tripleC 7(1): 1-11, 2009
ISSN 1726-670X
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Information as form
Anis Pervez
Communication and Media Arts, American International University-Bangladesh, anispervez@gmail.com
Abstract: An interpretive and constructive understanding of information can be developed by drawing on a number of
premises of autopoiesis in combination with Spencer-Brown’s laws of form. Such understanding views information as self-
referential meaning construction by observing an object. Therefore, information can be perceived as form resulted from
individuals’ making distinction of their environment. By analyzing forms — token of indications — one can empirically
understand what information is constructed. Such investigation is a qualitative exploration of human actions and
interpretations.
Keywords: Autopoiesis, Self-reference, Laws of form, Observation, Indication
Acknowledgement: Debora Shaw
he popularization of the term
“information” has complicated its
theoretical definitions because it is often
difficult to put a rigid scientific boundary
around a popular term. Information has been
theorized from a number of perspectives
across different disciplines; one can find
several perspectives on information within
information science. Some of the
understandings are supplementary and
complementary to each other. There are also
understandings that are quite contradictory.
For some, information has an objective status.
A growing number of scholars, however, see
information as an emergent property. This
second perspective has a sound basis and
appeals because it takes individuals as the
focus; but methodological tools are
inadequate to operationalize this qualitative
and phenomenological approach to
understanding information. The objective of
this paper is to offer an interpretive
understanding of information that can be
empirically investigated. I argue that
information is form taking caused by the way
individuals self-referentially make distinctions
to their environments. Some premises of
autopoiesis in combination with Spencer-
Brown’s laws of form facilitate such an
understanding.
1. Diversity of the conceptions of
information
Some researchers view information as data
— mechanical, economic, or sensory — that
can be understood as a commodity or
physical resource (Artandi, 1973; Boulding,
1956; Budd & Ruben, 1979; Horton, 1979;
Lancaster & Gillespie, 1970; Lipetz, 1970;
Luftus & Luftus, 1976; Rogers & Kincaid,
1981; Ruben, 1972, 1984; Thayer, 1968;
Williams, 1979). For some, it is a signal
(Cherry, 1966; Watzlawick, Beavin, &
Jackson, 1967), code (Cannon & Luecke,
1980; Maruyama; 1968, Masuda, 1981),
symbol (Lin, 1973) or message (Fisher, 1979;
MacKay, 1952a, 1952b; Rapoport, 1982;
Shannon & Weaver, 1949). According to
McLuhan (1964) information is a medium. A
significant number of scholars understands
information as formal or recovered knowledge
(Boorstein, 1961; Davidson, Boylan, & Yu,
1976; Machlup, 1962; McCroskey, 1968)
whereas Boulding (1956), Goffman (1974),
Ruben (1984), and Whittmore and Yovitz
(1973) think information is subjective or
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personal knowledge. Miller and Steinberg
(1975) bring a socio-cultural and
psychological dimension to understanding
information as knowledge. Various scholars
understand information as thinking, cognition,
and memory (Burner, 1973; Hunt, 1982;
Laszlo, 1969; Luftus & Luftus, 1976; Masuda,
1980, Pratt, 1977; Schifrin, Castellan,
Lindman, & Pisoni, 1975; Schroder, Driver, &
Streufert, 1967). So diverse is the conception
of information that Dizard (1982), Salvaggio
(1983), and Schiller (1983) consider
information as a technology and Belkin and
Robertson (1976) view information as text.
Wiener (1961) sees information as uncertainty
reduction and his view is supported by Jones
(1969), Krippendorff (1977), Lin (1973), Pierce
(1961), Rogers and Kincaid (1981), and
Rapoport (1966). For Buckley (1967), Masuda
(1980), Miller (1965), Ruben (1972, 1984),
and Thayer (1968, 1979) information is a
linkage between living organisms and their
environment. Information is also a product of
social interaction (Deetz & Mumby, 1984;
Ruben 1975) that has a structure (Laszlo,
1969; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967,
Weiner, 1961) capable of changing the image-
structure of a recipient (Belkin & Robertson,
1976). As a stimulus (Bruner, 1973; Jones,
1969) information facilitates learning (Bruner,
1973; MacKay, 1952a, 1952b; Pratt, 1977;
Thayer, 1979) and it acts as means for
regulation and control in society (Ashby, 1964;
Laszlo, 1969; Milsum, 1968; Watzlawick,
Bevin, and Jackson, 1967; Young, 1960).
Such diverse understandings have made
the conception of information even more
complex and often difficult to follow. Ruben
(1985) identified several perspectives or
conceptions of information that could be found
across different disciplines and demonstrated
these under a number of dimensions as
shown in the following table.
Dimension
Perspective/Concept
Data (property,
code, pattern)
commodity, code/pattern,
documents, knowledge,
messages, news, physical
forms of property,
processed sensory data,
product, resource, service,
signal, stimuli, structure or
organization, symbols, text
Process
(through which
data are
transmitted,
transformed, or
stored)
learning, linkage, process
of being formed, thinking,
cognition, memory
Channel or
technology
(means through
which data are
captured,
transmitted,
transformed,
stored,
retrieved)
medium, technology
Uses, functions,
or outcomes (of
data
transmission,
transformation,
organization,
management, or
storage)
Consequence of action,
culture formation, decision
making/problem solving,
entropy (decrease in),
meaning, management,
network development,
personality development,
product of social
interaction, reality
construction labeling and
validation, regulation of
control, relational
development, rule and
ritual formulation, structure
or organization, therapy,
thinking, cognition,
memory
Table 1: Dimension and perspective/concept
of information
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Ruben may not have identified every
perspective, yet the metrics that he offered is
an indication that information has different
meanings and usages. Such a diverse
understanding of information may be fused
into an integrative perspective (Hofkirchner,
1998) that will “bring information theorists
together around the concept of information as
a theoretical subject.” (Doucette, Bichler,
Hofkirchner, & Raffl, 2007, p. 198) The
importance of such a perspective is well
recognized. However, this essay, which
discusses an interpretive understanding of
information that can be empirically examined,
does not have the scope to elaborate on that.
Instead, the article will limit the discussion
mainly to the way information has been
defined and understood in information science
paving a way to support an interpretive or
constructive approach to information.
1.1. Information in Information Science
Shannon's view of how information is
transferred, although it never defined
information, developed a ground for theorizing
information across different disciplines.
Theorizing information within information
science also rested on Shannon's information
transformation perspective for the many years
that the field held a positivistic nature. Over
the last few decades, information science has
experienced a shift from a predominantly
objectivist view of information theory to focus
on the phenomena of relevance and
interpretation (Capurro & Hjørland, 2003).
This was a shift from the hard science and
technical perspectives to social sciences and
humanities (Brier, 1992). Various detailed
reviews (Cornelius, 2002; Capurro & Hjørland,
2003; Machlup & Mansfield, 1983) identify
different approaches to information that can
be seen primarily as two categories, the
mechanistic approach and the cognitive
approach, denoting whether information has
an objective entity or it is a subjective
construct.
The mechanistic approach considers
information as a substance residing “in the
world.” Information systems and the
mechanism of information transfer are the
focus of this approach. It assumes that
information science is an empirical discipline,
unconcerned with what information is in an
ontological or metaphysical sense (Zund &
Gehl, 1979). The mechanistic approach does
not actually give a clear explanation of how
something becomes informative. During the
first half of the 1990s information scientists
began to understand the need to change their
approach and focus. Buckland (1991) defined
information as a thing that has some reified
existence. His view differs from the purely
mechanistic in the sense that he defined thing
to include tangible and intangible items,
knowledge, and process. Agre (1995)
advocated a practice-centered understanding
of information. He viewed information as an
object of certain professional ideologies that
can be understood only through the practices
by which professionals construct it in their
work.
The cognitive approach considers human
cognition as necessary for determining what
can be called information. This moves the
focus from the information system to the
user’s state of mind. Information science in
this phase benefited from ideas from outside
the discipline. In this regard Drestke's (1991)
information-based knowledge theory and
Barwise and Perry's (1983) theory of
situational meaning are important (Cupurro &
Hjørland, 2003; Cornelius, 2002); they
supplied with the necessary concepts for a
cognitive understanding of information. In
parallel to the development within cognitive
science, where there was a move from
symbol manipulation to embedded cognition,
a refined, human-centered approach to
information emerged: the constructivist
approach to information. The constructivist
approach focuses on the uniqueness of the
individual experience of information; it seeks
to understand and theorize how information
becomes meaningful to individuals and
shared as in a common linguistic, social and
cultural context.
Saracevic (1999) viewed information as a
continuum of complexity: as signal or
message in a narrow sense, as cognitive
processing and understanding in a broader
sense, and as embedded within a social
context. This continuum essentially is
congruent with Hjørland’s (2007) recent
classification of the understanding of
information into two basic categories: the
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objective understanding of information and the
subjective understanding of information. The
objective understanding is observer- and
situation-independent. In this sense
information has an intrinsic value that has a
universal and definite meaning to everyone
who has access to it. The narrow sense of
information is an example of this objective
understanding; the cognitive processing and
broad understanding is a subjective or
situational understanding of information.
According to Hjørland (2007, p. 1449), “What
is information for one person in one situation
need not be information for another person in
another situation. This view of information as
a noun is related to becoming informed
(informing as a verb). Something is
information if it is informative — or, rather,
something is information when it is
informative”. Understanding information as
subject- and situation-dependent is an
interpretive and constructivist approach that
subscribes to phenomenology and aims to
understand the individual's role in the process
of making information.
Scholars have employed various
perspectives within this approach. Cornelius
(1996) used symbolic interactionism to unveil
how meaning is negotiated in interaction with
other meanings. Capurro (2000) preferred a
hermeneutic perspective to mark the process
of interpretation of the way information is
constructed whereas Brier (1995) emphasized
a semiotic perspective called cybersemiotics.
The theory of autopoiesis represents a further
step in this tradition.
Autopoiesis is a radical form of
constructivism. Brier (1992), Qvortrup (1993)
and Mingers (1995) laid the ground for an
autopoietic view of information, but did not
offer any direction about how to operationalize
such a constructive and interpretive
comprehension. In the next two sections, the
article briefly discusses the properties of
autopoiesis that are relevant for a subjective
or interpretive understanding of information.
This will be later connected with Spencer-
Brown’s (1973) theory of “laws of form” in
order to operationalize such a conception of
information that can be used for empirical
investigation.
2. An autopoietic understanding
"Autopoiesis", combining the Greek words
auto (self) and poiesis (creation, production),
is a concept involved in the phenomenological
understanding of cognition proposed by
Maturana (1970); Maturana and Varela (1980)
developed this to a systemic explanation of
cognition and descriptive phenomenology.
In the autopoietic view cognition is
phenomenological. In other words, autopoietic
theory describes how living systems address
and engage the domain(s) in which they
operate. Living systems approach and engage
the world in terms of the perturbations in their
nervous systems, which are operationally
closed, i.e. the transformation occurs within
the system’s boundary. Living systems
constantly reproduce themselves by
maintaining their boundaries. The boundary is
a distinction that the system makes on its own
and the boundary is what makes the system
different from another system or the
environment. The boundary gives it
uniqueness that can be used for
manipulations or descriptions in interactions
with other observers. An observing subject is
a system who observes other systems and
the environment.
A system is comprised of organization and
structure. The organization is a set of inter-
component relationships, which outlines its
form at a given moment and serves as the
core “identity” that is maintained by the
system. Organization is necessary for a
system to become a member of a specific
class. The organization’s unity is realized
through the presence and interplay of
components in a given space and time. These
comprise the system’s structure.
The principle of structural determination is
used to understand the system's range of
potential structural transformations and the
potential perturbations impinging upon the
system. Any perturbation may trigger a
change of system state, but the particular
change is a function of the system's own
organization and structure. The basic point is
that the behavior of a system is constrained
by its constitution, not by the environment.
Structural coupling denotes the way a
system interacts, coordinates, and co-evolves
with another system or the environment. In
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structural coupling, the participant systems
reciprocally serve as sources of compensable
perturbation for each other. Here perturbation
is understood in the sense of indirect effect or
change without having penetrated the
boundary of the affected system. This implies
that (1) any change in a system is a self-
referential change and therefore the system is
closed and (2) an autopoietic system
reproduces itself and is thus recursive.
Self-referential observation is the core
principle of autopoiesis. An observer, who is a
system, observes an environment being
governed by the observer’s unique structure.
This is a second order cybernetic
understanding of observation. Observation
begins with the observer and ends with the
observer. This is how an observer constantly
reproduces her/his own structure. Varela
(1979) and von Foerster (1981) used the myth
of Uroborus, the snake that swallows its own
tail, to emphasize the self-referential nature of
observation. Like the Uroborus, all
observations recursively make the system
reenter itself.
Figure 1: Self-referential observation (Source:
1478 drawing by Theodoros Pelecanos)
A cybernetic approach to examining
narratives leads to an individual perspective,
where the individual is seen as the starting
point for relationships. It further argues that
any person should become the author of his
or her own story. These stories bring us to
perceive the importance of the self and inner
experiences. Authoring one’s own story or
narrative is an inner dialogical experience
where one talks to oneself (Bertrando, 2000).
In authoring one’s own story, one develops
texts.
Luhmann (1986, 1995) extended Maturana
and Varela’s autopoietic theory for biological
systems to an autopoietic theory for non-living
systems like psychic and social systems. A
social system allows space for such other
systems as the economic, cultural, and
religious. Social systems are characterized by
their communicative character; they
reproduce meaning through a self-referential
order and the production of meaning is
recursive.
2.1. Autopoiesis and information
Perturbation is the point of departure for an
autopoietic understanding of information.
Qvortrup (1993) considers information as an
operational change the external world
introduces into an observing system. The
individual is a closed system that experiences
perturbation through a structural coupling with
another system or the environment.
Perturbation is a state of change or difference
in the interacting system or the environment
that triggers a change or difference in the first
system. By grounding Bateson’s (1972)
famous notion of information — difference that
makes difference is information — into an
autopoietic setting, Brier (1992, pp. 80-81)
commented:
“I find that his [Maturana] theory gives a
better foundation for Bateson’s theory of
information through the important point
that the autopoietic system does not
receive information but only
perturbations of its organization. The so
called reaction is internal adjustment to
preserve the internal organization of the
system. It underlines the distinction
between the world and its being of
differences – potential information if you
like – and information processing of the
autopoietic system.”
Autopoietic information theory denies the
existence of any information in the
environment and also does not recognize
information as thing. Information is a mental
state, or change in the individual system—the
way the individual relates himself to a
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particular state of the world. It is a
phenomenological and constructivist
approach.
The cognitive mind relates itself with an
external state by interpreting that state self-
referentially. This is done by producing
meaning from within those that already exist.
In the domain of communicative systems,
meanings are the extension and reproduction
of the stock of meaning one already has.
Therefore, information is also the extension
and reproduction of meanings that already
exist. The process of reproduction in this
regard is understood as evolution. Nothing
becomes informative out of the blue:
everything that informs is an outcome of a
construction. This is a construction process
similar to the concept of language games
posited by Wittgenstein (1963). A language
game views language as a set of tools that we
use to construct and assign meaning defined
within a particular knowledge system.
Similarly, the construction of information is the
usage of a set of meanings that a system has
in possession. Because the tools, in this case
meanings, have boundaries for their
operation, the process of assigning meaning
is self-referential: one meaning reproduces
another by reference to the knowledge system
to which the meanings belong. Dretske’s
(1981) notion of belief as a background for
generating knowledge and Gadamer’s (1977)
concept of pre-understanding have similarity
with the way information is self-referential and
recursive. An autopoietic system is also
analogous to von Uexkull’s (1957) concept of
Umwelt, which emphasizes an organism’s
sovereignty and it’s self-reference.
The fact that self-referential meaning and
therefore the reproduction of information are
constrained and shaped by organizational
closure implies that a system is intentional in
its relating to its environment and to other
systems. Intention in this context is similar to
Brentano’s formulation (Hamlyn, 1984) that
intentionality was so obviously inexplicable in
physical terms that it proved the existence of
a non-material world. Intentionality is
comprised of aspiration as well as an
individual’s need for volition. Intention is not
only a private mental phenomenon; it is also
expressed in social conventions (Grice, 1989)
via signs in speech and other forms.
Recognition of the intent of a system by
another one via social conventions brings
forth the importance of semiotics in
understanding the complexity of structural
coupling and its meaningful co-ordination and
co-evolution. Semiotics may help unveil this
complex structural coupling. Brier (1995), by
developing the concept of cybersemiotic — a
combination of second order cybernetics,
autopoiesis, semiotics, and ethology —
suggests that we use the triadic and dynamic
concept of sign (or semiosis) from C. S.
Peirce to give a deeper explanation of what is
exchanged, as well as how information is
created and has effect on a biological level.
Semiotics, both Sussarian and Peircean,
discuss sign and symbol; Spencer-Brown’s
theory of the laws of form, however, analyzes
how an observer creates forms by making
distinctions and indications. I will use the
fundamental concepts and tools of the laws of
form to show how an autopoietic
understanding of information can be
operationalized.
3. Information as form
A Platonic perspective understands form as
archetypes or abstract representations of the
many types and properties of things we see
around us. Aristotle was the first to distinguish
between from and matter. Spencer-Brown
offered a theory, laws of form, denoting how
form emerges as an outcome of our
observation.
An observer observes by drawing a
distinction. To put it another way, what we
perceive always follows from an act of making
distinctions. In his work Laws of Form,
Spencer-Brown (1973) introduced the basic
and fundamental human act of making
distinction by using an arithmetical notation.
Making distinction is fundamental, as this is
how something is marked, indicated, and
created. Marking an unmarked world is also
the way something emerges from the
unconscious into conscious, for
“consciousness itself is the progressive
emergence of a self-reflective, recursive cycle
of ever more subtle distinctions” (Robertson,
1999, p. 51).
By making distinctions, which means
marking an unknown whole into a known and
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an unknown, form arises and unfolds through
different tokens. Engstrom (1999) developed
the following sequence to express the process
of unfolding:
ď‚· Level 0: formless void (wholeness)
ď‚· Level 1: distinction
ď‚· Level 2: indication (token) regarding the
distinction
ď‚· Level 3: arrangements of tokens
ď‚· Level 4: archetypes (patterns in these
arrangements)
ď‚· Level 5: infinity, time, feedback, memory
ď‚· Level 6: concrete existence (matter,
energy)
The emergence of form, by making a
distinction that serves as indication,
constructs a world by arranging a set of
tokens that we make sense of by our
observation. The tokens of indications, the
markers, are actually signs according to our
popular vocabulary. Luhmann (1999) asserts
that signs per se do not exist; rather they exist
only as forms within the operations of a
system that uses them. Signs, in this line of
thought, are prerequisites to second-order
observation.
Language works as sign when it mediates
our orienting behavior. Maturana and Varela
(1980) developed the term “orienting
behavior” to denote a mode of communication
or action through which an organism orients
another organism to some other interaction
that both the organisms have in common.
“Orienting behavior is thus symbolic; its
significance lies not in itself, but in what it
connotes” (Mingers, 1995, p. 74). Orienting
behavior indicates the indication or marks the
marking, which means that through orienting
behavior humans describe and also describe
their descriptions. This in turn forms the basis
of language. Mingers (p. 74) further says, “As
a result of this process and a concomitant
development of the neocortex, organisms
have arisen that can make complex and
recursive descriptions of descriptions, and
thus they become observer.” By repeatedly
sharing the distinction and description of
indication, humans become structurally
coupled and that is how one can meaningfully
observe another’s observations, and thereby
understands a description of these
observations.
Use of language and the way people
punctuate their experience give us an
observable corpus to investigate how people
observe. This, when recorded, also becomes
a resource of the observing people to observe
themselves. Sinding-Larsen (1987) calls
action or performance recorded on an
external device the externalization of
knowledge. He attempts to develop an
anthropology of information technology where
the concept of the externalization of
knowledge plays the pivotal role as a
historical process. Larson shows how
knowledge (i.e., humans themselves) is
externalized through a semiotic process. This
ongoing process develops tools and
artifacts—language, numbers, printing
technology, radio, TV, computers—for
humans to express themselves over socially
shared platforms.
Sinding-Larsen argues that with the
process of externalization we externalize the
structure and process of knowledge. He
elaborates the way language helps us
externalize ourselves. For him, “It [language]
is a way of living in the world. We try to make
our world intelligible through making it
readable. In fact, we transform our
environment more and more according to our
linguistic vision of the world, so most of our
living becomes a reading of our own texts” (p.
130). Sinding-Larsen’s concept of
externalization of knowledge may well be read
as analogous to the concept of orienting
behavior as both denote how indicated forms
are shared.
Forms can be physical or cognitive
(Kauffman, 1999); and potential forms in the
environment are called objects. According to
von Foerster (1981), an object does not exist
as an independent entity; something becomes
an object only when perceived by an
observer. Perceiver and the perceived arise
together in the condition of observation. This
relationship is called eigenbehavior. The
context that we regard as our external world is
called eigenform in Foerster’s language.
Now that we have spelled out the
fundamentals of autopoietic understanding of
information and laws of form, let us see how
information can be perceived. Our
understanding may follow this sequence:
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1. An environment becomes an object when
an observer perceives it.
2. Observation is self-referential.
3. An observer makes distinctions of an
object.
4. Distinction creates indication.
5. Indication is arranged in tokens.
6. Tokens are form.
7. Form indicates the operational change
brought about in an observing system.
8. Operational change is information.
By analyzing tokens of indications it should
be possible to perceive how one observes a
potentially informative eigenform and assigns
meaning to it. In other words, indication forms
are the clue to understanding information as
constructed by an observer. The following
example shows how different observers
observe an object differently and thus
constructs different information from the same
object or no information at all. The author calls
it the problem of perceiving September 11.
Figure 2: Problem of perceiving September 11
We have four images, of which the top
image is an object or environment and the
bottom images are indications of three
observations and subsequent information. Let
us name the object image “Observed” and
bottom images from left to right as “Observer
1”, “Observer 2” and “Observer 3”. “Observed”
is an image of destruction of September 11; it
is observed by three different observers
differently. “Observer 1” is mournful,
“Observer 2” is busy in her leisurely sewing
work, and “Observer 3” shows an expression
of joy and victory. This example demonstrates
how different observers may have different
eigenbehavior with an object. “Observer 2”
does not relate herself with the object and
therefore she does not assign any meaning to
it or construct any information. “Observer 1”
and “Observer 3” make relationships with the
“Observed” object but they make distinctions
differently — negatively and positively — as is
indicated by the token or form created in their
expressions. This further reinforces the notion
that “Observer 1” and “Observer 3” are
perturbed differently by the same object and
thus they assign meaning or construct
information differently.
4. Conclusion
The understanding of information as form
—an approach that explores how people
(using artifacts or media) self-referentially
assign value to environment — is a qualitative
exploration of human actions and their
interpretations. Therefore, qualitative
methods, which investigate human
expressions and interpretations, would be
appropriate means to conduct research in this
area. The act of indication (creating form) is
marked in people’s expressions (forms) and
these expressions or tokens are the empirical
clues or data that become the basis for
analysis. Analysis of text (linguistic and
semiotic) — indication of environment — is
expected to unravel the value or meaning
people assign to their environment. Content
analysis, discourse analysis, and reader-
response analysis are methods that one may
employ for such text analysis. These methods
are especially valuable because they support
exploring and analyzing patterns and forms of
human expressions.
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About the Author
Anis Pervez
Anis Pervez is educated in information science (Bloomington), communication (Oslo) and sociology (Dhaka) and has taught
different courses in communication, filmmaking, sociology, and development studies in a number of universities in the US
and Bangladesh. He also has research and consultancy experiences in different countries. Anis’ research interest includes
theories of information, development communication, home filmmaking, and film reception.