tripleC 10(1): 92-99, 2012
ISSN 1726-670X
http://www.triple-c.at
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
Toward a Critique of Surveillance in the Age of the Inter-
net: A Reflection on the “Internet and Surveillance” Vol-
ume Edited by Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund, and Sand-
oval *
Jernej Prodnik
Faculty of Social Sciences, Media Studies Department, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slove-
nia, jernej.prodnik@fdv.uni-lj.si
* Fuchs, Christian, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval, eds. 2012.
Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media. New York:
Routledge.
There seems to be an undisputed consensus amongst scholars and the wider public that the
rise and normalization of the Internet and overall digitalization brought an enormous change to
people’s lives and social life as such. Since the 1990’s, this led to a vast proliferation of Internet
studies. While some of the authors retained a critical approach with historical awareness, most of
them failed to do so and retained an implicit technologically-determinist view of the world. It ought
to be noted from the outset that seeing the Internet (or any other technology) as the one bringing
changes to society should be regarded as a highly problematic notion, even if social relations are
going through enormous changes (like they did throughout the history, main difference being a vast
acceleration of these changes). Positing technological changes as being separated and isolated
from other processes in society, as bearers and harbingers of social change, without looking at
complex social relations that influence construction and development of the technology, is doomed
to failure because of its historical blindness. Analyzing these complex social relations and their
historical intertwining can be seen as one of the tasks posited by dialectics, through which technol-
ogy can never be seen in isolation and could never simply produce social changes for itself – such
a view on the nature of social change should be regarded as being inherently deterministic, even if
it was proclaiming otherwise. Technology could, however, at least partially help to reveal why cer-
tain social changes occurred. This kind of a historically-materialist approach was demonstrated by
Raymond Williams (2003/1975, 7, 12, 13), according to whom such an interpretation differs from
technological determinism in that:
“It would restore intention to the process of research and development. The technology would
be seen, that is to say, as being looked for and developed with certain purposes and practices al-
ready in mind. At the same time the interpretation would differ from symptomatic technology in that
these purposes and practises would be seen as direct: as known social needs, purposes and prac-
tices to which the technology is not marginal but central. [...] It is never quite true to say that in
modern societies, when a social need has been demonstrated, its appropriate technology will be
found. This is partly because some real needs, in any particular period, are beyond the scope of
existing or foreseeable scientific and technical knowledge. It is even more because the key ques-
tion, about technological response to a need, is less a question about the need itself than about its
place in an existing social formation. [...] But there were other social and political relationships and
needs emerging from this complex of change.”
Social surveillance, which will be the main issue discussed in this review, should, therefore, not
be seen as some inherent quality brought upon the multitude by digital technologies, but something
that is embedded in them and (ab)used because of wider political, economic, and social pressures,
influences and expectations. While digitalization may coincide with increasingly invasive surveil-
lance techniques and continuous commodification of social life - and can in several cases even be
seen as a necessary precondition for making such detailed and continuous surveillance possible -
neither of these processes happened because of technology and its (supposedly neutral) develop-
ment in the last decades.
tripleC 10(1): 92-99, 2012 93
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
1. Towards a Critique of Social Surveillance
The volume Internet and Surveillance: The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media, edited by
Christian Fuchs, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund and Marisol Sandoval, can in large part be
seen as an effort of connecting technological changes and new techniques of surveillance to wider
processes in society and social relations, which is similar to approach mentioned earlier. It provides
several answers of why surveillance is still gaining importance (and becoming even more invasive)
in postmodern capitalist societies. In his text on location sharing and online social networking (enti-
tled Socializing the City), Albrechtslund, for example, points at a very important, but quickly forgot-
ten fact, which too often seems too transparent to even take notice today, but can indeed be very
useful in helping to clarify these issues. According to him, the “alleged gap between offline and
online world has been bridged. [...] These two supposedly separate worlds have been woven to-
gether; this is especially obvious in connection with our social interactions, which take place in the
mixed spaces.” (189) Surveillance on the Internet is, therefore, very much a social surveillance – it
is spreading throughout society and people’s lives with the help of Internet’s everyday and omni-
present use. Digitalized surveillance has developed through the online-offline dialectic, where the
‘virtual’ is – especially with sedimentation of technology in everyday lives – merely an extension of
the ‘real’ (separating virtual from the real is, therefore, a false dichotomy; Castells (2010, ch. 5)
termed this ‘real virtuality’, because virtuality is a fundamental dimension of reality). There should
be little left of immaterial idealism that spoke of the glorious potentials of the Web as a harbinger of
freedom, democratization of the world, and other wonders connected to the new media technolo-
gies, without embedding them in power struggles and relations of the material world (see Breen
2011). Technology is not an autonomous actor; its practical application and reasons for such an
application are connected to complex material contradictions and power-relations. As seen in sev-
eral reports on the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, technological deter-
minism is still remarkably present in popular media and even in serious scholarly discourse.
The collection of texts on Internet and surveillance, published in 2012 and covering a wide
range of diverging topics, is one of the first attempts to systematically analyze surveillance on (and
through) the Internet from a variety of possible perspectives. Texts in the volume are divided into
two parts: five texts in the first part are focusing on theoretical foundations of the Internet surveil-
lance studies, while eight texts in the second part deal with case studies and empirical perspectives
(with a preface by Thomas Mathiesen and a postface by Kees Boersma). The majority of the au-
thors agree that surveillance in general should be used in negative and critical terms, before-
mentioned Anders Albrechtslund perhaps being the most obvious exception. He is presenting an
alternative concept of participatory surveillance, which emphasizes “social, playful, and potentially
empowering aspects of surveillance practices” (190). The notion of participatory surveillance is
seen as more democratic than other types of surveillance; people take part in it voluntarily, and in
most cases, it can even be seen as desirable by them. According to Albrechtslund, social interac-
tions empower people (at least in comparison to governmental mapping of citizens) to shape how
they appear to others, even if it is quite difficult to imagine where exactly the empowering part lies
here, presupposing we are using empowerment as a concept emerging from political theory. Trotti-
er and Lyon in their chapter on key features of social media surveillance also partially draw on the
notion of participatory surveillance. According to them, surveillance has become liquid (conceptual-
ization derived from Zygmunt Bauman’s writings, see Bauman 2000) and older institutions of con-
trol have become much more malleable and adaptive. Or, as they put it in Deleuze’s terms, they
modulate. Nevertheless, Trottier and Lyon very much retain the critical notion of surveillance, be-
cause even though surveillance facilitates online sociality, according to them, it simultaneously
enables data commodification and other exploitative practices, which are at least as important.
Drawing on the arguments made by Andrejevic (75), Fuchs (52), or Allmer (133), we can see
that the main reason for mostly critical conceptualizations of surveillance is derived from the simple
fact that it is in most, if not all cases, a form of domination. There are vast asymmetries in power
relations when it comes to surveillance, amongst them being control over data, capacities for carry-
ing out surveillance, or of owning the necessary (new) means of production (in this case Web 2.0
companies, which are, as Fuchs accentuates, far from being participatory when it comes to their
political economic part - their ownership as such is entirely non-participatory). Coercion therefore
stays embedded in social relations, so to speak the structure, and because capitalist societies are
always based on inequalities, free choices are merely appearing to be free. Inability or lack of ac-
cess to the means of production leaves little to no freedom of choice – it is after all corporations
that own the data of the users, while users do not own shares of corporations (Fuchs, 52) – while at
the same time effective control over those who perform both economic and political surveillance is
becoming more and more evasive. If in modern societies this role had historically been performed
94 Jernej Prodnik
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
by the serious press when it came to political (counter)surveillance, and trade unions, when it came
to economic (counter)surveillance, it seems media have very much been in a permanent crisis for
decades now, while labour-power has been crushed by the neo-liberal “revolution” (see David Har-
vey’s writings, e.g. Harvey 2010) and their own inability to cope with changing “technical composi-
tion of labour” (see Negri and Hardt 2009), which nowadays demands a different democracy and
wider political involvement. Neutral conceptualizations of surveillance therefore tend to overlook
these enormous power asymmetries and tend to present individuals as being as powerful as corpo-
rations or state institutions, which seems quite illusory (see Allmer, 133).
2. A Typology of Surveillance
Definitions of surveillance are usually based on a separation between panoptic (Foucauldian)
and non-panoptic concepts of surveillance (as argued in the chapter by Thomas Allmer). One can
possibly add the notion of synoptic surveillance (where, as pointed out by Thomas Mathiesen, see
Mathiesen 2004, many watch the selected something, constituting a “viewer society” – crucially,
there is a double process of people being silently silenced through Synopticon and Panopticon). It
is, however, furthermore possible to delineate between different possible types of surveillance in
contemporary complex societies, especially between political and economic surveillance (as ar-
gued by the editors in the introduction), political being the most extensively researched and in fact
severely scrutinized. There are reasons for a sustained scrutiny of political surveillance:, liberal
thought, which has been predominant in the past couple of centuries, has traditionally seen liberty
in terms of “negative” liberty: liberty from the political authority or/and system. This liberal-
individualist account of freedom was most famously argued for by Isiah Berlin in his essay “Two
Concepts of Liberty”, where he separated “negative” liberty from “positive” liberty. He quite strin-
gently warned against positive liberty, because it could become an engine of oppression by falsely
assuming what is the essence of human condition (in liberal thought, this is, of course, masked in
possessive, egoistic individual that takes care of his own interests in the private sphere; this natu-
ralized notion leads directly to the need of the “minimal state”). There is no need to go into further
details in this seriously flawed dichotomous division of liberty, which is perfect (only) for capitalist
societies, because it was long ago remarkably dissected and criticized by C. B. Macpherson (see
1973, ch. 5). What is more important is to point at the other type of surveillance, namely economic
surveillance, and its necessity in capitalist societies.
Economic surveillance was thus far within “Surveillance Studies”, which has a rather liberal bi-
as, only sporadically identified as being as controversial as political, while a substantiated critique
of its workings and techniques of control on an everyday level was even rarer. This is in large part
compensated by the mentioned collection of texts on surveillance and the Internet, which is
(amongst other topics) focusing on what kind of techniques capital is using to accumulate surplus
value (and/or rent) through the Internet. Historically economic surveillance was without any doubts
most obvious, tenacious, and crude in the production process. On the invitation of Marx
(1990/1867, 279-280)s, we should leave the “noisy sphere [of circulation], where everything takes
place on the surface and in full view of everyone, and follow into the hidden abode of production,
on whose threshold there hangs the notice ‘No admittance except on business’”. According to him,
it is the realm of production, where “we shall see, not only how capital produces, but how capital is
itself produced. The secret of profit-making must at last be laid bare”. This was also the obvious
place of economic violence manifested through little-to-none regulation in regards to the length of
the working day, repetitive inhuman routines and commonly-present sweatshop-like working condi-
tions. Both the brutality of exploitation and to a large extent also the techniques and methods of
surveillance, needed for this exploitation, were already implicitly demonstrated by Marx in Capital
Vol. I (1990/1867). For him, supervision of labour in the production process was “purely despotic”.
Later, this notion of surveillance in capitalist societies was historicized and actualized by E. P.
Thompson (1967) in his celebrated essay “Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism”.
What is of central importance here is the fact that post-Fordist capitalism spreads the necessity
of surveillance from the production process, where it was concentrated (but of course not entirely
delimited) historically, further-out into the sphere of consumption and distribution, which is pointed
out by several authors contributing to the volume. Fuchs (43), for example, writes that “surveillance
is a central method of control and discipline in the capital accumulation process”, it is a method
employed for “controlling the production and circulation process”. According to Andrejevic (82),
“interactive media technologies facilitate new forms of communication and collaboration, but also
represent the next stage of the colonization of social life by market forces”. All new technologies
contain an inherent contradiction distinctive of all social forms: multitudes are always able to use
them for emancipatory purposes, but they can at the same time also be constructed and (ab)used
tripleC 10(1): 92-99, 2012 95
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
in order to oppress them (see also one of the central theses on contradictions of new technologies,
made by Fuchs (2008)). There is an inherent capacity in digital technologies of having the neces-
sary technical means to supervise almost every act and move people make, not only on the Inter-
net, but also in their everyday lives (see again Albrechtslund’s text). By collecting information and
data, which makes people and their actions highly predictable (as furthermore demonstrated in a
short analysis of data mining by Andrejevic), they are producing latent demands and influencing
consumer behaviour (overall making advertising more effective), which can be seen as a new ma-
jor form of power in society.
We can see at least two principal forms of surveillance: the political one being the most obvious
and often also most oppressive, and the economic one that is surely not less important or less in-
fluential for the lives of people in capitalist societies. In most cases, quite the opposite is the case.
The capitalist market can today be at least as violent as political repression, and according to
Allmer (124), economic surveillance is a central aspect of modern surveillance societies; it is also
worth pointing out that economic and political surveillance usually complement each other (the
economy always needs as much servile politics as possible). Both forms of surveillance are aimed
at controlling and directing behaviour of individuals and groups (Fuchs, 43). Through several chap-
ters, this volume presents an excellent example of a critique of political economy, with its focus on
questions connected to economic exploitation, and with them, it also touches on surveillance in the
age of the Internet. Fuchs, for example, focuses on a reconstruction of the classic Marxian cycle of
capital accumulation, pointing at surveillance in the workplace and consumer (or better prosumer)
surveillance, also integrating into his account Marx’s labour theory of value, its role in the “new
economy”, and commodity-form. Andrejevic, Fuchs, and Allmer are all offering a Marxian approach
for an updated critique of surveillance from a plethora of different political-economic perspectives,
focusing on various issues and together forming a well-rounded theoretical foundation for future
researches. Hill is adding to their input an important, but extremely pessimistic Lyotardian theoreti-
cal critique of economic surveillance, complementing Andrejevic’s account of exploitation. Both
contributions point at alienation from one’s own product of labour (Lyotard’s approach also consid-
ering alienation from our species-being). Similarly, Arditi draws on Marx in his analysis of surveil-
lance and disciplining of the consumer on the Net by leading players in the music industry. He
points out that the latter successfully re-established the dominance over music distribution that they
held already before the rise of the new filesharing Internet technology. Because it plays such a vital
role, surveillance by capital is indeed a key feature of post-Fordism. This is what makes it so crucial
to put it under scrutiny, which will provide a viable answer to the question why surveillance is so
necessary for exploitation.
Most of the mentioned authors also point at free labour performed by users, which is either ex-
tracted through rent (i.e. Andrejevic, who bases his arguments on Italian critique of political econo-
my, for example, on Vercellone and Pasquinelli, while also focusing on enclosures of digital com-
mons), selling of audiences as commodities (Fuchs, Arditi) or indirect knowledge work and exploi-
tation of produsage/prosumage. According to Fuchs (55), “prosumage in capitalist society can be
interpreted as the outsourcing of productive labour to users who work completely for free and help
maximize the rate of exploitation [...], so that profits can be raised and new media capital may be
accumulated. Again, this situation is one of infinite over-exploitation. Capitalist prosumage is an
extreme form of exploitation, in which prosumers work completely for free”, which of course means
users are essential for generating profit and surplus value in the digital economy. This circum-
stance is not disturbing only because of privacy concerns, but moreover because consumers are
asked to pay extra for the surplus extracted from their own work (see Andrejevic, 73). Such a dis-
cussion leads us directly to the necessity of defining exploitation (an issue that is dealth with both
by the contributions by Andrejevic and Fuchs, and to a certain extent also Arditi), and even if this
might be seen as contestable ground in the Marxian critique of the political economy – especially
today, because production and consumption are more and more blurring – Andrejevic (78) never-
theless attempts to redefine it in concordance with the changes brought by the digital age: “If
someone else realizes a financial profit from one’s efforts, and this capture of value is enabled by
relations of control and ownership of productive resources,” then exploitation is at work, Andrejevic
writes. Fuchs calls this infinite over-exploitation.
At least two more points should be made here: on the one hand, these changes in the ways ex-
ploitation is carried out demonstrate it has moved well beyond the old confines of the workplace
and the factory, where the production process traditionally took place, into what some strands of
autonomist Marxism have termed the “social factory” or society as factory. Both production and
consumption become productive as they have the capacity to create informational commodities
(Andrejevic, 84). On the other hand, the sheer sociability can be exploited with new techniques of
96 Jernej Prodnik
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
exploitation. This is what Andrejevic (80), building on Arvidsson’s arguments, defines as “direct
exploitation of communitarian dimension of social life”, which is again in line with the autonomist
account. According to Hill (118-120), cultures and subcultures begin to have a market value, they
can be sold, different communities become commercialized and become niche markets, cultural
groups are exploited for profit, and even most subversive of countercultures can be marketed. This
means that little can escape from the commodification process and “something as vital as social
relation can be conditioned to exploitative logic”, (Hill, 120) because the very act of communication
is in accordance with the logic of post-Fordist capitalism. These are vast overall changes indeed,
and they need to be taken into account when we attempt to produce new concepts for a very much
different social context.
There are, however, at least two more types of surveillance, which are mostly present only im-
plicitly in the debated publication. They are indicated especially through the empirical chapters, for
example in Christensen’s and Jansson’s Bourdieuian analysis of networked communities (where
they build on Bourdieu’s notions of social fields and his understanding of the unequal distribution of
power, which enables them to show the complex ways in which surveillance works at subjective,
everyday levels), Taddicken’s focus group discussions in Stuttgart, and Székely’s analysis of inter-
views with IT professionals, which demonstrates their opinions on surveillance. The first form can
be termed interpersonal surveillance, while the second one is social surveillance, social in this case
being separated from political and economic. The latter type of surveillance can focus on problems
of implicit social control through surveillance and can be connected to social pressures and expec-
tations of individual behaviour, so to speak, social pressures for normalization. This phenomenon
was perhaps most forcefully pointed out and criticized by Hannah Arendt (1998/1958), who la-
mented about the emergence of society and the rise of the social, and as a consequence public life
(especially in comparison to its Ancient Greek meaning) would have more or less disintegrated. As
she points out (Ibid., 39), “society always demands that its members act as though they were
members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest”. The rise of society
according to Arendt (1998/1958, 40) brings about conformism: “society, on all its levels, excludes
the possibility of action [...]. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of
behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to
make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement”. Indeed, when
society rules, it can be seen as a kind of a ‘no-man rule’, but “the rule by nobody is not necessarily
no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its crudest and most
tyrannical versions” (Ibid.).
The Arendtian critique of the (usually concealed) social surveillance over multitudes can be
connected to what Foucault (2008), and after him Negri and Hardt (2009), have conceptualized as
biopower. While this rule of society can be seen as a more and more manifest rule of neo-liberal
technocrats with their demands for economic “rationalization”, how one behaves in society and
what opinions or actions are expected from citizens, is much more implicit, concealed and difficult
to discern. Statistics plays a key role in the process of the production of different norms and cate-
gorizations, which serves to analyze distinctions and similarities between people. Hill (108), draw-
ing on Lyotard’s notion of performativity in techno-scientific computerized capitalism, sketches this
as “inhumanity of social conditioning, the pressure to conform to prescribed behaviour”, which is
very much a constitutive part of postmodern society. This performative logic always spreads over to
the Internet (or even emanates from it), where personal information is often shared without people
realizing it, and even without wanting this to happen; but even if one is aware of the problems that
are a part of being involved in social networks, it is social pressure (risk of being excluded) that
makes one join and participate in them anyway. Monika Taddicken, for example, points at the pri-
vacy paradox in her contribution to the volume. She demonstrates how even if web users are con-
cerned about privacy matters, this has little influence on their actual behaviour, amongst the main
reasons for this circumstance being ignorance, lack of competence and awareness, and perhaps
most importantly, the obtained advantages and gratifications obtained by being a part of these net-
works. According to observations made by Trottier and Lyon (98), these issues can be seen as a
form of soft coercion. They are based in social ties, compelling people to share personal infor-
mation with others.
These types of surveillance and consequent self-censorship of people’s behaviour are often at
the same time both inter-personal (micro-level, subjective surveillance by friends, family, relatives)
level, what Christensen and Jansson termed “interveillance” (social control with peer-to-peer moni-
toring), and social (macro-level surveillance of “fitting into” particular society and social context). It
can be seen as an important problem, that even if the user “adopts tactics to avoid worst conse-
quences, it is difficult to anticipate all outcomes of published information” (Trottier and Lyon, 10) on
tripleC 10(1): 92-99, 2012 97
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
the Internet. Restricting access to the information people post online, can curb social and inter-
subjective surveillance, but can also lead to partial social exclusion. It is impossible to leave no
data traces when surfing the Web. It is therefore nearly impossible to completely escape economic,
and probably also political surveillance. In these instances, people have little choice whether their
actions will be closely watched or not.
3. Techniques and Mechanisms of Surveillance
As pointed out at the beginning of this text, the Internet fully broke into people’s everyday lives
and became normalized, even naturalized. Trottier and Lyon (89) think that one of the main rea-
sons for this circumstance is the “cultural, contextual and spatial versatility of web-based services”.
These services are constantly changed and modified and can be used on different platforms and in
different life-situations and contexts. This versatility, however, at the same time indicates multiplica-
tion of surveillance opportunities. Digitalization enabled a dramatic change in possibilities for sur-
veillance of individuals and groups in various situations, which historically could not provide oppor-
tunities for monitoring or measurement. With digitalization, several new techniques and mecha-
nisms of surveillance have been constructed, making possible distinction, classification, and identi-
fication of individuals and their “value”. This is done especially through a technique called data
mining (see the chapter written by Andrejevic and Oscar Gandy’s writings, e.g. Gandy 2011; 2012),
which transforms measurable user patterns into a saleable information commodity. As Gandy
(2012, 130, 131) points out, “data mining’s special value is its ability to derive knowledge from the
patterns and relationships in data that would be invisible without the aid of software designed to
become more accurate through use. [...] Data mining facilitates the identification of individuals as
members of ‘groups’ on the basis of the similarity of their ‘profiles’”. The application of these tech-
niques to business and government surveillance ensured its wide explosion in recent years. Mech-
anisms such as tracking cookies and other information aggregators serve the market (and conse-
quently group) segmentation, paving the way for consumer targeting through identification of peo-
ple by measuring and differentiating them along multiple dimensions. Not all groups are equally
desirable of course, which means this segmentation process furthers social discrimination and
increases disadvantages of those already most disadvantaged (Gandy 2012).
According to Arditi (172), the main goal of surveillance and monitoring of individuals is altering
human behaviour. He connects this finding to the concept of governmentality, developed by Fou-
cault, through which he deals with norms, practices, and laws of society. They influence different
types of surveillance, which were mentioned earlier, perhaps most notably social surveillance. In
several instances in time, different types of surveillance may either operate instantaneously (yet as
separate processes), as knit-together processes, or their singular operation may even be depend-
ent upon operation of other processes (economic surveillance may well produce social surveillance
and inter-subjective surveillance, while all may in some way be dependent on the political context
of society). At the concrete level of social practice, we can therefore see that all types of surveil-
lance may coincide with each other, forming what Marx called ‘unity of the diverse’ (or as he puts it:
“The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of
the diverse” (Marx 1993/1973, 101). What is perhaps most problematic is that it is “almost impossi-
ble to determine which information is collected and to whom it is disseminated” (Sandoval, 161),
which holds true for most of the Internet, not only of Web 2.0 platforms that are subject-matter of
Marisol Sandoval’s analysis. She provides an empirical study of consumer surveillance on com-
mercial Web 2.0 platforms that is grounded in Marxist political economy and analyses the plat-
forms’ terms of use and privacy statements, which enables her to answer the question how far
owners of these platforms can collect and consequently sell their user’s data. Not surprisingly, she
finds out that Web 2.0 platforms are mainly commercial, which brings about quite far reaching con-
sequences, as their main motive must be profit maximization and capital accumulation. This is
mostly done through exploitation of user data, which render possible personalized advertising that
is very much favoured by advertisers. Complementing Arditi’s findings, she points out that “control-
ling the behaviour of consumer [...] also requires controlling their mind. Surveillance and manipula-
tion are two complementary strategies for influencing consumer behaviour” (Sandoval, 149). Differ-
ent discursive techniques (e.g. the use of the term “sharing” instead of “selling” information) are
used by Internet companies selling information, but the key point of course is to render possible
invasive information gathering techniques. They are covered in different legal mechanisms and
even if individuals are able to control what data will be seen by one’s friends or wider public, there
are rarely any viable ways of controlling what information will be gathered by websites themselves
and later-on sold to third parties.
98 Jernej Prodnik
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
In his chapter entitled “How Does Privacy Change in the Age of the Internet”, Rolf H. Weber
gives an outline of the weaknesses of the present legal framework in connection to privacy (where
prevention of improper use of personal information can be seen as the crucial objective) and sur-
veillance, which he defines as repeated surveying of certain activities. Weber’s approach, which
provides a welcome legal background, perhaps most effectively resonates with Wayland’s, Armen-
gol’s and Johnson’s chapter on the problems connected to transparency. Both texts effectively
demonstrate how problematic the borders between secret(ive), (non)transparent, surveillance, and
private are, and why transparency as such needs to be scrutinized, especially as it is such a fun-
damental concept for liberal theory in capitalist society (Fuchs, see 2011, provides an alternative
conceptualization of privacy, also touching on its meaning in liberal theory). Transparency can even
become a surveillance system, which is demonstrated through the metaphor of the “house of mir-
rors” by Wayland, Armengol and Johnson, using the notions of entry, bouncing, highlighting, shad-
ing, and rendering. They effectively demonstrate how transparency is not always transparent and
their argument should actually take us back to square one: transparency, when it comes to
what/who is being transparent, very much depends on the context and on the social hierarchies
and asymmetries of power. The question is what and who should be transparent under what condi-
tions. Wayland’s, Armengol’s and Johnson’s opinion is that underlying the goal of transparency is
accountability, which is essential to democracy. But it should be noted that accountability means
accountability of those who are in power. The same is true for transparency. Either way, what
seems clear is that a fresh look both at privacy and surveillance is unavoidable in a digitalized so-
ciety. This society is, however, hugely influenced by transnational corporations that move beyond
national borders and their bounded legal regimes, which has to be taken into account.
4. Dystopian Nightmares of Huxley and Orwell
Some sixty years ago, George Orwell’s dystopian account of a totalitarian world, which was de-
lineated in his exceptional book Nineteen Eighty-four, was seen as a dark vision that societies
should defend themselves against. The society he described was an unsettling world of near-total
surveillance and control. Only a couple of years after the prophetic 1984, Neil Postman
(2005/1985, xix) pointed out how people have, in the meantime, forgotten about another dark vi-
sion, “slightly older, slightly less well known, equally chilling”, namely Aldous Huxley’s dystopia of
the Brave New World, which prophesied a decidedly different form of oppression than Orwell’s.
“The two worlds opposed each other in virtually every detail”, Zygmunt Bauman (2000, 53) later
stressed, “and yet there was something that united both visions”, he continued. “What they shared
was the foreboding of a tightly controlled world; of individual freedom not just reduced to a sham or
naught, but keenly resented by people drilled to obey commands and to follow set routines; of a
small elite holding in their hands all the strings” (ibid.). Postman’s (2005/1986, xix-xx) interpretation
of these two texts was remarkably similar to Bauman’s:
“Orwell warns that we will be overcome by an externally imposed oppression. But in Huxley’s
vision, no Big Brother is required to deprive people of their autonomy, maturity and history. As he
saw it, people will come to love their oppression, to adore the technologies that undo their capaci-
ties to think. What Orwell feared were those who would ban books. What Huxley feared was that
there would be no reason to ban a book, for there would be no one who wanted to read one. Orwell
feared those who would deprive us of information. Huxley feared those who would give us so much
that we would be reduced to passivity and egoism. Orwell feared that the truth would be concealed
from us. Huxley feared the truth would be drowned in a sea of irrelevance. [...] In short, Orwell
feared that what we hate will ruin us. Huxley feared that what we love will ruin us”.
Is it postmodern love for the trivial and insignificant that is “ruining” Western societies? Is this
what the privacy paradox is all about? What about participatory surveillance? Are we prepared to
give away some of our basic freedoms, exchange privacy for different types of surveillance, just so
we can have a little fun? Postman (Ibid., 155-157) was certain it was not Orwell’s, but Huxley’s
account of the future, that has realized itself in societies of abundance. Bauman (2000, 53-54) fur-
thermore twisted this logic, claiming both authors had no vast disagreements amongst them, espe-
cially if their arguments were boiled down in respect to the world’s future destination. In his opinion,
they both agreed there will be less freedom and more control. They just envisioned different roads,
which would lead us towards increased ignorance and obtuseness.
What do these dystopian accounts and their humanist (re)interpretations tell us of society?
Which account is nowadays closer to reality, Huxley’s or Orwell’s? As perhaps holds true for all of
the dystopian accounts in particular historical moments, they are usually both right and wrong,
maybe not instantaneously, but still always. Brainwashed, uncritical consumerism can only be as
effective as it gets, before its hegemony somehow breaks down and transparency of its ideological
tripleC 10(1): 92-99, 2012 99
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
mechanisms becomes too obvious to ignore. Huxley’s vision may be seen as being predominant in
some historical moments, especially when no significant social conflicts are on the horizon, but it is
the Orwellian nightmare that seems closer to reality when multitudes rise and repressive apparat-
uses hit back at them with full force (or when “agreements” such as SOPA or ACTA are introduced
through the back doors). Democracy and freedom of speech seem like nice ideas until the multi-
tude tries to claim access to them at your own backyard. It is then, when situations get tricky. This
was well demonstrated by several resistance movements and uprisings in the Western world last
year. Mainstream Western media and politicians were widely celebrating quite similar revolts
across North Africa and the Middle East only a couple months earlier, but then turned on the heat
as soon as they started to develop at home – first ignoring, and then quite openly attacking differ-
ent progressive social movements (i.e. the Occupy movement) when they became powerful. What
can be seen is that the most important question is not which of these dystopian visions manifests
itself in the real world more often (they all do to some extent), but to what extent resisting multi-
tudes are able to produce societal changes in their struggles against repression and inequalities. It
is here that dystopian accounts really fail. Multitudes neither stay silent and totally subjugated nor
completely unreflective and passive. History never stands still. Multitudes have an inherent ability
to resist their oppressors and demand more real freedom. They will always retain this capacity.
History remains a history of class struggles, and today, these struggles have to involve struggles
against surveillance.
References
Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Berlin, Isiah. 1958. Two Concepts of Liberty. Accessed February 13, 2012. http://www.scribd.com/doc/19638228/Isaiah-
Berlin-Two-Concepts-of-Liberty
Breen, Marcus. 2011. Uprising: The Internet’s Unintended Consequences. Champaign: Common Ground.
Castells, Manuel. 2010. The Rise of the Network Society. 2nd ed. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, Michel. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979. New York: Palgrave MacMil-
lan.
Fuchs, Christian. 2008. Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Information Age. New York: Routledge.
Fuchs, Christian. 2011. Towards an Alternative Concept of Privacy. Journal of Information, Communication, and Ethics in
Society 9 (4): 220-237.
Fuchs, Christian, Kees Boersma, Anders Albrechtslund, and Marisol Sandoval, eds. 2012. Internet and Surveillance: The
Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social Media. New York: Routledge.
Gandy, Oscar H. Jr. 2011. Consumer Protection in Cyberspace. tripleC – Cognition, Communication, Co-operation: Open
Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 9 (2):175-189. Accessed February 13, 2012. http://triple-
c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/267/241
Gandy, Oscar H. Jr. 2012. Matrix Multiplication and the Digital Divide. In Race After the Internet, edited by Lisa Nakamura
and Peter A. Chow-White. New York: Routledge.
Harvey, David. 2010. The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. London: Profile Books.
Macpherson, Crawford. 1973. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Marx, Karl. 1990/1867. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy: Volume One. London: Penguin.
Marx, Karl. 1993/1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft). London: Penguin
Books.
Mathiesen, Thomas. 2004. Silently Silenced: Essays on the Creation of Acquiesence in Modern Society. Winchester: Wa-
terside Press.
Negri, Antonio, and Michael Hardt. 2009. Commonwealth. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
Postman, Neil. 2005/1985. Amused to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. New York: Penguin.
Thompson, Edward Palmer. 1967. Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism. Past and Present 38: 56-97.
Williams, Raymond. 2003/1975. Television: Technology and Cultural Form. London: Routledge.
About the Author
Jernej Prodnik
is a Researcher at the Social Communication Research Centre and Assistant to the Teaching Process at the Media Studies
department (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia). His main research interests include structural
transformations of post-Fordist capitalist societies, critique of political economy (focusing especially on communication), and
wider social context of technological changes and democratic potentials brought by new technologies.