tripleC 7(2): 142-157, 2009
ISSN 1726-670X
http://www.triple-c.at
CC: Creative Commons License, 2008.
Outline of a Theory of Truth as Correctness for Semantic
Information
Luciano Floridi
Research Chair in Philosophy of Information and GPI, University of Hertfordshire
Faculty of Philosophy and IEG, University of Oxford
Abstract: The article develops a correctness theory of truth (CTT) for semantic information. After the introduction, in section
two, semantic information is shown to be translatable into propositional semantic information (i). In section three, i is
polarised into a query (Q) and a result (R), qualified by a specific context, a level of abstraction and a purpose. This
polarization is normalised in section four, where [Q + R] is transformed into a Boolean question and its relative yes/no
answer [Q + A]. This completes the reduction of the truth of i to the correctness of A. In sections five and six, it is argued
that (1) A is the correct answer to Q if and only if (2) A correctly saturates (in a Fregean sense) Q by verifying and validating
it (in the computer science’s sense of “verification” and “validation”); that (2) is the case if and only if (3) [Q + A] generates
an adequate model (m) of the relevant system (s) identified by Q; that (3) is the case if and only if (4) m is a proxy of s (in
the computer science’s sense of “proxy”) and (5) proximal access to m commutes with the distal access to s (in the category
theory’s sense of “commutation”); and that (5) is the case if and only if (6) reading/writing (accessing, in the computer
science’s technical sense of the term) m enables one to read/write (access) s. The last section draws a general conclusion
about the nature of CTT as a theory for systems designers not just systems users.
Keywords: Computer Science; Correctness; Information Theory; Philosophy of Information; Semantic information; Truth
1. Introduction
n recent years, philosophical interest in the
nature of information has been increasing
steadily.
1
In particular, one of the current
debates concerns the veridical nature of
semantic information. The debate is
somewhat old,
2
but has been re-ignited by the
proposal to analyse semantic information in
terms of well-formed, meaningful and veridical
data (Floridi [2004b]). Admittedly, the analysis
– according to which semantic information
encapsulates truth, exactly as knowledge
does – has attracted some criticisms for being
too restrictive.
3
Such criticisms, however,
1
For an updated overview and guide to the literature
see Floridi (2004a).
2
For example, Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953) and
Devlin (1991) argued against the veridical nature of
semantic information, whereas Dretske (1981) and Grice
(1989) argued in its favour.
3
See for example the discussion in Fetzer (2004), with
a reply in Floridi (2005a); or the objections moved by
Colburn (2000a), Colburn (2000b) and Dodig-Crnkovic
(2005).
have been proved unjustified.
4
As a result,
there is now a growing consensus about the
following approach.
Semantic information is primarily
understood in terms of content about a
referent. I shall discuss the formal nature of
content in the following pages but, at the
moment, suffice to say that it is analysable in
terms of well-formed and meaningful data.
5
Strings or patterns of data may constitute
sentences in a natural language, but of course
they can also generate formulae, maps,
diagrams, videos and other semiotic
constructs in a variety of physical codes,
being further determined by their appropriate
syntax (well-formedness) and semantics
(meaningfulness). By “about a referent” one is
to understand the ordinary and familiar way in
which some well-formed and meaningful data,
constituting semantic information, concern or
address a topic. Following Dretske (1981) and
4
Floridi (2007) and Sequoiah-Grayson (2007).
5
On the analysis of data see Floridi (2008a).
tripleC 7(2): 142-157, 2009 143
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Dretske (1988), one may easily recognise this
“aboutness” feature in propositional attitudes
such as “Mary is informed that there is some
beer in the fridge”, where “being informed” is
used in the statal
6
sense, i.e., in the sense
that Mary holds that information. This is the
condition into which a enters once a has
acquired the information (actional state of
being informed) that p. It is the sense in which
a witness, for example, is informed (holds the
information) that the suspect was with her at
the time when the crime was committed. In
the rest of this paper, we shall be concerned
with only this standard, statal and
epistemically oriented concept of semantic
information.
In Floridi (2005a), I argued that a definition
of semantic information in terms of alethically-
neutral content – that is, strings of well-formed
and meaningful data that can be additionally
qualified as true or untrue (false, for the
classicists among us), depending on
supervening evaluations – provides only
necessary but insufficient conditions: if some
content is to qualify as semantic information, it
must also be true. One speaks of false
information in the same way as one qualifies
someone as a false friend, i.e. not a friend at
all. This leads to a refinement of the initial
definition into:
[DEF] p qualifies as semantic information if
and only if p is (constituted by) well-
formed, meaningful and veridical data.
[DEF] captures the general consensus
reached by the debate and mentioned at the
outset of this section. According to it,
semantic information is, strictly speaking,
inherently truth-constituted and not a
contingent truth-bearer, exactly like
knowledge but unlike propositions or beliefs,
for example, which are what they are
independently of their truth values and then,
because of their truth-aptness, may be further
qualified alethically.
6
The distinction is standard in linguistics, where one
speaks of passive verbal forms or states as “statal” (e.g.
“the door was shut (state) when I last checked it”) or
“actional” (e.g. “but I don't know when the door was shut
(act)”). In this paper, I deal only with the statal sense of
“is informed”. This is related to cognitive issues and to the
logical analysis of an agent’s “possession” of a belief or
some knowledge.
[DEF] offers several advantages. For
example, it plays a crucial role in the solution
of the so-called Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox
(Floridi [2004c]) and provides a necessary
element for a subjectivist theory of epistemic
relevance (Floridi (2008c)). Here, it is worth
emphasising that it forges a robust and
intuitive link between semantic information
and knowledge. More specifically, the
veridical thesis contained in [DEF]
corresponds to the one characterising the
definition of knowledge. Taking advantage of
this parallelism, one may rely on the ordinary
apparatus of modal logic (e.g. Chellas (1980))
to formalise “a is informed that p” as I
a
p, and
hence formulate the veridicality thesis of
semantic information in terms of the so-called
veridicality axiom □φ φ, also known as T, M
or K2, thus:
[VT] I
a
p p
The intended interpretation of [VT] is that a
is informed that p only if p is true. In Floridi
(2006), I have shown that information logic
(IL) can then be satisfactorily modelled in
terms of an interpretation of the relation “a is
informed that p” based on the axioms of
normal modal logic B. [VT] associates IL to
epistemic logics (EL) based on normal modal
logics KT, S4 or S5. And it differentiates both
IL and EL from doxastic logics (DL) based on
KD, KD4 and KD45, since, of course, no DL
satisfies the veridicality axiom. It follows that
IL allows truth-encapsulation (i.e., it satisfies
[VT]) without facing either epistemic or
doxastic collapse, i.e., merely morphing into
another epistemic or doxastic logic. So
knowledge encapsulates truth because it
encapsulates semantic information, which, in
turn, encapsulates truth, as in a three dolls
matryoshka.
Despite its advantages, any approach
endorsing [DEF] raises two major questions
(Floridi (2004b)). One is upstream:
a) what does it mean for semantic information
to be truthful?
The other is downstream:
b) how can semantic information turn into
knowledge?
144 Luciano Floridi
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
Both questions are prompted by [DEF] but
neither is specifically about [DEF] only, so
each fails to provide a starting point for a
reductio ad absurdum. They are rather
information-theoretical versions of classic
conundrums: (a) is a request for a theory of
truth and (b) is a request for a substantive
analysis of knowledge. Since the goal of this
paper is to seek to answer only (a), let me
brush (b) away by adding a final clarification.
[DEF] nests semantic information into
knowledge so tightly that one is naturally led
to wonder whether anything else might be
missing, in order to escalate from the weaker
to the stronger phenomenon, and hence
between their corresponding concepts.
Indeed, the threshold can be so fine that one
may often overlook it and thus fail to
distinguish between the two propositional
attitudes, treating “Mary is informed that there
is some beer in the fridge” and “Mary knows
that there is some beer in the fridge” as if they
were always losslessly interchangeable. In
everyday life, this might be the norm and the
conflation is usually harmless: it can hardly
matter whether the bus driver is informed or
knows that the traffic light is red.
Philosophically, however, the distinction
captures an important difference, and hence it
is important to be more accurate. For it takes
only a moment of reflection to see that one
may be informed (hold the information) that p
without actually knowing that p. Not only
because holding the information that p does
not have to be a reflective state (although it is
not necessarily the case that I
a
p II
a
p, one
may also object that K
a
p KK
a
p is
notoriously controversial as well) but also
because, even when it is, it might still
arguably be opaque and certainly unjustified.
Consider opaqueness first. It is open to
discussion whether a messenger carrying
(whether in her memory or in her hand it does
not matter) an encrypted message p that she
does not understand – even if she is informed
that she carries p – may be said to hold the
information that p. On the one hand, one may
argue that she is not genuinely informed that
p. On the other hand, one may retort that, if
she can deliver the information that p (and we
are assuming that she can) then she can
legitimately be said to hold that information.
The interesting point here is not to solve the
dispute, but to note that the dispute itself is
reasonable, whereas, if the same messenger
knows that p, there can be no doubt that she
must also comprehend the information carried
by p. It might be open to debate whether
holding the information that p is necessarily a
non-opaque state, but such a dispute would
be pointless in the case of knowing that p.
Next, consider the degree of justification.
Epistemic luck does not affect informativeness
negatively. To see why, one may use a
classic Russellian example: if one checks a
watch at time t and the watch is broken but
stopped working exactly at t - 12 hours and
therefore happens to indicate the right time t -
12 at t, one still holds the information that the
time is t, although one can no longer be said
to know the time. The same applies to a more
Platonic example in which a student
memorises, but fails to understand, the proof
of a geometrical theorem: she is informed
(holds the information) that the proof is so and
so, but does not really know that the proof is
so and so. Generalising, Russell- Plato- or
Gettier-type counterexamples may succeed in
degrading “knowing” to merely “being
informed” (“holding the information that”), but
then “being informed” is exactly what is left
after the application of such counterexamples
and what remains resilient to further
subjunctive conditionalization. The additional
difficulty is that the counterexamples show
both that some justificatory variable might
have a key role to play in full epistemic states,
besides reflectivity and transparency, and that
this variable too is still insufficient to
guarantee the delivery of knowledge every
time. Sometimes, one may be (reflectively and
transparently) informed that p and fully
justified in holding the information that p and
yet still fail to know that p.
Rotten as all this may be, it is not all, for
there is further bad news. One can also prove
that Gettier-type problems are logically
unsolvable by showing that they are a sub-
class of the more general “coordinated attack”
problem, which is demonstrably insolvable in
epistemic logic (Floridi [2004b]). This entails
that the tripartite account is not merely
inadequate as it stands, as proved by Gettier-
type counterexamples, but demonstrably
irreparable in principle, so that efforts to
tripleC 7(2): 142-157, 2009 145
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improve it can never succeed. Although it is
useful to know that we should stop trying to fix
this approach and start looking for a different
one, the disappointing conclusion is that, as
far as question (b) above is concerned, we
lack even a promising strategy to upgrade I
a
p
to K
a
p.
So much regarding (b), which we can now
leave on one side. Prospects are much
brighter when it comes to question (a). In this
case, the challenge is not a shortage, but
rather an overabundance of viable answers,
since we are spoiled for choice by a variety of
theories of truth.
7
Admittedly, in the literature
on semantic information there appears to be
at least an implicit predilection for some
version of a Tarskian and/or correspondentist
approach.
8
And yet, at least in principle,
nothing prevents each of the major theories of
truth from answering (a). They simply would
have been refuted a long time ago if they
couldn’t. It follows that some initial tolerance
towards a pluralistic approach to (a) might be
unavoidable, if not methodologically welcome.
Of course, if this were all that one could
sensibly recommend about (a), there would
be little reason to pursue any further
investigation. There is, however, another way
of approaching (a), which opens up an
interesting line of enquiry.
Consider the strategy sketched above. It
consists in selecting the best available theory
of truth and testing how well it might be
applied and adapted in order to explain the
truthfulness of semantic information. With
some negligible adjustments, such a top-down
approach is comparable to the so-called
“design pattern” technique (Gamma et al.
(1995)) in software engineering (Sommerville
(2007)). This consists in identifying and
specifying the abstract features of a design
structure, which are then generally reusable
solutions to commonly occurring problems in
the construction of an artefact. In our case, we
have several design patterns for the concept
of truth. We know that they are robust,
7
In this paper, I have relied especially on Lynch
(2001), Engel (2002) and Künne (2003), among the many
introductions and anthologies available on the major
theories of truth, as particularly helpful.
8
See for example Popper (1935), Dretske (1981), Fox
(1983), Israel and Perry (1990), Barwise and Seligman
(1997) and Bremer and Cohnitz (2004).
because they have been tested and refined
since Ramsey, if not Aristotle. We also know
that they are reusable: although they have
been developed to deal primarily with
propositional or sentential truths, one may
reasonably expect them to be effectively
adaptable to truthful data (e.g. a truthful map)
as well. So, when our artefact, i.e. semantic
information, is proved to require the particular
feature of being truthful, a sensible alternative
is to consider such design patterns and try to
identify the ones that best satisfy the
constraints and requirements imposed by the
development of the artefact itself.
Oversimplifying, one may answer (a) by
choosing whichever pre-packaged theory of
truth turns out to be most suitable. This
strategy may be classic, is certainly viable but
it is hardly innovative and I shall not pursue it
in the following pages.
The other approach is bottom-up and
suggests the sort of strategy that will guide
the rest of this investigation. It consists in
assuming the artefact itself as given, and then
trying to discover the principles governing its
properties and workings by analysing its
structure, function and operations. In software
engineering, this technique is known as
“reverse engineering”. This is “the process of
extracting the knowledge or design blueprints
from anything man-made” (Eilam (2005), p.
3). It consists in examining an existing artefact
in order to identify its components and their
interrelationships and hence create
representations of it in other forms or at a
higher level of generalization. Following this
strategy, one may answer question (a) by
assuming the occurrence of some semantic
information and then disassembling it in order
to reveal what its components are and how
they interact with each other to deliver
information. We have the artefact and we
seek to understand its mechanism by taking it
apart, hopefully in the right way and places.
Note that this second strategy is perfectly
compatible with the first, once it is realised
that there is a virtuous cycle of feedback
between design patterns and reverse
engineering results. Contrary to the first
strategy, however, reverse engineering
promises to deliver a more innovate analysis,
as it avoids approaching the problem of truth
from pre-established theories and explores it
146 Luciano Floridi
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
from a new perspective. After all, the first
strategy merely retrofits some already existing
theory of truth to semantic information,
instead of trying to develop a customised
solution which may then be generalisable.
The cost to be paid for this innovation is that
our bottom-up strategy will also be uphill, if I
may be allowed to combine the two
metaphors: it is much more economical to
choose from a pre-established menu than to
develop a new approach. I can only hope that
the reader will find the effort rewarding and
the result enlightening. And now it is time to
start climbing.
2. First Step: Translation
A large variety of kinds of semantic
information, from traffic lights to train
timetables, from road signs to fire alarms, falls
within the scope of [DEF]. This is how it should
be but it is awfully inconvenient for our
purposes. For in order to reverse-engineer
semantic information in such a way that its
components might easily be identified,
disassembled and explained, it would be far
easier and more fruitful to concentrate on just
one kind, the propositional one, which lends
itself to such a treatment straightforwardly.
So, our first step will be to ensure that all
kinds of semantic information covered by
[DEF] are indeed translatable into
propositional semantic information, thus
guaranteeing that what will be concluded
about the latter may be extendable to the
former. At this point, the reader who finds
such “translatability” uncontroversial, or
indeed trivial, may wish to skip the rest of this
section. The one who finds it impossible may
concede the restriction of scope as a matter of
convenient stipulation, although the rest of
this section purports to show that the burden
of proof is on her shoulders. As for the rest of
us, what follows should be sufficiently
convincing to make our second step
unproblematic.
Syntactically (or in terms of information
theory), the propositional translatability of any
kind of semantic information is unquestionable
and a matter of daily experience. After all,
analogue information is reproducible digitally
to any chosen degree of accuracy, its digital
version is equivalent to finite lists of zeros and
ones, and these can be further encoded into
as many answers to questions asked in a
suitably chosen language, and hence
ultimately translated into statements of that
language. That doing any of this would be
sheer madness is irrelevant here. For the
question is not how difficult or costly this
process would be, e.g. in terms of accuracy,
time and memory resources, but that it might
be possible at all. More to the point is whether
some non-propositional, semantic information
– the sort of information provided by the map
of the London Underground, for example –
may always be translatable semantically into
propositional semantic information, at least in
principle. Mind, not all of it at once, and not
even part of it at every level and for every kind
and degree of detail (henceforth Level of
Abstraction or simply LoA, Floridi (2008b)),
but any of it at the right LoA, depending on
needs and requirements. Since the difference
between a syntactic and a semantic
translation may not be very familiar, let me
first introduce it with an example.
Consider being able to reproduce the map
of the London Underground on graph paper
by being told, say over the phone, the position
and colour of each square on the paper: the
communication over the phone would provide
a syntactic translation, with the end result (the
coloured graph paper representing the map)
constituting a test about whether the
translation worked. Contrast it now to being
able to travel from one station to another on
the London Underground, by receiving verbal
instructions from someone who is navigating
using the visual indications provided by the
map. This is a semantic translation, and your
trip is a test of its accuracy.
Suppose now that a semantic translation
from non-propositional into propositional
information, of the kind just illustrated, were
sometimes impossible, even in principle. Then
there would be some residual semantic
information, conveyed non-propositionally
(e.g., by the map), that one would necessarily
be unable to convey propositionally,
independently of the resources available. We
would then have reached the limits of the
informational powers of any natural language,
even natural languages formally expanded,
e.g. mathematically. Allegedly, we should still
be able to point to the information in question
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(in the previous example, suppose we are
both looking at the same map), but we would
be unable to generate the right sort of
propositional content that could adequately
convey it. This is a reductio ad absurdum. For
here we are not engaging with some
Wittgensteinian limits of the “sayable”, with
Kantian noumena, with some linguistically-
ungraspable sensations, or some mystical
experience enjoyed while looking at the map
of the London Underground. We are talking
about what the map of the London
Underground can encode, in terms of
information about travelling through the
network, positions of the stations,
interconnections, available routes etc., which,
allegedly, would be at least partly beyond the
expressive power of any natural language to
convey. But since natural languages have
been acknowledged to be “semantically
omnipotent” at least since Leibniz (Formigari
(2004), pp. 91-92), one can arguably assume
that the translation is always possible, even if
it is likely to be onerous at times and hence
often unfeasible in terms of resources. So, in
the rest of the paper, we shall treat semantic
information as possibly semiotic-dependent (it
may always require a code) but not as
semiotically bounded (codes are translatable
propositionally, if expensively resource-wise)
or, more formally and briefly:
[TR] x (DEF(x) Non-prop (x))
y (Prop-t (y, x) DEF(y))
The intended interpretation of [TR] is that, if
any data (the domain on which the quantifiers
range) satisfy [DEF] but are not propositional,
then there is a propositional translation of
those data which also satisfies [DEF]. Note
that we do not need to assume the stronger
principle of translational equivalence: pictures
may be worth thousands of words, but there
might be thousands of words that are
priceless. All that [TR] needs to guarantee is
that the conclusions reached about the alethic
nature of propositional semantic information
will be exportable to the truthful nature of non-
propositional semantic information as well. In
other words, that what can be concluded
about the truth of “there is some beer in the
fridge” is equally applicable to the truthfulness
of a picture conveying the same information
visually.
3. Step two: Polarization
Once some information i is formulated
propositionally, the second step is to follow a
standard approach, in information theory, to
the quantification of information, and
disassemble i into a combination of a query Q
and a result R. A query is to be understood as
a request for data sent (e.g., an illocutionary
act performed) by a sender to a receiver, in
the form of a message. Thus, it might have
the format of a question (“where is the beer?”)
as well as of an imperative (“tell me where the
beer is”), or a string of symbols in a search
engine. A result is also to be understood as a
message, the requested data, sent by the
receiver to the querying sender. In short, we
have (the asterisk is a reminder that the
formula is provisional and will have to be
refined):
[POL*] i = Q + R
That [POL*] is always achievable is
warranted by the fact that any propositional i
is equivalent to a message, and that any
message is a combination of querying and
resulting data encoded in the same set of
symbols of the chosen language
(alternatively: every p can be transformed into
a request of whether p plus a result, but more
on this in the next section). The polarization of
i into Q + R offers several advantages. We
shall exploit four of them.
First, [POL*] highlights the need to specify
the context (C) in which, the level of
abstraction (LoA) at which, and the purpose
(P) for which the query is formulated and
hence it is expected to be satisfied by the
result. For the sake of simplicity, below I shall
refer to the combination of these three
parameters by means of the acronym CLP.
The first two requirements were stressed by
Austin (1950). “Where is the beer?” is asked
by someone in some specific circumstance
(the context), by relying on a specific
granularity of discourse or detail, what I have
called LoA. In our example, there might be no
beer (if no beer has been purchased) or, if the
sender of the query knows that some beer
has been purchased, answering that “the beer
is somewhere” would amount to a joke or a
mistake in the choice of LoA, if the sender
wishes to know the precise location of the
148 Luciano Floridi
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beer, e.g. left in the car or carried inside the
house or placed in the fridge. The third
requirement was stressed by Strawson
(1964). LoAs are always teleological and
queries are formulated (results are offered) for
a purpose, even if the purpose might be
implicit. In the example, one may wish to
make sure that the beer has been placed in
the fridge and not left in the car, for example.
To recall a Fregean point, queries cannot
acquire their specific meaning in isolation or
independently of their CLP parameters. It is a
bit of a pain, but we need to keep these
variables in mind, lest the conceptual mess
becomes unmanageable. So, as a memory
aid, let me revise [POL*] by adding a
combined index, thus:
[POL] i
CLP
= [Q + R]
CLP
A second advantage of the polarization of i
into Q + R is that it makes evident the role of
R, which is to saturate Q, to adapt another
Fregean idea lately borrowed by information
theory.
9
Although it is trivial to apply [POL] to
any piece of information, p, like “the beer is in
the fridge”, in order to obtain:
[Ex. 1] Query Where is the beer?” +
Result “In the fridge” =
Information “The beer is in the fridge”
it is important to keep in mind that the
correct interpretation of i
CLP
= [Q + R]
CLP
in
[POL] is not as (i) a request for confirmation or
(ii) a test, but as (iii) a genuine request to
erase a data deficit through saturation. The
difference is that, in (i) and (ii), the sender of
the query already holds the information that p,
but wishes to double-check it, or to check
whether the receiver also holds that
information; whereas in (iii), the sender lacks
the information that p and wishes to acquire it
from the receiver by obtaining the missing
data. Having said this, let me hasten to clarify
a point that might be a source of potential
confusion. The polarization of i does not really
involve two agents. I shall speak sometimes
as if the querying sender and the saturating
receiver were two different entities, but this is
9
In information theory saturation is the condition at
which a communications system reaches its maximum
capacity of traffic-handling.
only for heuristic purposes and ease of
treatment. It is i that is being polarised, so
sender and receiver are really the same
entity. If you need an intuitive representation,
imagine a language in which Mary can make
statements not by uttering declarative
sentences, but only by formulating questions
followed by the appropriate answers. Her
language does not enable her to say: “The
beer is in the fridge” but only “Where is the
beer? In the fridge”.
The third advantage is set-theoretic.
Adopting a standard extensional theory of
questions,
10
it is easy to see that [POL] allows
us to treat “is correctly saturated by” as a
relation r from a countable set of queries A =
{Q | Q A} to a countable set of results B =
{R | R B}. Note that r is not a function
because two or more propositional i, e.g. “the
beer is in the fridge” and “the beer is in the
kitchen” are analysed as “where is the beer?”
+ “in the fridge” and “where is the beer?” + “in
the kitchen”, thus mapping the same Q
1
both
to R
1
and to R
2
(see Figure 1). In section six,
we shall see that the real crux is to provide an
analysis of correctness that does not beg the
question.
Figure 1: The relation “is correctly saturated by” assigns
to each query Q in A at least one result R in B.
4. Third step: Normalization
In real life, queries and results share, in
variable proportions, the amount of semantic
content that is to be found in the
corresponding semantic information. In [Ex.
1], the full semantic content to be found in “the
beer is in the fridge” is allocated partly to Q,
10
This is a rather standard approach, see Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1994) and Szabolcsi (1997).
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which contains a request for location and a
reference to the object to be located, and
partly to R, which contains a reference to the
requested location of the object to be located.
Although a step forward in the disassembling
process, this is still unsatisfactory because it
makes it very hard to quantify – precisely,
consistently and uniformly across the whole
class of Qs + Rs – how much content is
allocated to which side of the polarised
information. In order to uncover what lies
under the thick layer of content, it would be
useful to shovel it all on one side, by shifting
all the content, still embedded in R, to the left,
until R is completely streamlined. At the same
time, however, weakening R should not lead
to an over-strengthening of Q into a rhetorical
question, since a question that requires no
answer would be a mere transliteration of i
itself and would only defy the purpose.
Luckily, a little trick from information theory
comes to our rescue: we can reach the right
balance, in shifting all the content on the side
of the queries, by normalising them into
yes/no questions, that is (again the asterisk
reminds us that the formula is only a first
approximation):
[NORM*] [Q + R]
CLP norm
[Q
0/1
+ A
0/1
]
CLP
The intended interpretation of [NORM*] is
that a query Q and a result R, both CLP-
parameterised, can be normalised into a
Boolean Question Q and a Boolean Answer A
(the 0/1 subscripts are there to remind us of
their Boolean nature), equally CLP-
parameterised. This is very much easier done
than said, so let us look at our example again.
By applying [NORM*] to [Ex. 1], we obtain:
[Ex. 2] Question “Is the beer in the fridge?” +
Answer “Yes”=
Information “The beer is in the fridge”
Of course, this is not what happens in the
real world, where one cannot expect a
querying sender to be able always to
maximise the content of her questions, for she
often lacks much more than just a positive or
negative saturation. However, recall that we
are disassembling semantic information as a
given artefact: all the content is already
provided, and hence some idealization, typical
of controlled experiments, is perfectly
reasonable. Recall also that [NORM*] does not
really involve two agents. This time, imagine
Mary being able to state that the beer is in the
fridge only by uttering “is the beer in the
fridge? Yes”.
Once again, [NORM*] offers several nice
advantages for our analysis, four of which will
be immediately useful for our next step.
The first advantage is syntactic: following
standard programming languages,
11
we can
now interpret “+”in [POL] and [NORM*] more
precisely as a concatenation operator,
whereby a string Q and a string A are locked
together to form a longer string i.
The second advantage is semantic: it is
now easy to see that it is really Q and not A
that sets the scope of the CLP parameters. A
Boolean answer can only endorse the context
(C) in which, the level of abstraction (LoA) at
which, and the purpose (P) for which the
Boolean question is formulated; it can neither
change nor challenge them. So we can revise
[NORM*] thus:
[NORM] [Q + R]
CLP norm
0/1
CLP
0/1
AQ
The third advantage is set-theoretic: the
normalization transforms the relation r “is
correctly saturated by” into a function f from a
still countable domain of Boolean questions A
{Q | Q A} to a codomain of only two possible
Boolean answers {Yes, No}. Figure 2 provides
a graphical illustration.
Figure 2: The function f (= is correctly saturated by)
assigns to each Boolean question Q in A exactly one
Boolean answer (either Yes or No) in B. Note that Q
3
, for
example, corresponds to a negative truth, e.g. “the red
11
For example in BASIC, C++, Java, Pascal, and
Python.
150 Luciano Floridi
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
wine is not in the fridge” in the case in which the fridge
does not contain any red wine
Correctness is now a functional concept,
but it is still premature to investigate it. At this
stage, what matters is that the dramatic
downsizing of the codomain of the function
represents the extensional counterpart of a
fourth, informational advantage: [NORM] shifts
all the content in i to Q. We have seen that
this re-location of content is what motivates
the normalization in the first place. To
understand how it works and why it is useful,
we need to recall a few other elementary facts
in information theory.
As is well-known, given a set of N
equiprobable symbols, information theory
quantifies the amount of information in a
symbol thus:
log
2
(N) = bits of information per symbol
It follows that a coin (N = 2), by producing a
head (h) or tail (t), delivers at most (if it is fair)
1 bit of information, whereas two coins (N =
4), deliver at most (again, if they are both fair)
2 bits of information (e.g. <h, t>), and so forth.
Imagine now a biased coin, which makes
obtaining h more likely. The more biased the
coin is, the more likely h is, the less
information is provided by the answer, the
smaller the information deficit becomes, up to
the point when, if both sides of the coin are
heads, the bias is total, the probability of h is
1, the information conveyed by h is 0 bit and
so is the receiver’s information deficit. All this
means that, since [NORM] transforms queries
into yes/no questions that can be answered
by tossing a coin A with different degrees of
bias, the worst scenario is one in which Q
corresponds to an information deficit that
requires at most 1 bit of information from A to
be saturated. However, even a A
0/1
worth a
full bit of information fails to add anything, in
terms of semantic content, to what is already
contained in Q. It follows that, whatever the
specific semantic content in i is, [NORM] shifts
it entirely to Q, exactly as we wished.
As a consequence, we now have an
intuitive way of defining semantic content as
unsaturated information or, more formally:
[CONT] Content in i
CLP
= Content in
CLP
0/1
Q
= i
CLP
–A
0/1
= i
CLP
–n bit of information, for n = 0, 1
We have seen the case in which n = 1. For
n = 0, the semantic information i
CLP
, its
content and the content in
CLP
0/1
Q
overlap: this
is the case with rhetorical questions (“are you
joking?” when used to assert that you are
joking), pseudo-questions (“could you close
the door please?” asked in terms of a polite
request instead of “I would like you to close
the door”), self-answering questions (“were
the four evangelists more than three?”) and
tautological questions (“is a = a?” or “are
bachelors unmarried?” where the noun and
the qualification are both used not
mentioned). Still following [CONT], it becomes
easy to see how p and ¬ p may have exactly
the same semantic content while counting as
very different information.
[CONT] is not just interesting in itself but
provides a reassuring test, since it is perfectly
consistent with a theory of strongly semantic
information (Floridi (2004c)). In particular, it
shows that tautologies and contradictions are
pure semantic contents, equally uninformative
or, to phrase it differently, that they provide no
semantic information about their referents,
over and above their contents (in both cases
the coin we are tossing has two identical
sides, as it were). This is as it should be, so
our reverse engineering seems to be
proceeding in the right direction.
5. Fourth step: Verification and
Validation
We have now disassembled semantic
information into two components. By
combining [POL] and [NORM], the result can be
more succinctly formulated thus:
[PN] i
CLP
=
0/1
CLP
0/1
AQ
Let us now scrutinize each component
separately.
On the one hand, we have seen that Q
0/1
sets the CLP parameters. Since it provides all
the content in i, Q
0/1
also identifies its referent,
that is, what i is about. We can express all this
more precisely by saying that
CLP
0/1
Q
identifies
a system s (the referent of i) and provides all
the semantic content (the content in i) for a
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model of s (namely,
0/1
CLP
0/1
AQ
) within a
given context, at a particular LoA and for a
purpose.
On the other hand, although
CLP
0/1
Q
in [PN] is
still neither a test nor a request for
confirmation but a request for saturation,
clearly the sort of saturation in question can
no longer be a matter of content, as it was in
[POL]. A
0/1
acts only as a Boolean key, that
either fails to apply at all (see ¬ A
0/1
in Figure
3) or that applies and then either locks or
unlocks the content provided by
CLP
0/1
Q
, thus
generating a partial model (henceforth just
model) of the targeted system. Once again, a
conceptual distinction and some technical
vocabulary from software engineering (Fox
(2007)) can help to clarify this crucial point.
Software Verification and Validation (V&V)
is the overall process of checking the “fitness
for purpose” of an artefact, by ensuring that
the software being developed or modified:
a) complies with some given specifications,
regulations or pre-conditions imposed at
the start of the development process; and
b) accomplishes its intended purpose,
meeting its requirements.
The two phases are complementary.
In phase (a), called verification (no relation
at all with the philosophical concept), one
checks whether one is constructing (or has
constructed) what one has (or had) planned to
construct, that is, whether the artefact is being
developed in the right way. This means
evaluating the consistency, completeness and
correctness of the software during the stages
of its development life cycle.
In phase (b), known as validation (again, no
relation with the logical concept either), one
checks whether one is constructing what is
required, that is, whether the right artefact is
being developed. This means evaluating the
correctness of the final software with respect
to the user’s needs and requirements.
The V&V process applies to a variety of
artefacts and products and helps to clarify the
twofold role played by A
0/1
in [PN]. Let me first
show how by relying on our example [Ex. 2].
Given the question “is the beer in the fridge?”,
any Boolean answer – independently of
whether it is “yes” or “no” – implicitly verifies
(in the V&V sense) that the question complies
with the pre-conditions (i.e., the specifications)
regulating its proper formulation, including its
context, LoA and purpose. A question like “Is
the fridge in the beer?” fails to qualify as
something that can receive either a “yes” or a
“no” answer because it fails the verification
check, since it blatantly fails to develop the
semantic artefact in the right way. Once the
question is verified – once it is shown to have
been formulated properly – the specific
answer, either “yes” or “no”, validates (gives a
green or a red light to) its content. If this
process seems to be prone to error recall that
we started by assuming p in order to obtain Q
and A, so the possibility of re-obtaining p by
re-combining Q and A is a priori guaranteed
by hypothesis and sceptical suggestions
would merely be out of place here.
All this can be formulated more precisely by
saying that A
0/1
saturates
CLP
0/1
Q
by implicitly
verifying its CLP parameters (roughly: both
“yes” and “no” implicitly signal that the
question is being asked in the right context, at
the right LoA and for the right purpose) and
explicitly validating its content, as a model of
the system (roughly: “yes” and “no” provide a
green or a red light for the question
respectively). Figure 3 summarises how far
we have progressed in reverse engineering
semantic information.
152 Luciano Floridi
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
Figure 3: Summary of the first four steps in the Analysis of semantic information. The process starts with Q
0/1
on the left.
Clearly, a correct saturation consists in a
correct verification and a correct validation. It
has taken several clarifications and
distinctions and quite a bit of technical
vocabulary, but we have finally reached the
heart of our problem.
6. Step five: Correctness
Let us quickly review our progress.
Simplifying, we now know that p qualifies as
semantic information about a system s if and
only if p is true; that p is true if and only if A
correctly saturates the Boolean question Q
corresponding to p; and that A correctly
saturates Q if and only if it correctly verifies
and validates it, thus generating an adequate
model m of s. Having reduced truth (of
semantic information) to adequacy (of the
corresponding model m) via correctness (of A
with respect to Q), our next challenge is the
analysis of the correctness of A.
The challenge consists in negotiating two
crossroads in a row. The first is represented
by the twofold correctness of the saturation.
Let me just highlight the fact that the correct
verification of Q by A is a formal precondition
for the development of an adequate model m
of the targeted system s: it is necessary for,
but does not contribute to, the truthfulness of
i. In other words, the analysis of the
correctness of the verification cannot help us
in understanding what it means for semantic
information to be truthful. At this crossroad,
the really interesting path is represented by
the correct validation of Q by A. By following
it, we encounter the second crossroad,
represented by two further alternatives. For
now we can either analyse correctness of the
validation in terms of some concept of truth,
thus showing consistency but also failing to
provide a non-circular analysis of what it
means for semantic information to be true. Or
we can move forward, and check whether a
further reduction of the correctness of the
validation and hence of the adequacy of the
issuing model in terms that are truth-poietic
but not truth-dependent is possible. Let us
quickly review the circular path first.
A useful way to test whether our reverse
engineering process is still on the right track is
by showing that we have not lost touch with
our starting point. Statistics provides the
standard analysis of what it means for a
model to be adequate (Freedman et al.
(2007)). A model is adequate with respect to
its target system if it is valid. This is now the
statistical (not the software engineering or the
logical) concept of validity, which is to be
understood as the result of a combination of
accuracy and precision, two other technical
concepts borrowed from statistics. Although
one might have the impression that we are
actually gaining some new ground, it is easy
to see that this road only leads back to our
starting point. For statistical accuracy is the
degree of conformity of a measure or
calculated parameter (belonging to the model)
to its actual, that is, true, value (belonging to
the system). And statistical precision is the
degree to which further measurements or
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calculations show the same or similar results
(this is why it is also called reproducibility or
repeatability). So it turns out that the statistical
concepts of validity, accuracy and precision –
even assuming that we could adapt them to
our less quantitative needs and hence exploit
them to clarify what we mean by an adequate
model – ultimately presuppose a truth-
dependent relation of conformity and hence
cannot provide a foundational analysis of truth
itself without begging the question. The silver
lining in all this is that such internal coherence
is reassuring: we have not got lost in some
conceptual wilderness, while searching for the
mechanism that generates semantic
information. Encouraged by the knowledge
that we could still go back to square one
should we wish to do so, let us not press the
panic button but push forward.
The second path should lead us away from
semantics and epistemology, if we want to
avoid ending up back where we started, and
take us into the realm of pragmatics, that is,
the realm of actual and hopefully successful
interactions – between an agent a holding the
information that p, the model m generated by
p, and the system s modelled by m – that can
provide some exogenous grounding for the
evaluation of the quality of the model itself. In
order to achieve this, I shall ask the reader to
bear with me a bit longer, as I need to
introduce two more technical concepts to
make sense of such interactions.
One is that of proxy, and is borrowed from
Information and Communication Technology
(Luotonen (1998)). Technically, it refers to a
computer agent (e.g., a network service)
authorized to act on behalf of another agent
(the client), e.g., by allowing another computer
to make indirect network connections to other
network services (the server). In this sense, a
proxy can be an interface for services that are
remote, resource-intensive, or otherwise
difficult to use directly. Note that the “proxy-
ing” system need not be a copy, an image, a
representation or a reproduction of the “proxy-
ed” system (the client).
The other concept is that of commutative
diagram, and is borrowed from category
theory (Barr and Wells (1999)). Technically, it
refers to a diagram of objects (vertices) and
morphisms (arrows) such that, when selecting
two vertices, one can follow any directed path
through the diagram and obtain the same
result by composition.
Adapting these two concepts to our needs,
we can now reverse engineer the correctness
of the validation, and hence the adequacy of
the ensuing model, in terms of the
commutativity of the accessibility relation, thus
(see Figure 4 for a more intuitive presentation,
all Greek letters in [COR] refer to paths in the
diagram in Figure 4):
[COR] A
0/1
correctly validates
CLP
0/1
Q
about a
target system s identified by
CLP
0/1
Q
if
and only if
CLP
0/1
Q
+ A
0/1
generates (β)
an adequate model m of s; and m is
an adequate model of s if and only if
m is a proxy (δ) of s such that, if a
holds (α)
+ A
0/1
, then a’s
proximal access (γ) to m commutes
with a’s distal access (ε) to s.
Figure 4: The meaning of [COR]. Q+A is a simplification for
CLP
0/1
Q
+ A
0/1
.
[COR] offers two advantages and raises a
problem. The first advantage is that it finally
introduces an explicit reference to an informee
a. This is crucial, since semantic information
154 Luciano Floridi
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
is an objective (i.e., not subjective) but also
liminal (that is, neither internal nor external)
and relational (that is, neither absolute nor
relative) concept, like food. It makes little
sense to talk about the presence and nature
of food without any reference to the specific
type of feeder. Likewise, something counts as
semantic information only with respect to a
specific type of informee.
The second advantage is that [COR]
explains the well-known fact that semantic
information provides distal access to its target.
If the agent in the bedroom upstairs asks
whether the beer is located in the fridge, and
the agent in the kitchen downstairs answers
positively, then the agent upstairs, by having
proximal access to this overall piece of
information, gains distal access to the
presence of the beer in the fridge, as long as
the answer is correct. [COR] merely combines
this into a single agent’s informative state.
The problem concerns the interpretation of
the relation of distal and proximal
accessibility. If we were to interpret it
alethically or epistemically this would
obviously fail to take us off the semantic
merry-go-round and, sooner rather than later,
we would be sent back where we came from.
The good news is that we do not need to go
down that modal road. On the contrary, the
sort of accessibility at stake here is a matter of
pragmatic or factual interaction, which
provides an exogenous grounding of
correctness. It is the one that we find specified
in computer science, where accessibility
refers to the actual permission to read
(technically, sense and retrieve) and/or write
(again, technically modify and record) data as
a physical process. The result is that a’s
proximal access to m commutes with a’s distal
access to s if and only if a can read/write s by
reading/writing m.
The writing of s through the writing of m is
admittedly rare, but it is useful to illustrate it in
order to convey the sense of concrete
interaction with the targeted system that is
involved. Thus, we have left behind a magic
culture that considered it an ordinary
phenomenon (cf. the practice of sticking pins
in a doll as a method of cursing an individual).
Nevertheless, self-fulfilling prophecies (Bill
Gates confessing that “Microsoft’s shares are
overvalued”), performative sentences (the
baptising priest declaring that “the name of
this girl is Mary”), magic-placebo formulae
(the guru concluding that “you are now
healed”), authoritative-fictional descriptions
(“Sherlock Holmes never visited the Bodleian
Library” written by Conan Doyle), God’s
intellectual intuition that p, according to Kant,
and other ways of “doing things with words”
(“this train is not leaving the station” uttered by
a dictator) are a good reminder that it is far
from impossible to modify/record a system by
accessing only its model. Of course, access to
m is most commonly used in order to read
(i.e., sense and retrieve) s by reading (ditto)
m. One gains distal access to (part of) the
actual, physical system represented by the
fridge in the kitchen and its contents (one
senses and retrieves the data in question at a
distance) by gaining proximal access to its
(partial) model represented by the semantic
information “the beer is in the fridge”. A way of
conveying the same point is by relying on a
subjunctive formulation: the proximal
read/write access to m as a proxy of s
commutes with the distal read/write access to
s if and only by having read/write access to m
one were having read/write access to s. This
happens in space as well as time: imagine the
question being “Will the train leave from
platform one?” and the answer being “yes”.
Semantic information may be seen as a way
of being telepresent (Floridi (2005b)).
We needed actual interaction with the
system being modelled in order to ground
exogenously the correctness of the (validation
provided by the) answer to the question
pertaining to it, and we have now obtained it.
Our toiling is almost over. Putting together this
last piece of our jigsaw puzzle, we obtain
Figure 5 (the reader may check that this is
simply the result of merging Figure 3 and
Figure 4, even if this may not be immediately
obvious visually):
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Figure 5: The Correctness Theory of Truth.
Figure 5 represents the blueprint of the
mechanism that underlies the truthful nature
of semantic information. If we apply it to our
example, we obtain:
1. “the beer is in the fridge” qualifies as
semantic information if and only if
2. “the beer is in the fridge” is true; this is the
case if and only if
3. “yes” is the correct answer to (i.e., correctly
saturates by correctly verifying and
validating) the question “is the beer in the
fridge?”; this is the case if and only if
4. “is the beer in the fridge?” + “yes” generate
an adequate model m of the relevant
system s; this is the case if and only if
5. m is a proxy of s and proximal access to m
provides distal access to s; and finally this
is the case if and only if
6. reading/writing m enables one to read/write
s.
That is, if “the beer is in the fridge” qualifies
as semantic information, then holding that
semantic information is tantamount to
accessing the particular feature of the system
addressed by the model which, in our
example, is the location of the beer inside the
fridge.
7. Conclusion
We have come to the end of a rather long
journey. The hope is that the effort might have
been rewarding both in itself, if it has been
clear enough, and in terms of the final result, if
it has been sufficiently convincing. At this
point, the reader will probably wish me to
keep this conclusion as short as possible. I
shall oblige, by adding only a final comment.
Theories of truth often seem to be
developed with passive viewers of an outside
world in mind, detached observers, whether
inside or outside Plato’s cave, TV watchers,
radio listeners, movie goers, in short, systems
users, according to the computer science
terminology favoured in this article. The
correctness theory of truth, proposed in the
previous pages, should rather be seen as an
attempt to cater for a different sort of
customer, namely embodied and embedded,
creative agents, who interact with reality,
shape and build it, Plato’s artisans, writers not
just readers, players not audience, in short
systems designers. To these customers, truth
is about constructing and handling artefacts
and interacting with them successfully, not
merely experiencing them passively.
Unfortunately, this is not very Greek, but it is
still a very respectable tradition to which both
Russell and Tarski belong, insofar as their
156 Luciano Floridi
CC: Creative Commons License, 2009.
groundwork in model theory concerned the
design of systems.
12
12
A first version of the paper was then presented at
the I International Meeting of Experts in Information
Theories (Leon, Spain, 6-7 November, 2008) and I am
very grateful to Francisco Salto for his kind invitation and
to the audience for the lively and valuable discussion. I
would also like to acknowledge the help, useful comments
and criticisms by Patrick Allo, Mark Jago, Sebastian
Sequoiah-Grayson, and Matteo Turilli. I remain deeply
indebted to Michael Dummett and Susan Haack for their
clarifications and feedback, which date to almost twenty
years ago. I am afraid this paper has been a work in
progress for quite some time. Joanna Gillies kindly
copyedited the last version. All the aforementioned people
helped me to improve the paper substantially but they are
not responsible for any remaining mistakes.
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About the Author
Luciano Floridi
(Laurea, Rome University “La Sapienza”, Mphil and Ph.D. Warwick, M.A. Oxford) is professor of Philosophy at the
University of Hertfordshire, where he holds the Research Chair in Philosophy of Information, and Fellow of St Cross
College, University of Oxford. He is the founder and director of the IEG, Oxford University Information Ethics research
Group, and of the GPI, the University of Hertfordshire research Group in Philosophy of Information. In 2006, he was elected
President of IACAP (International Association for Computing And Philosophy). He is the first philosopher to have been
elected Gauss Professor by the Göttingen Academy of Sciences. In 2009, the American Philosophical Association awarded
him the Barwise Prize, in recognition of his research on the philosophy of information. Floridi is best known as the founder of
two major areas of research: Information Ethics and the Philosophy of Information. His research interests include the
Philosophy of Information, Information and Computer Ethics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Logic and the History and
Philosophy of Scepticism. His forthcoming books are the Handbook of Information and Computer Ethics for Cambridge
University Press, The Philosophy of Information, for Oxford University Press, and Information for Oxford University Press - A
Very Short Introduction series.