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tripleC 7(1): 94-108, 2009
ISSN 1726-670X
http://www.triple-c.at
Some Reflections on Manuel Castells’ Book
“Communica-
tion
Power”
Christian Fuchs
Unified Theory of Information Research Group, University of Salzburg, http://www.uti.at, http://fuchs.icts.sbg.ac.at,
christian.fuchs@sbg.ac.at
Abstract: Manuel Castells deals in his book Communication Power with the question where
power
lies in the network society. In this paper, I discuss important issues that this book addresses,
and
connect them, where possible, to my own works and reflections. The book is discussed along
the
following lines: the concept of power, web 2.0 and mass self-communication, media
manipulation,
social movements, novelty &
society.
Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 592
pp.,
234x156mm, ISBN 978-0-19-956704-1, Hardback, $34.95 / £20.00 /
€24.99
Keywords: Manuel Castells, communication power, network society, mass self-communication, web 2.0, networking power,
network power, networked power, network-making power
1. Introduction
he task that Manuel Castells has
set
himself for his book Comunication
Power,
is to elaborate answers to the
question:
“where does power lie in the global
network
society?” (p. 42). He tries to show that
com-
munication is the central power in
contempo-
rary society by analyzing and presenting
nu-
merous empirical examples and by
drawing
on data from many studies. The
discussion
that follows does not engage with every
detail
of Castells’ voluminous 570 page book
be-
cause this is in my opinion not the task of
a
reflective review essay. Therefore I will
con-
centrate on a selective discussion of
those
aspects that I personally find most
important.
In Communication Power, Castells
contin-
ues the analysis of what he has termed
the
network society, from a specific perspective
–
the one of power. He argues that global
social
networks and social networks of social
net-
works that make use of global digital
commu-
nication networks are the fundamental
source
of power and counter-power in
contemporary
society. The relation between power
and
counter-power is analyzed in respect to
the
contradictions between multinational
corpo-
rate media networks and the creative
audi-
ence, framing and counter-framing,
bi-
ased/scandal media politics and
insurgent
grassroots media
politics.
Four kinds of power in the network
society
are introduced: networking power,
network
power, networked power,
network-making
power (pp. 42-47, 418-420).
Network-making
power is for Castells the “paramount form
of
power in the network society” (p. 47). It is
held
and exercised by programmers and
switchers.
Programmers have the power “to
constitute
network(s), and to program/reprogram
the
network(s) in terms of the goals assigned
to
the network”. Switchers have the power
“to
connect and ensure the cooperation of
differ-
ent networks by sharing common goals
and
combining resources, while fending off
com-
petition from other networks by setting
up
strategic cooperation” (p. 45). Castells
gives
numerous examples in his book for the
usage
of “programming” and “switching” networks
in
order to enact power and counter-power.
He
illuminates how power and “resistance
to
power is achieved through the same
two
mechanisms that constitute power in the
net-
work society: the programs of the
networks
and the switches between networks” (p.
47).
The basic analysis is applied to power
strug-
gles between the global corporate
multimedia
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networks and the creative audience
(chapter
2), the development of media policies in
the
USA (chapter 2), framing and
counter-framing
in political campaigns, especially the
framing
of the US public mind before, during, and
after
the Iraq war (chapter 3); to scandal politics
in
Spain in the 1990s (chapter 4), media
control
and censorship in the USA, Russia,
and
China (chapter 4); the environmental
move-
ment, the global movement against
corporate
globalization, the spontaneous
citizens’
movement that emerged in Spain after the
al-
Qaeda attacks in 2004, and the
Barack
Obama presidential primary campaign
(chap-
ter
5).
2. The Concept of Power
Castells defines power in a
Weber-inspired
way as “the relational capacity that enables
a
social actor to influence asymmetrically
the
decisions of other social actor(s) in ways
that
favor the empowered actor’s will,
interests,
and values” (p. 10). Power is associated
with
coercion, domination, violence or
potential
violence, and asymmetry. He refers to
the
power concepts of Foucault, Weber,
and
Habermas and argues that he builds on
Gid-
dens’ structuration theory. However,
Giddens
conceives power in a completely
different
way, a way that is neither mentioned nor
dis-
cussed by Castells. For Giddens, power
is
“’transformative capacity’, the capability
to
intervene in a given set of events so as
in
some way to alter them” (Giddens, 1985,
p.
7), the “capability to effectively decide
about
courses of events, even where others
might
contest such decisions” (Giddens, 1985, p.
9).
Power is for Giddens characteristic for
all
social relationships, it “is routinely involved
in
the instantiation of social practices” and
is
“operating in and through human action”
(Gid-
dens, 1981, p.
49f).
In Giddens’ structuration theory, power
is
not necessarily coercive, violent, and
asym-
metrically distributed. Therefore it
becomes
possible to conceive of and analyze
situations
and social systems, in which power is
more
symmetrically distributed, for example
situa-
tions and systems of participatory
democracy.
Power as transformative capacity seems
in-
deed to be a fundamental aspect of all
socie-
ties. This also means that there is a
huge
difference between Castells’ approach
and
Giddens’ structuration theory, which as
such
is not problematic, but should also be
expli-
cated, especially because Castells says
that
he builds on Giddens’ structuration theory
(p.
14), which he in my opinion does not.
The
problem with Castells’ notion of power is
that
he sees coercive, violent, dominative
power
relationships as “the foundational relations
of
society throughout history, geography,
and
cultures” (p. 9). Such power is for him
“the
most fundamental process in society” (p.
10).
Furthermore, Castells dismisses the
“naïve
image of a reconciled human community,
a
normative utopia that is belied by
historical
observation” (p. 13). Is it really likely that
all
history of humankind and that all social
situa-
tions and systems, in which we live, are
al-
ways and necessarily shaped by power
strug-
gles, coercion, violence, and
domination?
Relationships of love, intimacy, and
affection
are in modern society unfortunately
often
characterized by violence and coercion
and
are therefore frequently (in Castells’
terms)
power relationships. But isn’t love a
prototypi-
cal phenomenon, where many people
experi-
ence feelings and actions that negate
vio-
lence, domination, and coercion? Isn’t
the
phenomenon of altruism in love the
practical
falsification of the claim that coercive power
is
the most fundamental process in society?
My
claim is that not coercive power, but that
co-
operation is the most fundamental process
in
society (Fuchs, 2008a, pp. 31-34, 40-58),
and
that indeed it is possible to create social
sys-
tems without coercive power (in
Castells’
terms) and with a symmetric distribution
of
power (in Giddens’ terminology).
Conceiving
power as violent coercion poses the danger
of
naturalizing and fetishizing coercion and
vio-
lent struggles as necessary and therefore
not
historical qualities of society. The
problematic
ideological-theoretical implication is that in
the
final instance war must exist in all
societies
and a state of peace is dismissed and
consid-
ered as being categorically
impossible.
Castells surely does not share this
implication,
as his analysis of communication power in
the
Iraq war
shows.
One problem that I have with Castells’
book
is the rather technocratic language that
he
tends to use for describing networks
and
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communication power – social
networks,
technological networks, and
techno-social
networks are all described with the
same
categories and metaphors that originate
in
computer science and computer
technology:
program, meta-programmers,
switches,
switchers, configuration, inter-operability,
pro-
tocols, network standards, network
compo-
nents, kernel, program code, etc. I have
no
doubt that Manuel Castells does not have
the
intention to conflate the difference
between
social and technological networks. He
has
argued for example in the past that
social
networks are a “networking form of
social
organization” and that information
technology
is the “material basis” for the “pervasive
ex-
pansion” of social networks (Castells,
2000b,
p. 500). But even if the terminology
that
Manuel Castells now tends to employ is
only
understood in a metaphorical sense, the
prob-
lem is that society and social systems
are
described in technological and
computational
terms so that the differentia specifica of
soci-
ety in comparison to computers and
computer
networks – that society is based on
humans,
reflexive and self-conscious beings that
have
cultural norms, anticipative thinking, and
a
certain freedom of action that computers
do
not have – gets lost. It is no surprise
that
based on the frequent employment of
such
metaphors, Castells considers Bruno
Latour’s
actor network theory as brilliant (p. 45). It is
an
important task to distinguish the qualities
of
social networks from the qualities of
techno-
logical networks and to identify the
emergent
qualities of techno-social networks such
as
the Internet (Fuchs, 2005; Fuchs, 2008a,
pp.
121-147). Castells acknowledges that there
is
a “parallel with software language” (p. 48)
in
his terminology, but he does not give
reasons
for why he uses these parallels and why
he
thinks such parallels are useful.
Obviously
society is shaped by computers, but is not
a
computer itself, so there is in my opinion
sim-
ply no need for such a terminological
confla-
tionism. Computer metaphors of society
can
just like biological metaphors of society
be-
come dangerous under certain
circumstan-
ces so that in my opinion it is best not to
start
to categorically conflate the qualitative
differ-
ence between society and technology.
Tech-
nology is part of society and society
con-
structs technology. Society is more than
just
technology and has emergent qualities
that
stem from the synergetical interactions
of
human beings. Technology is one of
many
results of the productive societal
interactions
of human beings, it has therefore qualities
that
are on the one hand specifically societal,
but
on the other hand different from the
qualities
of other products of society. That there
are
nodes and interactions in all networks is
a
common aspect of social and
technological
networks, but an important task that
should
not be forgotten is to differentiate between
the
different emergent qualities that
technological
networks and social networks have –
emer-
gent qualities that interact when these
two
kinds of networks are combined in the form
of
techno-social networks such as the
Internet
so that meta-emergent techno-social
qualities
appear.
Castells carefully argues that power is
dif-
ferentiated in the network society and that
the
power structure is not fully determined by
one
group or one kind of power structure. But
he
also avoids a relativistic position that
only
sees different types of power without
the
analysis of the relations between these
types.
Relativism categorically excludes the
possibil-
ity of the domination of a certain kind
of
power. Castells in contrast gives a
realistic
analysis of power. He says that there is
no
deterministic control of the power structure
by
one group and asserts that “whoever
has
enough money, including political leaders,
will
have a better chance of operating the
switch
in its favor” (p.
52).
3. “Web 2.0” and Mass Self-
Communication
The rise of integrative information,
communi-
cation, and community-building Internet
plat-
forms such as blogs, wikis, or social
network-
ing sites has not only prompted the
develop-
ment of new concepts – web 2.0, social
soft-
ware, social media, etc –, but also a
new
techno-deterministic optimism that
resembles
the Californian ideology that accompanied
the
commercial rise of the Internet in the
1990s.
So for example Tapscott and Williams
claim
that the “new web” brings about “a new
eco-
nomic democracy (…) in which we all have
a
lead role“ (Tapscott & Williams, 2007, p.
15;
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for a critique of this approach, see
Fuchs,
2008b). Kevin Kelly, who preached the
neo-
liberal credos of liberalization,
privatization,
and commercialization in relation to IT in
the
1990s (see for example Kelly, 1998),
argues
that the “new web”, where people “work
to-
ward a common goal and share their
products
in common, (…) contribute labor
without
wages and enjoy the fruits free of
charge”
(Kelly, 2009, p. 118) constitutes a “new
social-
ism” – “digital socialism”. The new socialism
is
for Kelly a socialism, in which workers do
not
control and manage organizations and
the
material output they generate. Therefore
this
notion of socialism should be questioned.
For
Kelly, socialism lies in collective
production,
not in democratic economic ownership. If
“so-
cialism seeks to replace capitalism by a
sys-
tem in which the public interest takes
prece-
dence over the interest of private profit“,
“is
incompatible with the concentration of
eco-
nomic power in the hands of a few“, and
“re-
quires effective democratic control of
the
economy“ (Frankfurt Declaration of the
Social-
ist International, 1951
1
), then Kelly’s notion
of
socialism that is perfectly compatible with
the
existence of Microsoft, Google, Yahoo,
and
other web corporations (as indicated by
the
fact that he lists Google, Amazon,
Facebook,
and YouTube in his history of socialism),
is
not at all a notion of socialism, but one
of
capitalism disguised as
socialism.
Castells discusses the recent
develop-
ments of the web and the Internet, but in
con-
trast to the new web 2.0 ideology he does
so
1
in a refreshing techno-dialectical way
that
avoids the deterministic pitfalls of
techno-
optimism and techno-pessimism. For
Castells,
a novel quality of communication in
contem-
porary society is mass self-communication:
“It
is mass communication because it can
poten-
tially reach a global audience, as in the
post-
ing of a video on YouTube, a blog with
RSS
links to a number of web sources, or a
mes-
sage to a massive e-mail list. At the
same
time, it is self-communication because
the
production of the message is
self-generated,
the definition of the potential receiver(s)
is
self-directed, and the retrieval of
specific
messages or content from the World
Wide
Web and electronic networks is
self-selected.
The three forms of communication
(interper-
sonal, mass communication, and mass
self-
communication) coexist, interact, and
com-
plement each other rather than substituting
for
one another. What is historically novel,
with
considerable consequences for social
organi-
zation and cultural change, is the
articulation
of all forms of communication into a
compos-
ite, interactive, digital hypertext that
includes,
mixes, and recombines in their diversity
the
whole range of cultural expressions
conveyed
by human interaction” (p. 55, see also p.
70).
Castells theorizes mass
self-communication
based on Umberto Eco’s semiotic model
of
communication as the emergence of
“the
creative audience” (pp. 127-135) that
engages
in the “interactive production of meaning”
(p.
132) and is based on the emergence of
the
figure of the “sender/addressee” (p.
130).
Castells analyzes the economic
operations
of ten global multimedia networks (pp.
73-84)
Of course one should mention that the
Socialist
International today makes more modest claims
and
argues that “the democratic socialist
movement
continues to advocate both socialisation and
public
property within the framework of a mixed
economy”
(Stockholm Declaration of Principles of
the
Socialist International, 1989). This meaning
of
socialism is not fully divergent, but far apart
from
the one advocated by central historical figures
of
socialism, such as Rosa Luxemburg, who
argued
that socialism is “a society that is not governed
by
the profit motive but aims at saving human
labour“
(Luxemburg, 1951/2003, p. 301) and that the
“aim
of socialism is not accumulation but the
satisfaction
of toiling humanity’s wants by developing
the
productive forces of the entire globe“
(Luxemburg,
1951/2003, p.
447).
– Apple, Bertelsmann, CBS, Disney,
Google,
Microsoft, NBC Universal, News
Corporation,
Time Warner, Yahoo! – and of the
second-tier
of multimedia conglomerates (pp.
84-92).
Important trends that he points out are
an
increasing economic concentration, the
usage
of a diversity of platforms, the
customization
and segmentation of audiences, and
econo-
mies of synergy. These corporate
networks
stand in a contradictory relation to
mass-self
communication.
For Castells, the contemporary Internet
is
shaped by a conflict between the global
mul-
timedia business networks that try to
com-
modify the Internet and the “creative
audi-
ence” that tries to establish a degree of
citizen
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control of the Internet and to assert their
right
of communicative freedom without
corporate
control: “Among the global media giants
and
other media organizations, the digitization
of
information and the expansion of networks
of
mass self-communication have facilitated
a
preoccupation with how to monetize
these
networks in terms of advertising” (p. 80).
“All
the major players are trying to figure out
how
to re-commodify Internet-based
autonomous
mass self-communication. They are
experi-
menting with ad-supported sites, pay
sites,
free streaming video portals, and pay
portals.
(…) Web 2.0 technologies empowered
con-
sumers to produce and distribute their
own
content. The viral success of these
technolo-
gies propelled media organizations to
harness
the production power of traditional
consum-
ers” (p. 97). “The interactive capacity of
the
new communication system ushers in a
new
form of communication, mass
self-
communication, which multiplies and
diversi-
fies the entry points in the
communication
process. This gives rise to
unprecedented
autonomy for communicative subjects
to
communicate at large. Yet, this
potential
autonomy is shaped, controlled, and
curtailed
by the growing concentration and
interlocking
of corporate media and network
operators
around the world. (…) However, this is
not
tantamount to one-sided, vertical control
of
communicative practices (…) As a result,
the
global culture of universal commodification
is
culturally diversified and ultimately
contested
by other cultural expressions” (p.
136).
Castells gives a techno-dialectical
analysis
here, but it remains unclear what he means
by
the rise of autonomy for communicative
sub-
jects.
The notion of autonomy in mass
self-
communication is first introduced on
page
129, but it is not defined, which leaves
the
reader wondering what Castells wants to
tell
her/him by using this normatively and
politi-
cally connoted term (see also p. 302).
The
meaning of the concept of autonomy is
not
self-explanatory. Is it autonomy in the
sense
of Kant, understood as the autonomy of
the
will as the supreme principle of morality
(Kant,
2002, p. 58), the “quality of the will of being
a
law to itself” (Kant, 2002, p. 63)? Or
does
autonomy mean the “true individualism”
that
Hayek (1948) had in mind, in which
capitalism
is conceived as spontaneous order
that
should be left to itself and should not
be
shaped by political rules (Hayek, 1988)?
Does
it refer to freedom of speech, taste, and
as-
sembly – “the liberty of thought and
discus-
sion” – in line with the harm principle, as
pos-
tulated by John Stuart Mill (2002)? Or
is
autonomy the existence of functionally
differ-
entiated self-referential subsystems of
society
(Luhmann, 1998)? Or does it in a less
indi-
vidualistic sense refer to the combination
of
individual autonomy, understood as
subjectiv-
ity that is “reflective and deliberative”
and
“frees the radical imagination” from “the
en-
slavement of repetition” (Castoriadis, 1991,
p.
164), and social autonomy, “the equal
partici-
pation of all in power” (Castoriadis, 1991,
p.
136; see also Castoriadis, 1998)?
Does
Castells’ notion of autonomy confirm one
of
the two poles of the theoretically
unreconciled
relationship of private autonomy and
public
autonomy that Habermas (1996, p. 84)
has
critically examined, or does it refer to the
dia-
lectic of autonomy that Habermas has in
mind
when he speaks of a “cooriginality of
private
and public autonomy” (Habermas, 1996,
p.
104) achieved in a “system of rights in
which
private and public autonomy are
internally
related” (Habermas, 1996, p. 280) and
“recip-
rocally presuppose each other”
(Habermas,
1996, p. 417)? Or does autonomy mean
the
“status of an organized people in an
enclosed
territorial unit” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 19, for
a
critique of this approach see
Habermas,
1989)? Or is autonomy a postmodern
project
of plural democracy with a multiplicity of
sub-
ject positions (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985)?
In
short: There are all kinds of meanings of
con-
cepts such as autonomy, and it is one of
the
tasks of social theory to clarify which ones
are
feasible and suitable for the situation of
con-
temporary
society.
If we define “web 2.0/3.0” platforms
as
world wide web platforms that are not
pre-
dominantly sites for information
consumption
or search, but sites for social
networking,
community building, file sharing,
co-operative
information production, and interactive
blog-
ging – platforms that are more systems
of
communication and co-operation than
sys-
tems of cognition (for details of this
definition
see Fuchs 2009c, 2008a) –, then this
allows
us to analyze the ownership structures
and
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usage data of the top 20 “web 2.0/3.0”
plat-
forms. I have gathered statistical and
eco-
nomic data about these platforms (see
table
1).
Rank Website Ownership Country Year of
Domain
Creation
Economic
Orientation
3 Month Aver-
age Daily Share
of Global Page
Views
3 Facebook Facebook Inc. USA 2004 Profit, adver- 2.99%
tising
4 YouTube Google Inc. USA 2005
Profit, adver-
tising
4.06%
7 Blogger Google Inc. USA 1999
Profit, adver-
tising
0.56%
8 Wikipedia Wikimedia Founda- USA 2001 Non-profit, 0.54%
tion Inc.
non-
advertising
11 Myspace MySpace Inc. USA 2003 Profit, adver- 1.25%
tising
15 Twitter Twitter Inc. USA 2006
Profit, adver-
tising
0.27%
16 Rapidshare Rapidshare AG CH 2002
Profit, non-
advertising
0.23%
19 WordPress Automattic Inc. USA 2000 Profit, adver- 0.13%
tising
32 VKontakte V Kontakte Ltd. RU 2006
Profit, adver-
tising
1.48%
33 Flickr Yahoo! Inc. USA 2003
Profit, adver-
tising
0.23%
37 hi5 Hi5 Networks Inc. USA 2004 Profit, adver- 0.44%
tising
39 Photobucket Photobucket.com
LLC
USA 2003
Profit, adver-
tising
0.11%
43 Orkut Brazil Google Inc. USA 2002
Profit, adver-
tising
0.11%
48 Youporn Midstream Media USA 2005 Profit, adver- 0.15%
tising
49 Blogspot Google Inc. USA 2000
Profit, adver-
tising
0.06%
50 Pornhub Pornhub.com USA 2000
Profit, adver-
tising
0.13%
58 Orkut India Google Inc. USA 2005 Profit, adver- 0.06%
tising
59 ImageShack
ImageShack Cor-
poration
USA 2002
Profit, adver-
tising
0.05%
60 Tudou Quan Toodou
Technology
CN 2004
Profit, adver-
tising
0.08%
62 Odonoklassniki Odonoklassniki RU 2002 Profit, adver- 0.34%
tising
Total: 13.27%
Table 1: The top 20 web 2.0/3.0 platforms, ranked based on a composite index that takes into
ac-
count the number of average page views over the past three months and the number of
average
daily visitors, data accessed on July 31
st
, 2009, data source:
alexa.com
The ranking in table 1 is based on an
index
that takes into account the average share
of
page views during the past three months
and
the average number of daily visitors of
web
platforms. A website is considered as
profit-
oriented if the organization owning the
domain
takes measures in order to accumulate
money
profit with the help of the website (as for
ex-
ample in the case of advertising-based
reve-
nue models, the selling of platform
member-
ships or premium memberships, the selling
of
goods or services over the platform). A
web-
site is considered as advertising-based if
the
organization owning the domain sells
adver-
tisements that are placed on its sites to
cus-
tomers in order to generate profit.
Platforms
can be profit-oriented without being
advertis-
ing-based. A number of observations can
be
made: 16 of the 20 dominant web
2.0/3.0
domains are owned by organizations that
are
registered in the USA. 19 out of 20 of
the
dominant web 2.0/3.0 platforms are
profit-
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oriented, the only exception is
Wikipedia,
which is advertising-free and non-profit.
The
most frequently encountered business
model
in this sample is one that gives platform
ac-
cess to the users for free, offers services
for
free, and generates profit by
advertising.
However, there are also other models. So
for
example Rapidshare, a file exchange
service,
is advertising-free and generates profits
by
selling premium memberships.
YouPorn,
PornHub and ImageShack are
advertising-
based and offer some free services, but
also
sell premium accounts. Odonklassniki, a
Rus-
sian social networking site, requires all
new
users to pay a membership fee and is
adver-
tising-based. Flickr is an
advertising-based
photo sharing community. Uploading
and
viewing images is for free, Flickr sells
addi-
tional services such as photo prints,
business
cards, or photo books. The 20 most
accessed
web 2.0 platforms accounted for 13.24%
of
the global average daily page views.
12.73%
of these 13.24% were page views on
profit-
oriented platforms, which means that
96.15%
of all views of the top 20 web 2.0/3.0
plat-
forms were conducted on profit-oriented
sites.
These data show that web 2.0/3.0 is
a
strongly commodified space, there seems
to
be only a tiny minority of non-profit
platforms.
Given these empirical results, one
can
question to which degree web 2.0/3.0
users
are autonomous from capital. On the
vast
majority of platforms that they visit, their
data
and usage behaviour is stored and
assessed
in order generate profit by targeted
advertis-
ing. The users who google data, upload
or
watch videos on YouTube, upload or
browse
personal images on Flickr, or
accumulate
friends with whom they exchange content
or
communicate online via social
networking
platforms like MySpace or Facebook,
consti-
tute an “audience commodity” (Smythe,
1981)
that is sold to advertisers. The difference
be-
tween the audience commodity on
traditional
mass media and on the Internet is that in
the
latter case the users are also content
produc-
ers; there is user-generated content, the
users
engage in permanent creative activity,
com-
munication, community building, and
content-
production. That the users are more active
on
the Internet than in the reception of TV
or
radio content is due to the decentralized
struc-
ture of the Internet, which allows
many-to-
many communication. Due to the
permanent
activity of the recipients and their status
as
produsers/prosumers, we can say that in
the
case of the Internet the audience
commodity
is a produser/prosumer commodity
(Fuchs,
forthcoming; Fuchs, 2009a). The category
of
the produser commodity does not signify
a
democratization of the media towards a
par-
ticipatory or democratic system, but the
total
commodification of human creativity.
During
much of the time that users spend online,
they
produce profit for large corporations like
Goo-
gle, News Corp. (which owns MySpace),
or
Yahoo! (which owns Flickr).
Advertisements
on the Internet are frequently
personalized;
this is made possible by surveilling,
storing,
and assessing user activities and user
data
with the help of computers and
databases.
Economic surveillance is a mechapnism
that
underlies capital accumulation in web
2.0/3.0.
That web 2.0/3.0 users constitute an
audience
commodity means that they produce
surplus
value and are exploited by capital
(Fuchs,
forthcoming). We can therefore say that
Inter-
net users constitute an exploited class
of
knowledge workers (Fuchs, forthcoming).
I
think that Manuel Castells is right in
arguing
that there are potentials for
counter-power
within web 2.0 that can create
autonomous
spaces (which are autonomous from
capital
and state power). But unfortunately
these
autonomous spaces are hardly existent
in
web 2.0, they do not automatically exist,
but
must be struggled for. An autonomous
web
2.0 is a mere tendency and potential that
is
today subsumed under the corporate
logic
that dominates, but does not determine
web
2.0.
Mass-self communication for Castells
al-
lows subjects to “watch the powerful” (p.
413),
but those in power “have made it their
priority
to harness the potential of mass
self-
communication in the service of their
specific
interests” (p. 414). Therefore they engage
in
enclosing the communication commons:
“the
commons of the communication revolution
are
being expropriated to expand for-profit
enter-
tainment and to commodify personal
freedom”
(p. 414). Castells speaks of a dialectical
proc-
ess in relation to mass
self-communication:
On the one hand web 2.0 business
strategies
result in “the commodification of freedom”,
the
“enclosing of the commons of free
communi-
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cation and selling people access to
global
communication networks in exchange for
sur-
rendering their privacy and becoming
adver-
tising targets” (p. 421). On the other
hand,
“once in cyberspace, people may have
all
kinds of ideas, including challenging
corporate
power, dismantling government authority,
and
changing the cultural foundations of our
ag-
ing/aching civilization” (p. 420). The
typical
web 2.0-business strategy in my opinion is
not
“selling people access”, but giving them
ac-
cess for free and selling the people as a
pro-
sumer commodity to third parties in order
to
generate profit. As I have tried to show,
this
relationship is highly unequal, the
actual
power of corporations in web 2.0 is
much
larger than the actual political
counter-power
that is exercised by the produsers.
Castells
acknowledges this at some instances in
his
book, for example when he speaks of
“une-
qual competition” (p. 422), but on the
other
hand he contradicts this realism at some
in-
stances by a certain web 2.0 optimism,
for
example when he says that “the more
corpo-
rations invest in expanding
communication
networks (benefiting from a hefty return),
the
more people build their own networks of
mass
self-communication, thus empowering
them-
selves” (p. 421). The power of
corporations
and other powerful actors on the web is not
to
a similar extent challenged by actual
counter-
powers that empower citizens. The dialectic
of
power is only a potential, but not an
automatic
actual or necessary dialectic. Political
counter-
power on the Internet is facing a
massive
asymmetry that is due to the fact that the
rul-
ing powers control more resources such
as
money, decision-making power, capacities
for
attention generation, etc. Power struggles
are
struggles of the less powerful against
the
powerful, there is no guarantee that they
can
emerge, that they can mobilize
significant
resources so that they do not remain
precari-
ous, and that they are successful. There
are
examples for relatively successful
counter-
power struggles that have made use of
the
Internet, as Castells shows in an
impressive
manner, but I am not so optimistic that it
will
be possible to seriously tackle the
existing
economic, political, military, and
cultural
power structures in the near or
medium-term
future. It is only a potential, not an
automatism
that citizens “overcome the powerlessness
of
their solitary despair by networking their
de-
sire. They fight the powers that be by
identify-
ing the networks that are” (p. 431). The
prob-
lem is that there are also forces of power
in
contemporary society, such as ideology
and
coercion, that might forestall such fights,
that
keep people occupied with struggling for
sur-
vival so that they have no time, energy,
and
thoughts for counter-power struggles. What
I
am saying is that the workings of
counter-
power should not be overestimated, but
only
assessed as
potentials.
Castells argues that in mass
self-
communication “traditional forms of
access
control are not applicable. Anyone can
upload
a video to the Internet, write a blog, start
a
chat forum, or create a gigantic e-mail
list.
Access in this case is the rule; blocking
Inter-
net access is the exception” (p. 204). In
my
opinion, a central filter of the Internet
that
benefits powerful actors is formed by
visibility
and the attention economy. Although
every-
one can produce and diffuse information
in
principle easily with the help of the
Internet
because it is a global decentralized
many-to-
many and one-to-many communication
sys-
tem, not all information is visible to the
same
degree and gets the same attention.
The
problem in the cyberspace flood of
information
is, how in this flowing informational
ocean
other users draw their attention to
information.
So for example Indymedia, the most
popular
alternative online news platform, is
only
ranked number 4147 in the list of the
most
accessed websites, whereas BBC Online
is
ranked number 44, CNN Online number
52,
the New York Times Online number
115,
Spiegel Online number 152, Bildzeitung
On-
line number 246, or Fox News Online
number
250 (data source: alexa.com, top 1 000
000
000 sites, August 2
nd
, 2008). This shows
that
there is a stratified online attention
economy,
in which the trademarks of powerful
media
actors work as powerful symbols that help
the
online portals of these organizations to
accu-
mulate attention. This is not to deny
that
“mass self-communication” platforms such
as
Blogger (ranked number 3) or
Facebook
(ranked number 7) are heavily used, but
po-
litical information generation and
communica-
tion on such sites is much more
fragmented,
which is the reason why Jürgen
Habermas
speaks in relation to the Internet of a
danger
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of the “fragmentation of large but
politically
focused mass audience into a huge number
of
isolated issue publics” (Habermas, 2006,
p.
423). In 2008, a year characterized by a
huge
interest of the US public in politics due to
the
presidential election and the grassroots
ap-
peal of the Obama campaign, only 14% of
US
Internet users posted political comments
on
social networking sites and 8% on blogs
(Pew
Internet & American Life Project: The
Inter-
net’s Role in Campaign 2008). 64% of
online
political users in the US "got their
information
about the November elections from
network
TV websites such as cnn.com,
abcnews.com,
or msnbcnews.com; 54% visited portal
news
services like Google or Yahoo, 43%
visited
the websites of local news organizations,
40%
read someone else’s comments in a
news
group, website, or blog; 34% visited the
web-
sites of major national newspapers", 26%
vis-
ited political or news blogs, "12% visited
the
website of an alternative news
organization"
(Pew Internet & American Life Project:
The
Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008). If we
as-
sume that the general interest in online
poli-
tics is in general somewhat lower than
in
2008, then these data give a realistic
picture
of political information and
communication
online: The major platforms for political
infor-
mation are the online versions of the
estab-
lished news sources and corporate mass
me-
dia, political “mass self-communication”
is
clearly present and forms an important
ten-
dency that nonetheless remains
subsumed
under and dominated by established
powerful
media
actors.
Castells employs the terms web 2.0 and
3.0
(see for example pp. 34, 56, 65, 97, 107,
113,
421, 429) that he defines as “the cluster
of
technologies, devices, and applications
that
support the proliferation of social spaces
on
the Internet” (p. 65). Questions that
should
also be asked and answered in relation to
the
notion of “web 2.0” are in my opinion:
To
which extent are the claims about the
“new
Web” ideological and serve marketing
pur-
poses? What is novel about “web 2.0”
and
how can this novelty be empirically
validated?
What does it exactly mean to say that
the
Web becomes more social? Which notions
of
the social are employed when people
speak
of “web 2.0”? Which notion of sociality
under-
lies “web 1.0” and how does this notion
differ
from the notion of sociality that underlies
the
concepts of web 2.0 and 3.0? What is
the
difference between web 1.0, 2.0, 3.0?
In
short: The talk about “web 2.0”, “social
me-
dia”, and “social software” compels us to
an-
swer some basic questions: What is
social
about the Internet? Which different forms
of
sociality do we find on the Internet? For
an-
swering these questions, we need to
enter
conceptual sociological discussions
and
therefore social theory becomes important
for
understanding the contemporary Internet
(for
a discussion of these sociological and
social
theory foundations of “web 2.0” see
Fuchs,
2009c). Users do have the
counter-power
capacities to use web 2.0 against the
inten-
tions of the corporate operators in
progressive
ways and political struggles, but the
corporate
platform owners possess the power to
switch
users off the networks or to switch off
entire
networks. Furthermore they also have
an
interest in and power to permanently
control
the online behaviour and personal data
of
users in order to accumulate capital with
the
help of targeted advertising (Fuchs,
2009b).
Economic surveillance is at the heart of
capi-
tal accumulation in web 2.0 (Fuchs,
2009b).
The power relationship between the
corporate
media and the creative users that
Castells
describes is an asymmetrical one that
privi-
leges the
first.
4. Media Manipulation
Castells shows the importance of inter-
and
transdisciplinary research for analyzing
the
contemporary world by combining
cognitive
science and the analysis of
communication
power in order to understand how
misinforma-
tion and the creation of misperception work
as
forms of communication power. For power
to
work it must also be cognitively reproduced
in
the neural networks of the brain. Political
cog-
nition works with emotions, especially
anxiety
and anger. Framing, agenda-setting,
priming,
and indexing are for Castells the four
main
mechanisms of communication power that
are
used in politics for influencing the public
mind.
The first three are concrete strategies
em-
ployed by the media for trying to
manipulate
their audiences, so to speak, whereas
index-
ing is connected to what Herman and
Chom-
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sky (1988)
2
have termed the third filter in
me-
dia manipulation: the tendency of mass
media
to rely on information that is provided by
pow-
erful actors (such as governments and
corpo-
rations). Castells shows the
communication
power of framing and the counter-power
of
counter-framing with the example of the
fram-
ing of the US public in the Iraq war. The
me-
dia frames of the war on terror and
patriotism
activated the emotional and subliminal fear
of
death of the audience, created
mispercep-
tions, and contributed to the successful
secur-
ing of public support for the war. This
analysis
parallels Herman’s and Chomsky’s
(1988)
stress on anti-communism and
anti-terrorism
as ideological control mechanisms that
they
have studied for the media coverage of
Gua-
temala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and
Vietnam.
Castells shows that relation to Iraq,
counter-
frames could only be successfully
employed
after hurricane Katrina induced a public
feel-
ing of mismanagement about the Bush
ad-
ministration, after a series of political
scan-
dals, and with the help of citizen
journalism.
He concludes this analysis by saying that
“by
activating networks of association
between
events and mental images via
communication
processes, power-making operates in
multi-
layered dynamics in which the way we
feel
structures the way we think and ultimately
the
way we act” (p.
192).
Castells argues that media make
power
and have the capacity to shape human
minds
2
Once one brings up the names Chomsky,
Her-
man, or McChesney, some readers tend to
invoke
the cultural studies-inspired negative sentiment
that
the propaganda model and these authors
advance
an elitist agenda that considers the recipients
as
stupid and passive and neglects possibilities
for
active reception. Such readers should be
advised
that Herman and Chomsky are mainly
analyzing
strategies in media production, no matter
how
these strategies that are crystallized in
media
products are decoded and enacted by the
audi-
ences, and, more importantly, that Chomsky,
Her-
man, and McChesney stress the political
impor-
tance of alternative media production,
diffusion,
and reception, which is an aspect of political
activ-
ity and counter-power of the media (see for
exam-
ple: Herman & Chomsky, 1988, pp. 306f;
Herman
& McChesney, 1997, pp. 189-205; for this
discus-
sion, see also Herman, 1996a, 1996b,
2003;
Klaehn,
2002).
by image making. Media politics involves
for
him four processes: securing access of
pow-
erful actors to the media, the production
of
images that serve the interests of
powerful
actors, the delivery of these messages in
di-
verse formats and through diverse
technolo-
gies combined with the measurement of
its
effectiveness, and the financing of these
ac-
tivities. Castells describes the tendency
in
media politics that the media exert
communi-
cation power with the help of
sensationalism,
theatrical politics, personalization,
dramatiza-
tion, the fragmentation of information,
nega-
tive stereotyping, attack politics, and
scandali-
zation. These are politics that focus on
human
emotions. He sees direct government
control
as well as corporate ownership and
leader-
ship as two important filters in media
politics.
The second aspect corresponds to the
first
two filters that Herman and Chomsky
(1988)
have stressed in their propaganda
model:
size, ownership, and profit orientation of
the
mass media; and
advertising-orientation.
Castells also discusses the role of
political
think tanks in informational politics, a
lobbying
that Herman and Chomsky (1988)
have
termed flak and that they characterize as
the
fourth filter of media manipulation.
Castells
analyzes political censorship and control
of
the media with the help of three case
studies
that cover the USA, Russia, and
China.
For Castells, there are the following
new
aspects of media politics: the use of the
Inter-
net in political campaigns (p. 230), the
multi-
plication of entry points of political reports,
on
which an interaction between
mainstream
media and the Internet is based (p. 234),
an
unprecedented prevalence and significance
of
scandal politics (p. 246), the easy and
imme-
diate diffusion of scandal politics over
the
Internet by everyone (pp. 247f), an increase
of
the publicity and perception of corruption
and
of the impact on public trust (p. 289).
The
result would be a worldwide crisis of
political
legitimacy, a decline in public trust, and
a
crisis of democracy. These crises could
pos-
sibly, but not automatically result in
depolitici-
zation, and would in many cases also create
a
desire for insurgent politics, social
move-
ments, and new public
spaces.
Castells continuously stresses that
the
communication structures that are used
by
powerful actors can also be used for
counter-
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power strategies. A question that
remains
unanswered for me after having read
chapter
4 of Communication Power, is if
Castells
thinks that it is possible and fruitful if
insurgent
movements try to exert counter-power
with
the help of the mediated politics of
scandaliza-
tion, stereotyping, and attacks, or not.
Scan-
dalization, stereotyping, and attacking are
the
communication power-mechanisms
that
Castells analyzes in chapter 4, but it
remains
unclear if the dialectic of power and
counter-
power that Castells has in mind also
applies
here and if these strategies can be
empirically
observed in counter-power movements.
In
chapter 5, he gives the example of how
the
Obama campaign that he characterizes as
a
form of insurgent politics resisted the
scandal
and attack politics directed against Obama
by
the Hillary Clinton campaign without
resorting
to the same tactics. This therefore also
leaves
open the question if insurgent politics
are
necessarily non-scandal politics or
not.
5. Social Movements
I have always been somehow sceptical
about
Castells’ (2004) distinction between
proactive
and reactive social movements. The first
–
Castells (2004) discusses the Zapatistas,
the
American militia, Aum Shinrikyo, and
al-
Qaeda – have primarily a “resistance
identity”
(Castells, 2004, p. 70), are “defensive
move-
ments built around trenches of
resistance”
(Castells, 2004, p. 73), “stigmatized by
the
logic of domination” (Castells, 2004, p.
8),
“primarily identity-based mobilizations in
reac-
tion to a clearly identified adversary (…)
rather
than purveyors of a societal project”,
whereas
the second – Castells (2004) mentions
the
movement for democratic globalization,
envi-
ronmentalism, feminism – develop
resistance
identity into “project identity” (Castells,
2004,
p. 70) and “seek the transformation of
overall
social structure” (Castells, 2004, p. 8).
All
social movements are reactive and
proactive,
they have adversaries and a societal
project.
So for example environmentalism is not
purely
proactive, but also opposes pollution and
pol-
luters as adversaries, whereas al-Qaeda
is
not only reactive, but also proactive: So
bin
Laden on the one hand expresses a
resis-
tance identity that is oriented against
the
West, especially the USA: “These
tragedies
and calamities are only a few examples
of
your oppression and aggression against us.
It
is commanded by our religion and
intellect
that the oppressed have a right to return
the
aggression. Do not await anything from us
but
Jihad, resistance and revenge. Is it in any
way
rational to expect that after America has
at-
tacked us for more than half a century,
that
we will then leave her to live in security
and
peace?!!” (bin Laden: Letter to America
3
).
On
the other hand he formulates a project
iden-
tity, a clear societal project that al-Qaeda
pur-
sues: “to make the Shariah the supreme
law”,
“the religion of the Unification of God; of
free-
dom from associating partners with Him,
and
rejection of this; of complete love of Him,
the
Exalted; of complete submission to His
Laws;
and of the discarding of all the opinions,
or-
ders, theories and religions which
contradict
with the religion He sent down to His
Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him)” (Ibid.;
9).
Bin Laden’s vision sounds terrifying, but it
is
clear that what he has in mind and what
he
and al-Qaeda struggle for is a large
societal
project – a fundamentalist theocracy.
In
Communication Power, Castells seems
to
stick to this distinction between
proactivism
and reactivism of social movements (p.
300).
The difference between certain
movements
cannot be found in their proactivism or
reactiv-
ism, two features that are characteristic for
all
of them, but in their political content
that
ranges on a continuum from progressivism
to
anti-progressivism (Fuchs, 2006; 2008,
p.
290).
For Castells, the movement for
democratic
globalization stands for “the old
anarchist
ideal of autonomous communes and free
indi-
viduals coordinating their self-managed
forms
of existence on a broader scale, (…)
the
promise of self-managed networks enabled
by
technologies of freedom” (pp. 345f). So
one
can say that this movement enacts and
repre-
sents the project of establishing a society
that
is based on “voluntary associations” that
are
based on “free agreements concluded
be-
tween the various groups” and that
“represent
an interwoven network, composed of an
infi-
nite variety of groups and federations of
all
3
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/
theobserver, accessed on August 2,
2008.
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sizes and degrees, local, regional,
national
and international temporary or more or
less
permanent - for all possible purposes”
(Kro-
potkin, 1910, p. 284). For me, the
movement
for democratic globalization is not just this,
but
even more (see Fuchs 2006, 2007; 2008a,
pp.
290-294): it is the contemporary
universal
social movement, a movement of
movements
that unites the diversity of other
protest
movements, creates a unity in diversity
that
articulates the topics of all contemporary
pro-
test movements with the topics of
capitalism
and class. This unity in diversity can for
ex-
ample be observed by taking a look at
the
structure of Indymedia, which is one
important
voice of the movement: The US website
of
this platform is structured into 48
different
topics, such as anti-war, environment,
gender
& sexuality, human & civil rights, labour,
race
& racism, etc. Historically, a single
movement
has existed for each of these topics, but
now
this diversity is combined within one
move-
ment. The central movement of the
“pro-
grammed society” that Alain Touraine has
so
long been looking for (compare
Touraine,
1985), might now have
emerged.
Castells argues that social movements
that
engage in insurgent politics – “the
process
aiming at political change
(institutional
change) in discontinuity with the logic
embed-
ded in political institutions” (p. 300) – “in
a
world marked by the rise of mass
self-
communication, (…) have the chance to
enter
the public space from multiple sources.
By
using both horizontal communication
networks
and mainstream media to convey their
images
and messages, they increase their chances
of
enacting social and political change – even
if
they start from a subordinate position in
insti-
tutional power, financial resources, or
sym-
bolic legitimacy” (p. 302). With the help of
four
case studies he shows how social
movements
try to reprogram “the communication
networks
that constitute the symbolic environment
for
image manipulation and information
process-
ing in our minds, the ultimate determinants
of
individual and collective practices”: the
envi-
ronmental movement, the movement for
de-
mocratic globalization, the
spontaneous
movement that emerged in Spain after the
al-
Qaeda attacks in March 2004, and the
Obama
presidential campaign. Methods of
media
counter-power that are discussed include:
the
networking of scientists, activists,
opinion
leaders, and celebrities; the use of
entertain-
ment and popular culture for political
causes;
mobilization and networking with the help
of
social networking sites (MySpace,
Facebook,
etc); celebrity advocacy; event
management;
alternative online media; video sharing
plat-
forms (YouTube, etc); actionism; street
thea-
tre; hacking; electronic civil
disobedience;
flash mob activism supported by
mobile
phones (“instant insurgent communities”,
p.
363); online fund-raising; Obama’s
emotional
political style that promised hope and
change
in order to stimulate enthusiasm and
grass-
roots activism; online petitions; political
blog-
ging; or delocalized mobilization and
micro-
targeting tactics supported by the
Internet.
6. A New Society?
Manuel Castells has advanced the
disputed
claim that the network society is a new
society
(Castells, 2000a, p. 371; see Garnham,
1998;
Webster, 1997a, b) in the sense that the
rela-
tionships of production, power, and
experi-
ence “are increasingly organized around
net-
works” that “constitute the new social
mor-
phology of our societies” (Castells, 2000b,
p.
500). One can note that in prior
publications
power seems to have been conceived
by
Castells as a typical political
process,
whereas now it seems to signify a
broader
phenomenon, which brings up the
theoretical
question how power, the political, and
the
non-political differ and are connected.
Castells
considers informationalism as the
“material
foundation” of the network society
(Castells,
2000a, p. 367) and characterizes the
eco-
nomic sphere of the network society as
infor-
mational capitalism or global economy,
the
political sphere as network state, and the
cul-
tural sphere as culture of real
virtuality
(Castells, 2000a, pp. 366-391). Within
this
approach that stresses the centrality of
net-
works, informationalism, and
communication,
it is a logical step that Castells argues
in
Communication Power that “power in the
net-
work society is communication power” (p.
53)
and that “communication networks are
the
fundamental networks of power-making
in
society” (p. 426). But take a sphere such
as
the capitalist economy. Figure 1 shows
the
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106
distribution of the capital assets of the
world’s
largest 2000 corporations at the end of
the
fiscal year 2008, a year that will be
remem-
bered for the emergence and intensification
of
a global economic crisis. Although
finance
capital suffered large profit losses in 2008,
it
still accounted for 74.86% of the total
assets
of the world’s largest companies. The oil
and
gas industry accounted for 6.21%,
which
shows the economic importance of fossil
fuels
– a resource over which wars are
fought,
which points out the military and political
rele-
vance of this part of the economy. The
infor-
mation industry made up 4.59% of the
total
assets of the world’s largest
corporations
4
.
This suggests that the capitalist economy
is
not dominated by the information
economy
and is not predominantly an
informational
capitalism, but besides an informational
capi-
talism also new imperialism (Harvey,
2003),
finance capitalism, hyperindustrial
capitalism,
etc. Capitalism is a complex economic
field
that is shaped by multiple interacting
tenden-
cies such as communication power,
finance
power, imperial power, hyperindustrial
power,
etc. Castells leaves no doubt about the
large
influence of finance capital in
contemporary
capitalism. He says that “the structure
and
dynamics of financial networks” are “at
the
heart of capitalist power” (p. 424). In my
opin-
ion notions such as “informational
capitalism”
and “communication power” should be used
in
a modest sense so that they signify only
those
parts of the economy or society that
base
specific operations on information and
com-
munication. Depending on which variables
we
observe (such as capital assets, profits,
la-
bour force, value added, transnationality
in-
dex, etc in the economy), we can
empirically
calculate to which extent a certain aspect of
a
subsystem of contemporary society is
infor-
mation-based. This approach is different
from
saying that contemporary capitalism is
pre-
dominantly informational and that the
central
power in contemporary society is
communica-
tion
power.
7. Conclusion
In sum: Manuel Castells’
Communication
Power is a powerful narrative about the
con-
nection of communication and power in
con-
temporary society that presents rich
empirical
details, illuminating case studies, and
repre-
sents an original and insightful approach.
It
will shape the disciplinary and
transdiscipli-
nary discussions about communication
and
power in the coming years. The central
new
category that the book introduces is the one
of
mass self-communication. Good books
bring
up many new questions, so I do have
ques-
tions and also doubts about Castells’ notion
of
power, the use of computer science terms
for
analyzing society, the assessment and
cate-
gorical description of the power
distribution
between global multimedia corporations
and
the creative audience, the feasibility of
the
notion of web 2.0, his notion of social
move-
ments, the role of the movement for
democ-
ratic globalization in contemporary
society,
and the centrality of informationalism
and
communication power. When all this is
being
said, it remains no doubt that this book
em-
powers the academic discourse about
com-
munication
power.
Contemporary society is a society of
global
economic crisis. This has resulted in a
return
of the importance of economic
questions,
which are also questions about class, in
social
theory and has shown which huge power
the
global financial and economic networks
have
over our lives. The central political task
might
now be to develop counter-power against
the
commodification of everything. That this
is
easier said than done was
communicated
recently by the result of the elections to
the
European Parliament. The task for social
the-
ory in the contemporary situation is to
develop
analyses of power and potential
counter-
power. Manuel Castells reminds us that
the
role of communication certainly should not
be
neglected in such
endeavours.
4
The information economy consists for
statistical
purposes in these calculations of the
following
realms: media, semiconductors, software &
serv-
ices, technology hardware & equipment,
telecom-
munications
services.
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Figure
1
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About the Author
Christian Fuchs
Christian Fuchs holds a venia docendi from the University of Salzburg in the field information and communication technolo-
gies & society. His areas of research are: social theory, critical theory, information society studies, media & society, ICTs &
society. He is author of more than 100 academic publications, among them the book Internet and Society: Social Theory in
the Information Age (New York: Routledge 2008) and the study Social Networking Sites and the Surveillance Society. A
Critical Case Study of the Usage of studiVZ, Facebook, and MySpace by Students in Salzburg in the Context of Electronic
Surveillance (Vienna 2009).