96 Jernej Prodnik
CC: Creative Commons License, 2012.
exploitation. This is what Andrejevic (80), building on Arvidsson’s arguments, defines as “direct
exploitation of communitarian dimension of social life”, which is again in line with the autonomist
account. According to Hill (118-120), cultures and subcultures begin to have a market value, they
can be sold, different communities become commercialized and become niche markets, cultural
groups are exploited for profit, and even most subversive of countercultures can be marketed. This
means that little can escape from the commodification process and “something as vital as social
relation can be conditioned to exploitative logic”, (Hill, 120) because the very act of communication
is in accordance with the logic of post-Fordist capitalism. These are vast overall changes indeed,
and they need to be taken into account when we attempt to produce new concepts for a very much
different social context.
There are, however, at least two more types of surveillance, which are mostly present only im-
plicitly in the debated publication. They are indicated especially through the empirical chapters, for
example in Christensen’s and Jansson’s Bourdieuian analysis of networked communities (where
they build on Bourdieu’s notions of social fields and his understanding of the unequal distribution of
power, which enables them to show the complex ways in which surveillance works at subjective,
everyday levels), Taddicken’s focus group discussions in Stuttgart, and Székely’s analysis of inter-
views with IT professionals, which demonstrates their opinions on surveillance. The first form can
be termed interpersonal surveillance, while the second one is social surveillance, social in this case
being separated from political and economic. The latter type of surveillance can focus on problems
of implicit social control through surveillance and can be connected to social pressures and expec-
tations of individual behaviour, so to speak, social pressures for normalization. This phenomenon
was perhaps most forcefully pointed out and criticized by Hannah Arendt (1998/1958), who la-
mented about the emergence of society and the rise of the social, and as a consequence public life
(especially in comparison to its Ancient Greek meaning) would have more or less disintegrated. As
she points out (Ibid., 39), “society always demands that its members act as though they were
members of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest”. The rise of society
according to Arendt (1998/1958, 40) brings about conformism: “society, on all its levels, excludes
the possibility of action [...]. Instead, society expects from each of its members a certain kind of
behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to
make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement”. Indeed, when
society rules, it can be seen as a kind of a ‘no-man rule’, but “the rule by nobody is not necessarily
no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its crudest and most
tyrannical versions” (Ibid.).
The Arendtian critique of the (usually concealed) social surveillance over multitudes can be
connected to what Foucault (2008), and after him Negri and Hardt (2009), have conceptualized as
biopower. While this rule of society can be seen as a more and more manifest rule of neo-liberal
technocrats with their demands for economic “rationalization”, how one behaves in society and
what opinions or actions are expected from citizens, is much more implicit, concealed and difficult
to discern. Statistics plays a key role in the process of the production of different norms and cate-
gorizations, which serves to analyze distinctions and similarities between people. Hill (108), draw-
ing on Lyotard’s notion of performativity in techno-scientific computerized capitalism, sketches this
as “inhumanity of social conditioning, the pressure to conform to prescribed behaviour”, which is
very much a constitutive part of postmodern society. This performative logic always spreads over to
the Internet (or even emanates from it), where personal information is often shared without people
realizing it, and even without wanting this to happen; but even if one is aware of the problems that
are a part of being involved in social networks, it is social pressure (risk of being excluded) that
makes one join and participate in them anyway. Monika Taddicken, for example, points at the pri-
vacy paradox in her contribution to the volume. She demonstrates how even if web users are con-
cerned about privacy matters, this has little influence on their actual behaviour, amongst the main
reasons for this circumstance being ignorance, lack of competence and awareness, and perhaps
most importantly, the obtained advantages and gratifications obtained by being a part of these net-
works. According to observations made by Trottier and Lyon (98), these issues can be seen as a
form of soft coercion. They are based in social ties, compelling people to share personal infor-
mation with others.
These types of surveillance and consequent self-censorship of people’s behaviour are often at
the same time both inter-personal (micro-level, subjective surveillance by friends, family, relatives)
level, what Christensen and Jansson termed “interveillance” (social control with peer-to-peer moni-
toring), and social (macro-level surveillance of “fitting into” particular society and social context). It
can be seen as an important problem, that even if the user “adopts tactics to avoid worst conse-
quences, it is difficult to anticipate all outcomes of published information” (Trottier and Lyon, 10) on