
let alone their ability to become subjects of
power.
However, even after all the revolutions of
18
th
, 19
th
, and 20
th
centuries, it could not be
testified that humanity in any way has really
achieved true democracy, when all the people
participate in policy making in full. Still, the
development of the human society and its
government could be presented as an
evolution towards the most optimal form of
that society and that government, that is,
towards democracy. In other words,
democracy under such nonlinear approach
appears not as a given state of affairs, but as
a constant process of development. Neither
stage of that process could be considered as
a complete democracy in fact, but each one of
those stages can serve as a certain
approximation to that ideal – the complete
realization of democratic form of social and
political organization of human life.
The notion of the people who can be and
are subjects of social and political power is
being constantly specified and extended.
Gradually, the slaves, the serfs, the workers,
the poor, women, national minorities and
other groups and strata are tending to be
included into the notion of ‘demos’, into the
volume of people subject to be bearers and
conductors of social power. Thus, national
democracy discovers that different ethnic
groups have equal rights for participation in
the life of society. Similarly, social democracy
defends rights of the poor, and stands for
equality of all human beings irrelevant to their
social positions.
Those named forms of democracy, – or, it
would be better to say, those stages of the
democratization process, – are still actual
under present-day situations. However, at the
same time, they remain abstract in relation to
further possible concretization of what
democracy really is. Both social and national
‘democracies’ appear as obsolete under the
situation of the globalizing world. Globalization
changes human lives, their traditional modes
of activity, and requires even more
specification of both our ideals and forms of
our social organization. The world is now
more unified than ever, and its common future
that concerns every person could be easily
endangered with a simple single action by a
superpower. We think that such a situation
conditions the necessity for all people of the
world to decide directly, and not through their
representatives of any kind, the fate of
humanity.
That means that the notion of power
present in the term ‘democracy’ also develops
and concretizes itself. In Greek, as well as in
other languages, there are different nuances
of the word ‘power’. First, it is the initial
‘’, power as a wraparound dominance
and possession, peculiar to the past historical
forms of total governance. Second, it is a
more gentile ‘’ – power as a guidance
and administration. And finally, it is ‘’ –
power as the ability to create, to behave, to
act. While all three do contribute to our
understanding of democracy, the
development from the first to the second and
then to the third of denoted aspects could be
seen as the real process of democratization
(see: Tolstoukhov, Myelkov, & Parapan,
2008).
Unfortunately, the situation we now observe
is quite different, if not opposite, from what
philosophy can and should say about
democracy. Democracy in its most
widespread meaning is considered not as a
process of social evolution, but – in a linear
perspective – as a certain given state of
affairs that exists in some time and place and
could be easily transferred to other time and
place. Most western experts do believe that
only the ‘Westminster’ model of democracy,
especially in its American version, with all its
traditional attributes – like legal state, strict
division of power, parliamentarianism, and
civil society – is the only possible form of
democracy. Thus, any deviation from that
model in any country, any insufficient level of
the development of some of its elements, or
their absence at all, is branded as an
inadequacy and/or incompleteness of
democracy in that country.
Such a view does not give justice to
contemporary nonlinear studies of democracy
we are trying to conduct, neither to its
classical ideal representations. We would like
to cite the criticism of that position by famous
Canadian theoretician of participatory
democracy, C. B. Macpherson: