
98
control of the Internet and to assert their
right
of communicative freedom without
corporate
control: “Among the global media giants
and
other media organizations, the digitization
of
information and the expansion of networks
of
mass self-communication have facilitated
a
preoccupation with how to monetize
these
networks in terms of advertising” (p. 80).
“All
the major players are trying to figure out
how
to re-commodify Internet-based
autonomous
mass self-communication. They are
experi-
menting with ad-supported sites, pay
sites,
free streaming video portals, and pay
portals.
(…) Web 2.0 technologies empowered
con-
sumers to produce and distribute their
own
content. The viral success of these
technolo-
gies propelled media organizations to
harness
the production power of traditional
consum-
ers” (p. 97). “The interactive capacity of
the
new communication system ushers in a
new
form of communication, mass
self-
communication, which multiplies and
diversi-
fies the entry points in the
communication
process. This gives rise to
unprecedented
autonomy for communicative subjects
to
communicate at large. Yet, this
potential
autonomy is shaped, controlled, and
curtailed
by the growing concentration and
interlocking
of corporate media and network
operators
around the world. (…) However, this is
not
tantamount to one-sided, vertical control
of
communicative practices (…) As a result,
the
global culture of universal commodification
is
culturally diversified and ultimately
contested
by other cultural expressions” (p.
136).
Castells gives a techno-dialectical
analysis
here, but it remains unclear what he means
by
the rise of autonomy for communicative
sub-
jects.
The notion of autonomy in mass
self-
communication is first introduced on
page
129, but it is not defined, which leaves
the
reader wondering what Castells wants to
tell
her/him by using this normatively and
politi-
cally connoted term (see also p. 302).
The
meaning of the concept of autonomy is
not
self-explanatory. Is it autonomy in the
sense
of Kant, understood as the autonomy of
the
will as the supreme principle of morality
(Kant,
2002, p. 58), the “quality of the will of being
a
law to itself” (Kant, 2002, p. 63)? Or
does
autonomy mean the “true individualism”
that
Hayek (1948) had in mind, in which
capitalism
is conceived as spontaneous order
that
should be left to itself and should not
be
shaped by political rules (Hayek, 1988)?
Does
it refer to freedom of speech, taste, and
as-
sembly – “the liberty of thought and
discus-
sion” – in line with the harm principle, as
pos-
tulated by John Stuart Mill (2002)? Or
is
autonomy the existence of functionally
differ-
entiated self-referential subsystems of
society
(Luhmann, 1998)? Or does it in a less
indi-
vidualistic sense refer to the combination
of
individual autonomy, understood as
subjectiv-
ity that is “reflective and deliberative”
and
“frees the radical imagination” from “the
en-
slavement of repetition” (Castoriadis, 1991,
p.
164), and social autonomy, “the equal
partici-
pation of all in power” (Castoriadis, 1991,
p.
136; see also Castoriadis, 1998)?
Does
Castells’ notion of autonomy confirm one
of
the two poles of the theoretically
unreconciled
relationship of private autonomy and
public
autonomy that Habermas (1996, p. 84)
has
critically examined, or does it refer to the
dia-
lectic of autonomy that Habermas has in
mind
when he speaks of a “cooriginality of
private
and public autonomy” (Habermas, 1996,
p.
104) achieved in a “system of rights in
which
private and public autonomy are
internally
related” (Habermas, 1996, p. 280) and
“recip-
rocally presuppose each other”
(Habermas,
1996, p. 417)? Or does autonomy mean
the
“status of an organized people in an
enclosed
territorial unit” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 19, for
a
critique of this approach see
Habermas,
1989)? Or is autonomy a postmodern
project
of plural democracy with a multiplicity of
sub-
ject positions (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985)?
In
short: There are all kinds of meanings of
con-
cepts such as autonomy, and it is one of
the
tasks of social theory to clarify which ones
are
feasible and suitable for the situation of
con-
temporary
society.
If we define “web 2.0/3.0” platforms
as
world wide web platforms that are not
pre-
dominantly sites for information
consumption
or search, but sites for social
networking,
community building, file sharing,
co-operative
information production, and interactive
blog-
ging – platforms that are more systems
of
communication and co-operation than
sys-
tems of cognition (for details of this
definition
see Fuchs 2009c, 2008a) –, then this
allows
us to analyze the ownership structures
and