
Seán Ó Nualláin
2
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CC: Creative Commons License, 2007.
book wishes to look at sign processes with re-
spect to a non-reductionistic empirical language.
In that vein, it includes a review of Hoffmeyer's
essay on the subject of the sign as the basic en-
tity in nature. Its conclusion is that semiotics as
applied to nature needs to look at intraorganism,
interorganism and between species levels, rather
than anything more simplistic.
3 Linguistics
Witzany (134) correctly, and in the company of
the Untersuchungen Wittgenstein´s, inveighs
against the early Wittgenstein. I (2003, chapter
3) and thousands of others in the field of compu-
tational linguistics (cl), confirming this, have had
demonstrated to us that there is no possibility of
a formalisation of natural language that is both
comprehensive and described with sufficient
formal precision as to be computationally tracta-
ble. More controversially, he parts company from
the Peircean ethos of what we can already call
"classical biosemiotics". These theses are de-
veloped in his 1995 review of Manfred Eigen's
work.
Eigen attempts to use the tropes of language
and communication, qua a molecular syntax, for
key recombination processes of DNA. However,
Witzany argues, this cannot be done without the
use of linguistic pragmatics, which he identifies
(incompletely) with Austin's "illocution". In fact,
perlocution is part of the Austin armoury as well;
for example, the perlocutionary thrust of the first
part of this sentence is to look it up and include it
in Volume 2. In a specifically genetic context
(116), he repeats the observation that context
determines the "meaning" of the gene, which
should be self-evident were it not for the fact that
there now are difficulties with naming the gene
as its use changes.
So context is a problem for gene expression as
for natural language. I and Richard Strohman
(forthcoming) have attempted to elucidate this
problem. Attempts to do so within cl have been
less than wholly successful, and there is a hard
road ahead within gene-expression.
4 Bioethics/ecophilosophy
Elsewhere (2004), following classical thinking on
the subject, I have discussed the difference be-
tween "anthropocentric" (that stress the use
value of nature with respect to humans) and "in-
trinsic value" ecophilosophies. My conclusion is
that the distinction is ultimately a false one; the
more we are truly ourselves, the more we care
for the biosphere. More formally put, the care re-
quired to assert what is authentic, and thus in-
tersubjective and/or self-transcendent in the
movements of the human psyche generates care
for the biosphere as a natural result. Witzany's
ecophilosophy can be read as a more detailed
working out of this thesis with respect to the con-
sequence of feeling part of a communicative
nexus with the rest of nature. Where he needs
support for this is outlined in the next section.
5 Bionoethics
I have coined this term to describe the European
schools of cognitive science (exemplified by
Piaget) that stressed knowledge as itself a form
of biological adaptation. The absence of this po-
tentially strong support is sorely missed in Wit-
zany's work. In particular, its absence makes the
stated goal of "Biology as an understanding so-
cial science" quixotic in the extreme. Along with
Piaget, the work of Vygotsky, Mike Cole, JJ Gib-
son (culturally European both), and Merleau-
Ponty will help, just for starters. The salutary
anti-cartesianism (if not anti-Kantianism) can be
put on a sounder basis.
6 Evolutionary theory
Another quixotic, if well-motivated, goal of this
book is the replacement of evolutionary theory
with an integration of epigenetics and a theory of
language and communication. It correctly points
out that several enzymes are needed for the ad-
vent of a single new physiologically active sub-
stance (60). Moreover, it cites Watson that a new
molecular informational functionality is necessary
(111). This functionality corresponds to a sculp-
tor's mold (ibid.) Some text-editing process must
intervene for new species (63). All this is judi-
cious, and exciting; we are going to refine the
notion of epigenesis considerably over the next
decade. Currently, we are led to believe it boils
down to chemical markers in the DNA, a very
Cartesian notion. However, the book cites very
outdated estimates for the number of mammal-
ian genes (102) and gene differences between
species (106). The book's use of the concept of
"gene" itself now becomes suspect, and one
waits for volume 2 with renewed interest to see
this argument doing justice to current fact.
7 Conclusions
This book's major articles are undoubtedly worth
looking at, particularly as researchers like
Marcello Barbieri are currently publishing major
statements in the field. Its major lacunae are the
absence of cognitive science/bionoetics, and the
outdated data in some of the papers. Volume 2
will undoubtedly resolve at least the latter issue
References:
Ó Nualláin, Seán (2003) The Search for Mind; third edition.
Exeter: England