tripleC 7(1): 1-11, 2009 3
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
Ruben may not have identified every
perspective, yet the metrics that he offered is
an indication that information has different
meanings and usages. Such a diverse
understanding of information may be fused
into an integrative perspective (Hofkirchner,
1998) that will “bring information theorists
together around the concept of information as
a theoretical subject.” (Doucette, Bichler,
Hofkirchner, & Raffl, 2007, p. 198) The
importance of such a perspective is well
recognized. However, this essay, which
discusses an interpretive understanding of
information that can be empirically examined,
does not have the scope to elaborate on that.
Instead, the article will limit the discussion
mainly to the way information has been
defined and understood in information science
paving a way to support an interpretive or
constructive approach to information.
1.1. Information in Information Science
Shannon's view of how information is
transferred, although it never defined
information, developed a ground for theorizing
information across different disciplines.
Theorizing information within information
science also rested on Shannon's information
transformation perspective for the many years
that the field held a positivistic nature. Over
the last few decades, information science has
experienced a shift from a predominantly
objectivist view of information theory to focus
on the phenomena of relevance and
interpretation (Capurro & Hjørland, 2003).
This was a shift from the hard science and
technical perspectives to social sciences and
humanities (Brier, 1992). Various detailed
reviews (Cornelius, 2002; Capurro & Hjørland,
2003; Machlup & Mansfield, 1983) identify
different approaches to information that can
be seen primarily as two categories, the
mechanistic approach and the cognitive
approach, denoting whether information has
an objective entity or it is a subjective
construct.
The mechanistic approach considers
information as a substance residing “in the
world.” Information systems and the
mechanism of information transfer are the
focus of this approach. It assumes that
information science is an empirical discipline,
unconcerned with what information is in an
ontological or metaphysical sense (Zund &
Gehl, 1979). The mechanistic approach does
not actually give a clear explanation of how
something becomes informative. During the
first half of the 1990s information scientists
began to understand the need to change their
approach and focus. Buckland (1991) defined
information as a thing that has some reified
existence. His view differs from the purely
mechanistic in the sense that he defined thing
to include tangible and intangible items,
knowledge, and process. Agre (1995)
advocated a practice-centered understanding
of information. He viewed information as an
object of certain professional ideologies that
can be understood only through the practices
by which professionals construct it in their
work.
The cognitive approach considers human
cognition as necessary for determining what
can be called information. This moves the
focus from the information system to the
user’s state of mind. Information science in
this phase benefited from ideas from outside
the discipline. In this regard Drestke's (1991)
information-based knowledge theory and
Barwise and Perry's (1983) theory of
situational meaning are important (Cupurro &
Hjørland, 2003; Cornelius, 2002); they
supplied with the necessary concepts for a
cognitive understanding of information. In
parallel to the development within cognitive
science, where there was a move from
symbol manipulation to embedded cognition,
a refined, human-centered approach to
information emerged: the constructivist
approach to information. The constructivist
approach focuses on the uniqueness of the
individual experience of information; it seeks
to understand and theorize how information
becomes meaningful to individuals and
shared as in a common linguistic, social and
cultural context.
Saracevic (1999) viewed information as a
continuum of complexity: as signal or
message in a narrow sense, as cognitive
processing and understanding in a broader
sense, and as embedded within a social
context. This continuum essentially is
congruent with Hjørland’s (2007) recent
classification of the understanding of
information into two basic categories: the