 2004)! But you
cannot force the people into freedom and
democracy – that’s the one lesson we, the
people of the former USSR, have learnt from
our former communist experience. And it is
quite bitter to see similar mistakes made by
contemporary ‘democrats’, trying to achieve
that abstract democracy by concrete anti-
democratic actions, like overthrowing and
threatening the legitimate political system
elected by a democratic process.
Of course, the kind of ‘democracy’ forced
and introduced by ‘the Orange revolution’
does not reflect the will of the whole
population, but only that of one part of it.
Supposing, as the careful analysis suggests,
that there were falsifications made by both
sides on almost equal scale (see:
Pohrebinskiy, 2005), one has to assume that
the Ukrainian society became highly polarized
during elections, and resolving the crisis
would have been required a very cautious
approach. However, ’a revolution’ here refers
to the minority usurping the power:
Yushchenko turns out to be ‘the President of
Maidan’, and not the President of Ukraine.
Ukrainian situation since 2004 proves that
statement. After its victory, the Orange power
has virtually deprived the other part of society
its right to exist, its right to express its opinion.
About half of Ukrainian citizens, mostly
located in the East or in the South regions of
Ukraine, were at once proclaimed ‘bandits’
and ‘reactionaries’. Only ‘Orange’ ideology
became legitimate, and only Orange identity
was openly allowed. For example, there was a
criminal case initiated against the cited
politician, Evheniy Kushnaryov, who said
during ‘the revolution’ that in his Kharkov
region there would be no ‘Donetsk power’ or
 

‘Lvov power’
2
, but only ‘Kharkov power’. That
seemingly rational notion was considered as
‘separatism’ and ‘federalism’ and prosecuted
by the new Orange central government
(Kushnaryov, 2005). It is not surprising then
that already in 2005 the sharp decrease of
trust the people had for their Orange leaders
was registered (Pohrebinskiy & Tolpygo,
2007); and permanent squabbles within ‘the
Orange democrats’ have deprived them of the
confidence bonus they had received from
Europe and the US by 2009.
 

In our opinion, the experience of ‘the
Orange revolution’ provides but another
incentive for philosophical rethinking of
democracy, for constructing a new ideal of the
democratization process, based on non-linear
approach, as described in the first chapter of
this article. The first reason for that is the
inadequacy of the Modern conception of
nation-state under the situation of the
globalized world. In fact, it is the task of
nation-building that drives Yushchenko and
other Orange leaders along the course of
abstract linearity, imposing unitary identity on
Ukrainian citizens. And struggle for the
dominant administrative power within the
nation-state no longer serves as an example
of democracy, and not only in Ukraine. But the
irony of Ukraine’s history (and that of other
newly independent countries) lies in its certain
backwardness: their sovereignty could appear
as a doomed one while being established in
times of globalization.
Humanity today is challenged with a
transition to the next form of the democratic
social system – the third one, after its antique
and medieval polis form, and its nation-state
modern form, – the system encompassing
humanity as a whole. There is a criticism
about nation-state, postulating its irrelevance
and uselessness in our times, appearing both
from the left and from the right. We can just
mention two books with the identical title –
“The end of the nation state” – published in
2
These cities are informal capitals of Eastern and
Western Ukraine, and in 2004 they were major support
centers for correspondingly Yanukovich and Yushchenko.
1995 (Ohmae, 1995; Guéhenno, 1995). The
authors come to similar conclusions while
sharing quite opposite positions and different
premises.
Japanese business-consultant Kenichi
Ohmae, who is an avid supporter of the
economical globalization and free market
system, argues that nation-states lack any
meaning for global economy: they hamper the
development of the economy with their
barriers and social programs; traditional
nation states now become “unnatural, even
impossible business units in a global
economy” (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5). The new
subjects of humankind development are
'economical regions’ that overcome any
national borders – and Ohmae here abstracts
away from any cultural, traditional, and
human-related issues.
French diplomat Jean-Marie Guéhenno (the
original French title of his above-mentioned
book was ‘The End of Democracy’) stands for
more humanistic positions. A nation-state is
over, because it is no longer able to satisfy
human needs and to solve political tasks.
Democracies are no longer sovereign and
responsible, as national policy is driven by
transnational forces:
“Too remote to manage the problems of
our daily life, the nation nevertheless
remains too constrained to confront the
global problems that affect us. Whether it
is a question of the traditional functions
of sovereignty, like defense or justice, or
of economic competencies, the nation
appears increasingly like a straitjacket,
poorly adapted to the growing integration
of the world (Guéhenno, 1995, pp. 12–
13).
Actually, the problem of democracy under
globalization lies not just in the disappearance
of nation-states, but in them losing their
exclusive status as the arena of the
embodiment of the democratic political and
social system. The power as the ability to act,
and not as just the dominance, is being
decentralized and spread in all multitudes of
spheres of human life and activity – from a
single family to the global humankind in
general. All these spheres naturally
intermingle, so that establishing limits of one’s
 

sovereignty and influence is thankless and an
unnecessary task.
What we want to state is that each human
person, every developed personality has to
become the subject of democracy, obtaining
abilities and possibilities to make decisions
and to govern his or her own life, and the
people (‘’) now refer to all the
humankind. The problem is that there are not
only objective reasons for the new
development of democracy (that is,
globalization and diminishing powers of
nation-states), but subjective reasons as well
– the development of human personality that
overcomes classical representative
democracy.
‘L'etat c'est moi’, Louis XIV used to say, –
but today neither President, nor Prime
Minister, nor anybody else has moral rights to
make such a statement. The state, the society
could not be reduced to a unitary nation, or
one culture, or a single language. According
to our profound conviction, democracy is
incompatible with processes of unification – it
is possible only as the unity in plurality. The
general will of the people could no longer be
justifiably represented. Each human
personality is the only possible and legitimate
representative of his/her own interests,
because nobody else has such a unique
combination of identities, cultural and
biological features. And no politicians could
serve as an embodiment of the spirit of the
nation. For example, the Orange leaders has
appealed for NATO participation, and the
western world understood it as an expression
of ‘Ukraine’s’ wish to join the Alliance;
however, the fact that the majority of the
Ukrainian population reject that idea (Atwell,
2008), is often being ignored. Indeed, the
people in general are not so eager to follow
the path of pseudo-revolutions upheld by
élites wanting dominance, as Polish
sociologist Jadwiga Staniszkis (2006)
demonstrates; masses now are rather
pragmatic and pursue their own everyday life,
which is quite remote from the ‘Big politics’ of
a nation state.
That is, human persons are able to
construct their own democracy, whether we
should call it ‘neighborhood democracy’,
grassroots democracy, or ideal democracy of
everyone. In order to achieve the real
democracy and responsibility, rights of each
person must be realized directly, and not
through delegates or representatives, like
governmental officers or ‘professional
politicians’. That does not imply that every
person must become a politician or a
governmental officer. That means that each
human person must become a personality as
the true driving force of the democratic
society.
We believe that we must possess not only
rights and opportunities, but also abilities and
possibilities as well, in order to function as the
subjects of democracy. It is very important to
note that such possibilities, as something
peculiar to everybody, is not unification and
‘leveling’ it used to be in some forms of
socialism and communism. Indeed,
democracy as the unity in plurality supposes
cultivating the difference between human
beings as its subjects. And the only possible
unification here is the same possibility of each
person for his or her personal growth, for a
creative upbringing of his or her personality.
In order for each person to be able to be
different and to develop as a personality, all
the people must be equally endorsed not only
with political rights, but with social,
economical, and cultural rights as well. The
political freedom of speech, for example, is a
great gain of democracy, but that right alone
is surely insufficient for democracy. The
freedom of speech remains empty and
senseless formality if not based on spiritual
and cultural background and filling. Simply
speaking, one has something to say, in order
to benefit from the given freedom of speech.
In other case, that democratic freedom is
nothing better than the prohibition of free
speech under totalitarian or authoritarian
regime. That prohibition at least supposes that
a person has some own inherent and
intelligent opinion or thought that he/she can
express if allowed.
That is, the true democracy could only be
enabled by the true personalities. The quality
of being the subject of democracy could not
be externally imposed on such a personality.
You cannot force human to obtain social and
political power, to say nothing of the ability
and desire to govern. That’s why democracy
 

could not be organized as any other kind of
social system and government. Democracy
could only appear as a result of self-
organization of human personalities.
It is quite important to note what we mean
here by self-organization. It is not self-
organization of a system, even it is a social
system, as in Niklas Luhmann’s theory. It is
self-organization of the humans themselves.
And what we just said on democracy is true
for self-organization as well: there could be no
self-organization ‘forced’ by an inanimate
system on living individuals as its ’elements’.
Humans are not molecules to be seen from
the ‘above’ with the microscope. Humans are
not Bénard’s cells that have to self-organize
volens-nolens, because the mighty observer
(read: the Orange President, the US agency
for promoting freedom and democracy, etc.)
heats them on a frying pan. Indeed, humans
have their own immanent goals, and that’s
why they do have self-development, self-
realization, and not just self-organization.
‘Self’ here is just the human self – as in ‘self-
discipline’, ‘self-critics’ – meaning personal
ability to be a subject of one’s own life. From
our point of view, self-organization of a social
system is the process of self-development
and self-motion of the society in accordance
to self-development of humans in that society.
In other case, the term ‘self-organization’
would only designate some outer and
inessential form of social development, and
not its real essence (Myelkov, 2006).
That’s where a non-linear approach to
philosophical comprehension of social and
political sphere of human life comes into focus
again. Both state and society under current
stage of a democratization process must be
considered according to the methodology of
self-organization. More simply, each human is
to be comprehended as not means for the
state’s activity and functioning, but as the goal
of such an activity. More precisely, not as an
object of influence for achieving let the most
optimal forms of social order, but as the
subject of the goal-making itself, who is
responsible for the development of his or her
society towards realizing those goals, who
directly performs that realization by his or her
own life activity. And it is the personality that
serves as the notion describing human being
in his or her ability to appear as the subject of
goals and values.
The personality itself from the philosophical
point of view is the essential force of human,
the already mentioned ability to act in a
creative way and to be the subject of life and
the life of the own society. The personality is
the process of development of one’s higher
self; it is the ideal, and not some external or
transcendent ideal, but the immanent ideal
that resides within oneself personally. Of
course, we must note that each person can be
and is engaged in personal and social
development: each person could be
considered as personality in development,
and not just some ‘leaders’ or ‘best people’
out of the total population of humanity.
At the same time, personality is not only
infinite uniqueness of each human; it also
unites him or her with other human beings.
The personality, in difference from the
individuality, is not something singular; it is
rather a mediating link between singular and
general. Or, it is such singular that bears the
universal in itself. The personality is deeply
tied to other personalities, and that tie is not
something outer or something casual for that
personality, it is presupposed by the
personality and forms indispensable condition
of his/her own independent existence. Such
coherence of personalities is based on their
solidarity as for mutual cultural traditions and
values that unite them and provide them with
the sense of the mutual trust. Trust, inner
moral interrelation of personalities enabling
their free cooperation in the process of social
self-organization, is possible only on the
foundation of values, and cannot originate out
of any outside compulsion (Tolstoukhov &
Myelkov, 2005).
While based on cultural values, the
personality demonstrates a creative approach,
creative active relation to those values, their
reflection-alteration as the inner contradiction
of the personality serving as the source of its
self-motion and self-development – and social
self-organization as well. Any personalistic
practical action appears as a creative
transformation of some outer object, as well
as that personality itself – either it is a
production of the new, or transformation of the
old in accordance with current conditions of
 

the environment. While mastering the cultural
experience of the humanity, the personality
recreates that experience, introducing its own,
unique dimension into the culture.
Democracy as the self-organization of
human personalities does not appear out of
nothing. As any development, self-
organization is possible on a certain ground,
out of some basis only. And in social and
personalistic development there is the cultural
background that presets possible contexts of
senses for that development, presets even
certain clusters of options that could be
revealed in the process of future self-
organization. In other words, only cultural
values could enable social development and
social organization, providing personalities
with all their creative and goal-making
abilities.
Traditional cultural values form the eternal
foundation for any construction. But eternal
here does not mean immutable. On the
contrary, every day we create something new,
we form new values, on the base of the
values that we already possess. The
personality appears to be the subject of
democracy as social self-organization just
because it undergoes its own development
towards optimal states, while facing the inner
contradiction of preserving/changing its
cultural background, its goals and values that
set the personality (and its society) into that
motion and development.
One can argue that democracy, especially
in our global age, could only be presented as
the result of collective, and not individual,
behavior. It may sound banal, but the
development of the personality is inseparable
from the development of its community. That
is, the personality cannot act and even exist
without communities and without other
humans, and community is surely nothing
without its members. Any collective is
composed of individuals, and thus their
activities as for social self-organization
process cannot be opposed to each other.
However, the collective organization of
personalities can obtain different forms in
society. Some of these forms enable self-
organization of personalities and the
development of democracy, others do not. We
think that crowd, which so often appears now
as a subject of social development
(Moscovici, 1991), could not be considered as
a community composed of developing
personalities. That is, actions of a crowd do
not present any kind of democracy and/or
social self-organization. A crowd, in its
principal difference from any true community,
is not an integral group that can justifiably
speak and act in the name of its members or
even in its own name as some other subject
or meta-subject. A crowd is but a chance
gathering of people, who cannot, while being
in crowd, neither act in a creative way, nor
take any responsibility for their actions.
Indeed, the crowd could be easily convinced
to obey the power of the demagogues,
serving as a blind tool in their hands, thus
presenting that aspect of organization that
opposes it to self-organization of people as
the bearers and the conductors of power. Our
Lord was crucified by the unanimous decision
of a crowd, but such decisions neither reflect
the will of all the people, nor could they be
presented as just deeds committed for the
sake of the common good or social order.
The society or its community is the
collective of the people closely united by
mutual life, mutual interests, and mutual
values. A crowd is not such a collective. Its
members are united only by some slogan or
some minute impulse with no value and no
long-term development orientations behind it.
A crowd is not made of free and creative
personalities, it could not consolidate people
in a real way, and it is not a vital part of the
social structure. A person as a part of a crowd
appears as an object of external impact, as
means for reaching some other goal that is
not his or her immanent, but is imposed by
somebody else – and not the subject of
democracy he or she can and should be.
 
Thus, we can outline some conclusion of
this article that can serve, in our opinion, as
preliminary ideas for the democratization of
our society, although the theme of
investigating philosophical foundations for
democracy is deep enough to host more and
more generations of philosophers. Recent
uprisings in Eastern Europe, like ‘the Orange
revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004, demonstrate
 

the urge to develop our ideas of democracy,
so that they would correspond to the current
global situation. A nation-state with its unitary
and administrative approach – understanding
democracy as a representative one, and
power as the national governance – is
becoming obsolete. Democracy as the unity in
plurality cannot be adequately expressed in
formulas or social structures possible and
effective in all places and under all
circumstances. Democracy is not a given
state of affairs; instead, it is a non-linear
process of social development towards better
society where real human beings are bearers
and conductors of social and political power.
In that sense, no society could yet serve as
‘the complete example’ of the true democracy.
The latter could be considered as a self-
organization of society composed of free and
conscious human personalities: it is the
personality that serves as both the supreme
value and the subject of democracy. Both
concepts of the people (‘’) and power
(‘’) are being developed and
concretized, enhancing and augmenting our
experience and our striving for a better human
society.
 


Atwell, K. (2008). Why Ukrainians don't want NATO. Retrieved April 28, 2009, from http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1215-
Why-Ukrainians-dont-want-NATO.html
Barber, B. (1984). Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of
California Press.
Crouch, C. (2004). Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Guéhenno, J.-M. (1995). The End of the Nation-State. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Jauvert, V. (2005). Les faiseurs de revolutions. Le Nouvel Observateur, 2116 (26/05/2005), 3-8.
Kushnaryov, Ye. P. (2005). The Red Horse. Notes by the Counterrevolutionary. Kharkov: Kharkov Editions. (In Russian)
Kuzio, T. (2005). From Kuchma to Yushchenko – Ukraine's 2004 presidential elections and the Orange Revolution.
Problems of Post-Communism, 52(2), 29-44.
Lifshitz, M. A. (1988). The Moral Meaning of the October Revolution. In M. A. Lifshitz (Ed.), Coll. Works: in 3 vol., Vol. 3 (pp.
230-258). Moscow: Iskusstvo. (In Russian)
Macpherson, C. B. (1973). Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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Cultural Context of Social Self-Organization (pp. 72-82). Kiev: Kiev University Publishing Center.
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March 2006. Kiev: Optima. (In Russian)
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The University of Chicago Press.
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Richter, P. (2004). We Cannot Accept’ Ukraine Vote Results, Powell Says. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 25, 2004, A-18.
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11/12, 7-13.
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2, 3-14. (In Russian)
Tolstoukhov, A. V., Parapan, I. G., & Myelkov, Yu. A. (2008). Democracy: Power, People, Nation. Practical Philosophy, 4,
69-81. (In Russian)

Anatoliy Tolstoukhov
Anatoliy Tolstoukhov is the President of the Charity Organization "Center for Practical Philosophy", holds a D.Sc. degree in
Philosophy (2004) and a Ph.D. in Philosophy (1999) (both Kiev Shevchenko National University). His major fields of interest
are philosophy of ecology, philosophy of politics, and philosophy of science. Anatoliy Tolstoukhov also works as a politician,
and currently serves as a member of Ukraine’s Parliament.
Yuriy Myelkov
Yuriy Myelkov is the Projects’ coordinator at the Charity Organization "Center for Practical Philosophy", holds a Ph.D. in
philosophy (2003, Kiev Shevchenko National University). Yuriy’s research is focused on philosophical problems of
contemporary science, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of democracy.